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PREFACE 
The European Union is mobilising considerable effort to cope with the major challenges confronting 
European society: in a context of increasing globalisation of  the economic activities, the EU has to 
ensure the implementation of a sustainable economic and  social development which takes account 
simultaneously of  the need to create jobs, to strengthen the level of  competitiveness of  companies, to 
fight  social  exclusion  and  to ensure  the protection of environment  and  the quality  of life  of its 
citizens. But, at the same time it has to anticipate and prepare for the needs for a new society based 
increasingly on knowledge and learning capacity of  its citizens. 
Socio-economic research,  carried out at the European level  through the projects financed  by the 
Targeted  Socio-Economic Research Programme (TSER) aims to contribute to the current debates 
on these  issues,  and  to  provide  the  European,  national  and  regional  decision-makers  with  new 
knowledge  which  could  enable  them  to  improve  the  definition  and  the  implementation  of their 
various policies . 
. This report is the result of a specific pilot action to establish the dialogue between researchers and 
decision-makers on the role that technology and innovation play in the economy. 
Having as a starting point the work undertaken in seven current TSER projects, this action, directed 
by Professor Bengt-Ake Lundvall, brought together a group of researchers from different disciplines 
and  schools of thought.  Together with political  decision-makers,  they debated the results of their 
research and sought to find answers to, and new insights into the following questions: 
•  What is the impact on innovation policies as a result of  the emergence of  a global economy, based 
increasingly on knowledge and learning? 
•  What  are  the  effects  of globalisation,  including  European  integration,  on  national  innovation 
systems? Do innovation systems develop towards greater European integration or towards greater 
fragmentation? 
•  What are the mechanisms which allow a better design of  research and development policies taking 
into account the phenomenon of  globalisation and learning? 
•  What is the most suitable political level of  intervention in this new context? 
Conclusions stress the need for greater co-ordination of  the various policies not only at the sectoral 
but also  at the transnational level in  order to better face the challenges of the globalisation.  Stress 
laid on the co-ordination of the research, innovation and  education policies supports the efforts of 
the European policy in these sectors which could find  increased effectiveness if  a similar approach 
were followed in the Member States.  These combined efforts would certainly contribute to better 
preparing us for the requirements of  the European society of  tomorrow. 
-3--4-Foreword and acknowledgements 
This report - a European Commission initiative - draws some provisional policy conclusions from the 
research  currently  being  carried  out  in  specific  European  projects  under  the  Targeted  Socio-
Economic Research (TSER) Programme of the EU.  In late spring 1997 the unit in charge of the 
programme in DG XII asked Professor Bengt-Ake Lundvall of Aalborg University (former Deputy 
Director for DSTI at the OECD) to take the lead in a pilot action to inform policy-makers of  findings 
from seven ongoing TSER projects. This entailed two meetings with project participants and other 
experts,  and more than 30 contributions from project members,  and  has resulted in the following 
report. 
One basic objective of the exercise has been to provide policy-makers with a reasonably coherent 
'world view' and with basic principles for policy-making on innovation in this new context. Another 
objective has been to point out research areas where more work is  needed.  These objectives have 
determined  the process for  producing  the report,  as  well  as  its  content  and  structure.  The  first 
meeting  in  Brussels  (24-25  April  1997)  gave  us  the  opportunity  to  present  TSER project  co-
ordinators and other invited contributors with a brief sketch of what we regard as the most salient 
transformations currently taking place in technological innovation at world level and in Europe. The 
participants suggested additional  elements,  features  and  corrections to this general framework,  as 
well as a number of specific topics to be addressed in the report. With this as a starting point, the 
major  lines  of the  report  were  drawn,  and  some  of the  participants  agreed  to  write  specific 
contributions. 
The report has extensively benefited from these and other forms of contributions.  Without th_em  it 
would never have been completed on time nor in its current form.  When writing/editing the report, 
we were faced with the difficult task of  trying to fit in the different contributions we received, while 
following a coherent line of argument. It has not been an  easy task, and we have undertaken major 
editing and writing in  order to preserve the coherence of the overall  report.  This  means that the 
report is not based exclusively on the preliminary results and findings of  the TSER projects and that 
we have also used other references and sources. 
A draft version of  the report was submitted in mid-September.  This served as a basis for a second 
meeting in  Brussels (29-30  September  1997) with TSER project coordinators,  and  other invited 
experts,  academics  and  national  and  EU policy-makers.  The  contents  of the  draft  report  were 
discussed,  and the valuable and  constructive comments made at these lengthy  sessions  served  as 
input for the authors producing this final version. 
Writing this report was possible only because of the collaboration and  enthusiasm of many people, 
first and foremost the commitment and vision of Achilleas Mitsos, Miroslav Bures, Virginia Vitorino 
and  Ronan  O'Brien,  who  launched  and  supported  this  initiative  technically  by  organising  the 
meetings in Brussels and with whom we have had on-going communication. 
We would like to thank all those who wrote special contributions for the report, namely Erik Arnold, 
Anthony Bartzokas, Patries Boekholt, Phillip Cooke, Johan Hauknes, Dylan Jones-Evans, Luis Sanz, 
- 5-Gert Schienstock, Simone Strambach and Peter Wood.  Without them this report would not have 
been possible. 
Special  thanks  should  also  go to Daniele  Archibugi,  Kristine Bruland,  Franyois  Chesnais,  Jesper 
Lindgaard  Christensen,  Giovanni Dosi,  Charles Edquist,  Dieter Ernst,  Jan Fagerberg,  Dominique 
Foray, Paul A.  Geroski, Ken Guy, Erik Iversen, Alexis Jacquemin, Andrew Jamison, Bjorn Johnson, 
David Keeble,  Mikel Landabaso, Franco Malerba,  Keith Pavitt,  Mario Pianta,  Sven  Otto Remoe, 
Margaret Sharp, Keith Smith, Rolf Sternberg, Michael Storper, Morris Teubal, Bart Verspagen and 
Hans Westling, who kindly sent us recent published and unpublished material, as well as invaluable 
comments on our draft version. 
We are also in intellectual debt to the many experts who commented the report in earlier versions at 
meetings and seminar. Still we are entirely responsible for the structure and content of  the report. 
Aalborg and Copenhagen 
December 1997 
Bengt-Ake Lundvall 
Susana Borras 
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1 
The challenges of  the globalising learning economy for innovation policy 
One of  the most fundamental trends in the economy over the last decades has been the accelerating 
rate  of innovation  and  change,  driven  by  intensified  competition  in  many  product  and  ·service 
markets. This reflects changes in sectors already exposed to international competition, and in those 
formerly protected. In other words, the faster rate of  innovation and change is closely related to the 
transition towards a global economy that has been taking place since the 1970s. There is little doubt 
about the importance and great impact on national and local economies of  today' s closer economic 
integration  in  the  form  of trade,  direct  foreign  investment,  world-wide  sourcing,  inter-firm 
collaboration and, not least, the increasingly global markets for financial assets. 
However,  globalisation is  not an  automatic,  unlimited  and  concluded  process.  Its real  forms  and 
limits are determined by phenomena,  some of which  are rooted in  political decisions while  others 
reflect technological developments. The globalisation of  production, trade and financial markets are 
strongly  interrelated  to  each  other  and  to  political  decisions  about  deregulation  and  market 
liberalisation.  There  is  also  a  strong  mutual  interdependence  between  globalisation  and  the 
development of  transport and communications technologies. The tendency towards globalisation has 
created  a  strong demand  for  new communications technologies,  and  in  tum the  development  of 
information  and  communications  technologies  (ICT}  has  helped  to  accelerate  the  process  of 
globalisation itself. 
Globalisation is, however, an asymmetric and unevenly distributed process. A closer look at flows of 
commodities and capital as well as of  patterns of  inter-firm co-operation points to the integration of 
multinational regions in America, Europe and Asia as the dominating aspect of internationalisation. 
And intemationalisation and globalisation is more developed in relation to some factors than others. 
Nowadays, the global dimension of financial  markets and flows is hardly questioned. The same can 
be said about trade in products and services, only to a lesser degree. The global dimension of other 
important factors of  production, such as labour and technological know-how, is even more limited. 
In  any  case,  and  despite  these  asymmetries,  globalisation  today  has  a  direct  impact  on  firms 
belonging to different industrial sectors and territories, through intensified competition. This means 
that  economic  performance  in  this  new  economic  context  increasingly  depends  directly  on  the 
learning ability of individuals,  firms,  regions and  countries.  Learning is  necessary both in  order to 
adapt to the rapidly evolving market and technical conditions and in order to achieve innovation of 
processes, products and forms of  organisation. 
One  of the  most  important  limits  of globalisation  is  the  spatial  mobility  of knowledge.  While 
information and codified knowledge can be easily transferred across the globe at low cost,  know-
1 There is no executive summary in the beginning of  this document but the busy reader may tum 
directly to chapter 11 which sums up the main argument and the major results of  the whole exercise. 
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how and tacit knowledge is not immediately transferable. In the learning economy crucial elements of 
knowledge remain specific and tacit,  and rooted in  specific organisations and locations.  This is the 
basic reason why patterns of  international specialisation in trade remain reasonably stable over time 
aad why technology gaps persist between regions and countries. 
Change and learning are two sides of the same coin.  Accelerating change confronts operators and 
organisations with new problems which demand new skills.  The market selection of change-oriented 
firms  further accelerates innovation and  change.  There is  nothing to indicate that the process will 
slow down in the near future. Rather, the deregulation of product markets and the entrance of new 
competitors on to the world market will give new momentum to the process. 
This  is  one  reason  why,  over the  next  couple  of decades,  innovation  policy  will  be  crucial  for 
economic  performance.  A  major  objective  must be to  contribute to the learning  ability  of firms, 
knowledge institutions and people, while at the same time coping with the possible negative effects 
of  the learning economy in terms of  social and regional polarisation. 
One major result of  this new economic context is thus that innovation policy is now more important 
than before. Globalisation, and especially the liberalisation of  financial markets, has drastically limited 
the  autonomy  of general  economic  policies  like  budgetary  and  monetary  policy.  This  loss  of 
autonomy in trade, monetary and finance policy gives a more important role to labour market policy, 
social policy, education policy and, not least, innovation policy, as essential factors for guaranteeing 
sustainable economic growth under these new conditions.  The increased importance of innovation 
reflects the fact that it represents  a  major  response to intensifying  competition by  enhancing the 
learning abilities of firms  and workers. Neither firms  nor regions  can establish sustainable  growt~ 
without innovation and learning. 
The scope of the challenges  posed  by  the globalising  learning  economy  requires  that  innovatiot 
policies should be reformulated to include a learning component.  In the EU context there are tw< 
dimensions that should be carefully taken into  account when  discussing  the contents of any  nev 
policy approach:  in the first place, the horizontal dimension, whereby different policy areas shoul1 
- 14-be effectively coordinated to produce synergies to enhance the learning ability of the system; and in 
the second place, the vertical dimension of  this coordination, where European, national and regional 
instruments  and  strategies  are  brought  into  line  with  this  new  approach,  complementing  and 
s,upporting each other in order to foster innovativeness throughout the EU. 
Accelerating innovation and increased competition leave policy-makers with a complex task.  There 
are three main lines of action that have to be taken into account when designing a broadly oriented 
innovation policy, namely: 
1.  Policies affecting the pressure for  change (competition policy,  trade policy  and  the  stance of 
general economic policy); 
2.  Policies  affecting  ability  to  innovate  and  absorb  change  (human  resource  development  and 
innovation policy); 
3.  Policies designed to take care of  losers in the game of change (social and regional policies with 
redistribution objectives). 
These policy areas need to be adjusted and coordinated horizontally in such a way that they promote 
innovation and growth without undermining social cohesion. This points to the need for horizontal 
coordination of sectoral policies that have traditionally been regarded as  more or less independent. 
There is  a need to create a minimum of congruence between these three sets of instruments.  The 
weaker the human resources, the less efficient would it be to accelerate innovation. The weaker the 
innovation  potential,  the  less  competition  the  system  can  absorb.  Competition  policy  might  be 
regarded as an instrument for effectively speeding up change, but it must be tuned and  adjusted to 
potential for innovation, human resource development and re-distributive goals. 
The vertical  dimension  of policy  coordination  is  also  crucial.  Since  the  mid-1980s,  new  policy 
instruments  have  increasingly  been  introduced  at  European  and  regional  level  to  address 
technological  development.  This  reflects  the  impact  of  political  developments  towards 
decentralisation and regionalisation in  many  national contexts,  and  the further  development  of the 
European integration process over the last 15 years. Each level of  policy-making has tended to focus 
on  the  three  different  aspects  of the  policy  moves  towards  innovation  listed  above.  The  new 
challenges posed by the globalising learning economy call for a reshuffling of policy responsibilities 
between local, regional, national and European levels. But, as we shall see later on in this repon. this 
does not necessarily imply delimiting in exclusive terms policy actions only at one single level. (Some 
measures  may  effectively  co-exist  at  the  three  levels,  for  example,  the  promotion  of innovation 
networks). A crucial element is the development of mutual learning across the three levels,  and  the 
creation of  institutions to gather a rich pool of  policy insight. 
Developing a new vision and policy paradigm 
The challenges posed by the globalising learning economy need policy responses that are based on an 
understanding of  the emergence of  this new socio-economic and organisational context in Europe. In 
the recent past the EU, national governments, and regional and local authorities have developed new 
- 15-policy instruments and reused old ones to tackle these emerging new challenges. However, in most 
cases this amounts to incremental adaptation of  old policy instruments rather than the introduction of 
radically new mechanisms,  and the response to the new trends is  implicit and  partial.  It is  useful, 
therefore,  to try to  provide  a  more  comprehensive  picture  of what  is  going  on in  the  field  of 
innovation. 
The aim of this report is to contribute to a new vision and policy paradigm at all levels of policy-
making  in  the  EU.  By  addressing  some  of the  most  salient  aspects  of the  globalising  learning 
economy and some of  the most important policy implications, we attempt to bridge the gap between 
policy-makers  and  academics  in  the  debate  about  the  role  of technology  and  innovation  in  the 
economy.  This is  an ambitious aim  given the theoretical framework in which the notion 'learning 
economy' is embedded, especially as this framework is rapidly evolving. The differences in forms and 
styles of  policy-making in Europe does not make the endeavour any easier. 
The TSER programme launched by the European Commission provides a unique opportunity in this 
context.  A  number  of on-going  TSER projects  address  issues  related  to innovation,  innovation 
systems  and  innovation  policy  in  the  context  of broader  socio-economic  issues,  and  represent 
up-to-date and extensive academic research based on theoretical, empirical and comparative analysis. 
The current report draws upon the provisional results of  seven different TSER projects:  "Innovation 
Systems  and  European  Integration"  (coordinator  Charles  Edquist),  "Technology,  Economic 
Integration  and  Social  Cohesion"  (coordinator Bart  Verspagen),  "Regional  Innovation  Systems: 
Designing  for  the  Future"  (coordinator  Phillip  Cooke),  "Services  in  Innovation,  Innovation  in 
Services"  (coordinator Johan  Hauknes),  "The  Strategic  Role  of Knowledge"  (coordinator  Peter 
Wood), "Networks, Collective Learning and RID in Regionally-Clustered High-Technology SMEs" 
(coordinator  David  Keeble),  and  the  project  "Universities,  Technology  Transfer  and  Spin-off 
Activities" (coordinator Dylan Jones-Evans). 
It is  important to emphasise that the results referred to in  this report are of a preliminary  nature, 
since the research is still in progress.  An evaluation of the full  impact of  the TSER programme (the 
final  results  of each  project  and  their  overall  contribution  to  policy-making)  is  not  intended. 
However, the empirical evidences, even though still preliminary, can contribute already to anatvsas of 
the innovation process and the impact of the globalising learning economy on European inno,·auon 
policy. 
However, the report is not based exclusively on the results of  TSER projects as it also incorporates 
other sets of  theoretical work and empirical evidence from important academic research. The a•m has 
been  to  maintain  a  clear  line  of argument  and  cohesion  in  the  report,  while  incorporating 
contributions and empirical studies from the seven specific projects where relevant. 
This report is a hybrid product. It is neither a typical theoretical and academic document nor a typica! 
policy report.  Theoretical debates are not analysed  in-depth and  empirical  data are presented  in  ~ 
condensed manner as illustrations and examples of  the main arguments. On the other hand, the rep or 
does not give recipes for policies,  with precise lists of policy instruments and  action to be taken 
Very little is said about policy implementation and the focus is on new policy principles rather that 
on  designing  specific  instruments.  We  hope that,  because of its hybrid  nature,  the report will  b 
useful for both worlds:  for the policy-makers, by providing a clear picture of  the current changes i: 
- 16-the working of  the economy and their implications for innovation policy; and for the academics, by 
providing something closer to a practitioner's approach and stimulating them to develop further the 
specific implications that their research can have on policy-making. Finally, it is up to the reader to 
judge if  this kind of  hybrid report is of  any use. 
It follows that the conclusions and recommendations in the report are no substitute for the process of 
policy  deliberation  and  decision.  Here,  the  practical  experience  of the  policy-makers,  their 
accumulated know-how from the implementation of  previous instruments, and their understanding of 
the  new  socio-economic  context  must  play  a  major  role  in  identifying  specific  bottlenecks  and 
problems in the system, and developing appropriate new instruments to tackle them. This is also true 
because  the  EU Member  States  are  so  diverse.  The  differences  in  terms  of size,  population, 
economy, etc. become obvious when examining the economic and institutional characteristics of  the 
respective national  systems of innovation.  Innovative  performance varies  greatly across industrial 
sectors and regions in Europe. This diversity,  and  the many levels of government involved,  means 
that it would be futile to present a comprehensive list of specific policy recommendations.  Instead, 
the report aims to establish a common mindset that can apply across different policy areas and levels 
of decision-making.  If this  common  mindset  reflects  a  shared  analytically-based  interpretation  of 
what is  happening in  the world,  it  will  be a  powerful  tool  for  coordinating policies,  horizontally 
across policy areas and, vertically through the different levels of  government. 
The contents of the report 
The report is divided into three parts. Part I contains three chapters, which summarise the challenges 
raised  by  the  current globalisation  trends  in  the  learning  economy.  Chapter 2  covers  the  major 
features of the globalisation process and the changes that have been taking place over the last two 
decades in relation to the innovation process. We argue that the role of  tacit and codified knowledge 
in the economy deserves special  attention as  the basis for new transformations towards a learning 
economy. The modes of  knowledge production and distribution have been changing, and tacitness is 
a  key  element  in  the  effective  exploitation  of innovative  opportunities,  despite  the  growing 
importance of  the trend towards codification, with the expansion of  information and communications 
infrastructure. 
Chapter 3 then considers the implications that these new trends have for policy design. It elaborates 
on the fact  that a new rationale for public action is  emerging in  relation to a broader theoretical 
insight of the role of public actors in  the system.  Market failure  is  no  longer the exclusive policy 
rationale:  other complex and dynamic bottlenecks in the system need to be considered too. Of  these, 
we pick out three different dilemmas, together with the question of  social and regional polarisation in 
the  learning  economy.  Taking  this  point  further,  the  chapter  states  the  need  for  a  new  policy 
paradigm based on the learning abilities of  the system. Three main ideas are developed here:  firstly, 
the need for policy strategies with an integrative and  coordination-oriented perspective (horizontal 
and vertical coordination) which can create synergies through different policy mechanisms; secondly, 
policy should focus  on  institutional and  individual  learning,  i.e.  the primary goal of policy  action 
should be to develop the learning abilities of  the system; and thirdly, the new policy paradigm should 
recognise that policy-making itself should be a learning process. 
- 17-Chapter 4 takes this point further.  The new learning approach has essentially a systemic perspective 
where public action is  one of a number of elements that define  the peculiarities of the innovation 
process  in  a  given  territory.  Consequently,  the  capacity  of policy-makers  and  institutions  to 
uaderstand, adapt and  anticipate policy demands by designing optimal policy instruments is crucial 
for  the  system's  performance.  This  chapter  summarises  the  nature  of policy  change  and  policy 
learning, and identifies three general ways of  enhancing it in the area of  innovation policy. 
Part IT of  the report is the most extensive one,  containing six chapters devoted to different specific 
aspects of  the innovation process and of policy areas which influence them.  Chapter 5 analyses the 
role  of basic  science  and  science  policies  in  innovation  systems.  The  interaction  between basic 
science  and  innovation  is  complex  and  changes  across  scientific  disciplines,  technologies  and 
industrial  sectors.  The  chapter  emphasises  some  overlooked  positive  effects  of basic  scientific 
research on performance,  and  especially science's contribution to the tacit knowledge base of the 
system by training students in scientific methods. 
Chapter 6 addresses two crucial elements in the innovation system: organisational change and  h~..1man 
resource development.  Intensified competition forces firms  and  organisations to find  new ways of 
doing  things.  Flexible  structures  within  a  firm  mean  that  the  firm  becomes  less  hierarchically 
organised,  that  there  is  more  interaction  between  departments,  and  that  problem-solving  is  the 
predominant  style.  Similarly,  human  resource development  is  crucial  for  a firm's  adaptability and 
learning ability.  The human skills required are no longer exclusively 'technical knowledge' but rather 
a person's capacity to learn  and  to  develop  communication  and  co-operation skills.  The  chapter 
analyses the ways in which public policies can enhance both trends and how,  through a 'new new 
deal',  they  can  improve  the  learning  ability  of poor learners,  who  would  otherwise  tend  to be 
excluded and marginalised in the learning economy. 
Inter-firm co-operation and networks are other aspects of  the new flexible mode of production, and 
are discussed  in  Chapter 7.  Firms can no  longer,  produce the knowledge required to launch new 
products or production processes in isolation. Networks are forms of  organisation in between market 
and hierarchy,  and  they are increasingly seen as interesting ways for  policy-makers to enhance the 
strengths of  the innovation system.  This is why there has been an increase in the number of public 
actions  at  regional,  national  and  EU  level  to  enhance  industrial  networking  in  recent  years. 
However,  we point  out that  networks  also  mean  costs  for  the  individual  partners  and  risks  of 
technological lock-in for the system. Therefore public action should focus on those costs and risks as 
well, anticipating negative impacts and contributing to the renewal of  networks. 
There has been a general tendency in innovation studies to focus mainly on the manufacturing sector. 
Chapter  8  considers  a  different  angle  by  looking  at  the  role  of the  service  sector,  and  more 
specifically  the  knowledge-intensive  service  sector,  in  the  learning  economy.  Service  firms  are 
increasingly becoming powerful  actors in  the innovation process,  as both producers and  users of 
innovations. Knowledge-intensive service firms interact with all kinds of  firms and play a special role 
in absorbing, transforming and distributing tacit knowledge in relation to technical and organisational 
change. The problems that the report identifies are mainly problems of access. Most clients of  thes~ 
service firms are large companies located in high-income and densely populated regions of the EU 
Public action should encourage the use of service firms by SMEs and in the less-favoured regions o: 
theEU. 
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countries to achieve innovation-oriented objectives not met when the market is left to itself The US 
model, used mainly for defence contracting, is  one of the best known.  It has  awarded contracts to 
firms  and institutions to develop technologies and products not yet on the market, and  has actively 
encouraged their dissemination for commercial purposes.  Some European countries are successfully 
using this policy instrument to encourage innovators to produce energy-efficient,  environmentally-
friendly and other socially desirable products. However, this potential is  still not exploited in  other 
countries, and we conclude that the EU could play a more active role in encouraging the use of  this 
instrument at European level too. 
Chapter  I 0  examines  the  role  of increased  competition  in  accelerating  the  innovation  process. 
Competition and co-operation coexist and there is a tendency for inter-firm co-operation to become 
more  important  as  competition  intensifies.  The  chapter  argues  that  alliances  are  increasingly 
becoming more global and that EU firms  should be given more encouragement to take part.  It also 
argues that increased competition has important effects on  social and territorial disparities,  so  there 
we  need  a  broader  definition  of competition  policy  which  takes  this  into  account.  The  chapter 
concludes that there might actually be a strong need for global agreement to slow down the rate of 
change. 
In Chapter 11  we sum up the report by presenting a skeleton model of the vision of the world that 
lies behind the whole analysis and we put forward some policy recommendations which we consider 
particularly important in the new context.  We suggest two strategies for stimulating innovation:  a 
narrow and conventional one, the main objective of which is  to speed up the rate of innovation to 
strengthen European competitiveness, and another one that explicitly takes into account the costs of 
rapid  change, including social  and  environmental costs.  At the very end,  we mention briefly  some 
areas where we see a specific need for further TSER research. 
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Introduction 
Globalisation  trends  and  significant  changes  in  the  innovation  process  are  two  parallel  and 
interrelated phenomena influencing decisively the current context of the global economy. European 
firms, regions and states are obviously exposed to both, and are facing growing pressure from world 
market tendencies through more intense price and non-price competition.  This applies not only to 
manufactured products, but also to the tertiary sector.  As  the report will  show,  services are also 
directly affected by these transformations and pressures, and in some cases simultaneously become 
agents of  organisational and innovative change in the manufacturing sector. 
As stated in the introductory chapter, the changes in these two important parameters of economic 
growth have important policy implications, especially for innovation policies at regional, national and 
European levels.  However, before discussing the implications of the new scenario for innovation 
policies in Europe, we need to review the patterns behind these trends, by taking a brief look at the 
nature, complexities and limits of  globalisation, and current changes in the innovation process. This 
review will lead later on in the chapter to a discussion of  the gradual transformation of  the European 
economy into  a learning economy.  Here, the key  to economic performance is  no longer a given 
knowledge base, nor information access capacities as such,  but rather the ability of economic and 
productive actors to exploit these optimally by adapting rapidly to ever-changing market conditions 
and developing new capabilities as old ones become obsolete. 
At the very end of the chapter we identify social and  regional  polarisation as the major negative 
aspects  of the learning  economy,  with  consequences  for  innovation  policy.  The  acceleration  of 
change  reflects  policies  related  to  competition  and  trade,  and  in  turn  is  reflected  in  social  and 
regional polarisation that call for social and regional policies. Innovation policy affects the ability to 
promote and  master change  at company  level,  and  we should  therefore  consider  how it  can be 
integrated  into  broader policy  strategies,  given  the  established  division  of policy  responsibilities 
between regional, national and European authorities. 
Major features and effects of  globalisation
2 
Most scholars agree that developments from the 1970s onwards have provided greater impetus for 
transforming and globalising market transactions and  industrial  production. Different political  and 
economic developments have determined the current configuration of  the world economy and its on-
going integration. The most salient political events of  the late 1980s and all through the 1990s have 
related to the profound transformation of  Eastern European political and economic systems and the 
dissolution of  the bi-polar system, which have changed the dynamics of  international politics. In the 
2 Important aspects of  the globalisation process are analysed in the Verspagen TSER-project on 
Technology, Economic integration and Social cohesion. See for instance Ietto-Gillies (1997). 
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regional stability, the North-South divide,  or the process of trade regionalisation acquire a different 
dimension. This change in the political climate and the current rapid trend towards globalisation since 
the mid-seventies are two deeply interrelated processes. This is not to say that there is a clear causal 
link between them,  but merely that it is  difficult  to disassociate them in  the macro-analytical  and 
historical perspective of  the last three decades. 
The process of  globalisation and market integration is also the consequence of some specific events 
in the international political economy.  The liberalisation of trade and financial  markets, important 
developments in transport and communications, and new rapid technological advances are the three 
elements most scholars use to identify the nature of globalisation,  its limits and its implications for 
the wealth of nations.  It is  important  to  mention  here  the  rapid  growth  of the Dynamic  Asian 
Economies (DAE),  which  has  significantly  contributed  to the  pressure  of competition  on  world 
markets. Our purpose here is neither to review the vast literature on this topic, nor to provide a new 
alternative insight into this phenomenon, but rather, to summarise the most relevant characteristics in 
relation to innovation. By examining the major features and effects of globalisation this section will 
serve as a basis for understanding the context in which important transformations of the innovation 
process  has  been  taking  place,  and  will  discuss  the  role  of innovation  policy  in  wider  policy 
strategies. 
Market liberalisation and de-regulation 
Two of  the political and economic features that have most clearly marked the trend towards market 
globalisation have been the liberalisation of trade and  of financial  markets.  These in turn reflect a 
broader political  trend  towards  deregulation  of national  markets.  However,  there  are  important 
differences in the extent of  liberalisation, and in the respective effects on national economies, which 
will become clear when we examine each of  the two liberalisation trends. 
Liberalisation of financial  markets and  capital movements has been one of the major political and 
economic processes in developed countries since the beginning of the  1980s.  In previous decades, 
restrictions of capital outflows were generally argued  in terms of preserving domestic savings for 
domestic use, and of reducing the risk of capital flight  in times of exchange rate pressures. In turn, 
controls of capital inflows from abroad used to be justified for monetary control and non-economic 
reasons (as in the case of foreign acquisition of domestic enterprises).  Starting with Japan and the 
UK in 1979, most other developed countries turned away from capital controls quite deliberately as 
part of  a new policy strategy. As the OECD (1990) points out, the main goal of such initiatives was 
to allow domestic enterprises access to overseas investment capital and treasury operations, and to 
open up the financial sector to foreign competition. 
Some  specific  international  agreements  and  institutions,  like  the  OECD  and  the  EU,  activel) 
promoted this process. The OECD Code on capital market liberalisation had a dual effect since,  b~ 
providing  a  'barometer'  of liberalisation  measures,  it  encouraged  cross-national  comparisons 
indirectly  influencing  national  practices  and  points  of view.  The  EU move  to  liberalise  capita 
movements  operations by  1 July 1990  was  an  important  step  under  the  project  to complete  tht 
Single Market by the end of 1992. The current political drive towards Monetary Union and a singl1 
currency aims at complete capital mobility in the EU. 
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Liberalisation  in  the  advanced  economies  has  tended  to  focus  equally  on  capital  inflows  and 
outflows.  Liberalisation has  affected most  significantly  the admission  of foreign  securities  on the 
domestic  capital  market,  credit  and  loans,  direct  investment  (in  both  directions,  namely,  the 
admission ofFDI, and the permission to domestic companies to invest abroad), and the right of non-
residents to repatriate funds invested in a country. 
The deregulation of  financial markets and the liberalisation of capital movements have gone hand in 
hand with an  increase in  the flow  of foreign  direct  investments  (FDI)  and  thereby contributed to 
globalisation (see Narula and Wakelin, 1997, for an analysis ofUS-investments). The impact of  these 
changes  on the  economic  process  and  on  innovation  may  be quite  radical.  Deregulation  may  be 
regarded  as  a  stimulus  for  international  trade  and  foreign  direct  investment,  but it  may  also  be 
regarded  as  the  strategic  element  in  the  construction  of a  new  mode  of capital  accumulation 
dominated by finance capital. 
The deregulation of  financial markets and the liberalisation of capital movements have stimulated an 
increased flow of  FDI and thereby contributed to globalisation, although the impact of  these changes 
on the  economic  process  and  on  innovation  may  be  much  more  radical  than  is  so  far  realised 
Deregulation may be regarded as  a strategic element in the construction of a new  mode of capital 
accumulation  dominated  by  finance  capital.  One  major  element  in  the  deregulation  of financial 
market, the securitisation of  treasury notes, had the side-effect of giving governments more freedom 
to run big deficits without risking inflation (Chesnais and Serfati,  1997, p.S).  The resulting increased 
power  of finance  (rentier)  capital  is  reflected  in  slow  growth,  high  real  rates  of interest  and 
stagnation  in  long-term  investments  in  tangible  and  intangible  assets  (such  as  R&D).  Nataonal 
governments do not dare to promote expansionary policies because finance capital can punish them 
by moving their assets abroad thereby attacking the currency rate. The dominance of passive-finance 
oriented  ownership  causes  management  to  pursue  short-term  profit  and  neglect  of long-term 
investment in R&D. 
The globalisation of financial  capital may thus have a detrimental effect on innovation.  On the one 
hand,  it  helps  to intensify  competition by  forcing  firms  to be  constantly  on  the  search  for  new 
innovations and  to speed up the process of innovation.  On the  other hand,  it  tends  to  promote 
short-term profits in a context of depressed demand.  The result of these combined forces  may be 
faster movement along existing trajectories and in incremental innovation, while resources allocated 
to long-term efforts to create new trajectories and radical innovations are reduced. The result might 
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Chesnais and Serfati (1997) the slow-down in the growth in business R&D-expenditure revealed in 
recent  OECD-publications  may  be  explained  in  this  way.  This  potential  for  conflict  between 
stimulating faster change along given trajectories and creating fundamentally new ideas will come up 
throughout the report as "the exploitation/exploration dilemma" (see Chapter 3). 
As already mentioned, trade liberalisation was the other major international economic trend over the 
last two decades.  The GATT Uruguay Round,  concluded  in  1993,  included  two important new 
features compared with previous rounds. First, it agreed to expand trade in manufactured goods; and 
second,  it included  areas  which  were previously  excluded  such  as  services,  intellectual  property 
rights  and  agriculture.  The  long  negotiations  centred  mostly  on  questions  related  to  domestic 
subsidies,  non-tariff  barriers,  trade-related  investment  measures  (TR.IM:s)  and  trade-related 
intellectual property rights (TRIPs), rather than exclusively on tariff structures for industrial products 
as  in the seven previous rounds.  Generally the round resulted in  increased liberalisation of world 
trade, and most important, provided an opening for political negotiations in new areas. 
However, despite the relative success of the last round, there are still remarkable disparities in the 
liberalising trends of different national economies.  According to the OECD (OECD 1993b), since 
the launch of  the Uruguay round in 1986, over 60 developing countries and former centrally planned 
economies have unilaterally liberalised their trade, but only 12 industrialised nations have responded 
similarly.  Significant  differences  in  liberalisation  and  protectionist  practices  have  been  revealed 
between  developed  and  developing  countries.  The  OECD  report  underlines  the  fact  that  the 
developing  countries  have  increasingly  engaged  in  liberalising  policies,  mainly  because  they  are 
required  to  do  so  before  applying  for  GATT  membership.  Developed  countries  do  not  find 
themselves in this situation, and their policies have continued to be based on protectionist practices. 
In this sense, argues the report, developed countries enjoy exceptional treatment. 
Paradoxically,  the formation  of trading  blocks  and  regional  agreements  has  been  taking  place  in 
parallel to the trend towards global trade liberalisation.  The 1990s saw two important developments 
in  this  direction.  The  first  was  further  progress  with  long  established  agreements  such  as  the 
European Union, from the single market to the forthcoming monetary union.  In Europe economic 
integration  and  political  integration  are  two  sides  of the  same  coin,  and  the  Maastricht  and 
Amsterdam Treaty reforms marked a profound transformation of  the political scene in Europe. 
The second development was the creation of  new regional agreements between states with common 
geographical borders. NAFTA (Mexico, USA and Canada, 1994) and ASEAN (Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines,  Singapore, Thailand, Brunei and Vietnam,  1992) are both of a free-trade nature,  whil~ 
Mercosur (Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and Brazil,  1991) is a common market, based on custom! 
union  and  some  coordination  of macro-economic  and  sectoral  policies.  There  is  still  mucl 
disagreement about the consequences of this trend,  and  more specifically,  whether regionalisatiot 
hinders or benefits the global liberalisation of trade.  In any case, the constitution of trade blocks i: 
today  an  important  reality  in  the  world  economy,  and  their  impact  on  the  respective  nationa 
economies depends on many factors,  one of them being the nature and  contents of the agreemen 
itself 
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By increased communication at global scale we mean the rapid and significant transformation of  both 
infrastructure and technology for the transfer and exchange of information,  and physical items like 
persons and goods. The relevance of  telecommunications infrastructure, information technology and 
transport  connections  in  today' s  world  cannot  be  denied.  The  rapid  development  of their 
technological and physical infrastructure has been a key factor in the proliferation of  global exchange 
since the 1980s. This section focuses on two of  the most studied phenomena in this respect, namely, 
the  development  of  transport  infrastructure,  and  the  development  of  information  and 
communications technologies (ICT) and infrastructure. 
There has been a substantial improvement in transport infrastructure over the last two decades. This 
is evident from the emergence of more direct and faster transport connections in most modes (rail, 
air,  road  and  sea),  and  from  the lower costs of all  passenger and  goods transport over the same 
period. The reasons for these developments are two important trends: firstly the rapid evolution of 
transport innovation  and  technologies resulting  in  better,  faster  and  larger vehicles  such as  high-
speed  trains,  mono-rail  trains,  faster  boats  and  ferries,  larger  and  faster  commercial  planes  like 
Concorde or Airbus, and safer and more economical cars, all of  which have simultaneously enhanced 
comfort and safety; and secondly, Iiberalisation of  national market regulations (EIU, 1990). 
These trends indicate that, today more than ever,  accessibility is  considered to be a key factor for 
economic development. The accessibility of  people, production and markets depends not only on the 
geographical centrality of a given  place within  a  'centre'  or pole of economic development,  but 
mostly on having better and faster physical links between the place concerned and  other regionally 
and  internationally important economic locations.  It is  in  this  scenario  of higher relevance of the 
'accessibility' and  'connectivity' of a location, that new risks might emerge.  The negative aspect of 
the positive trends defined above is that, the more costly and worse the transport connections to a 
location, the more problematic are its prospects for  economic development.  The risk of territorial 
isolation and marginalisation through lack of access to this new transport infrastructure is growing. 
This is an issue to which we shall return at the end of  this chapter. 
The  second  phenomenon  briefly  analysed  here  is  the  implication  of the  fast  and  impressive 
development of information  and communication  technologies  (ICTs)  and infrastructure  in  the 
international economy.  Since the mid-1980s computing systems have dramatically transformed the 
work place and personal life.  The rapid creation and  marketing of new hardware have resulted in 
similarly rapid change in software products. The same can be said of telecommunication technology 
and  infrastructures.  The  development  of satellite  communications,  optical  fibre,  sophisticated 
antennas,  and  mobile  telephones  are  central  to  these  transformations.  Technologies  and 
infrastructures  reinforce  each  other,  and  the  combination  of  these  two  fast  technological 
developments has resulted in new communication channels, namely electronic mail  systems and the 
world wide web. The next major new wave will be in the field of  multi-media, where there are many 
strong entrants investing substantial resources in what is regarded as a very promising market. 
Some  authors  have  described  these  developments  with  terms  like  'third  industrial  revolution' 
(Castells,  1989) or 'information society'  (Brotchie, et al  1987).  The point of these notions is that 
information  and  communications  technologies  are  profoundly  transforming  economic  operations 
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also  been crucial in  creating a new  context for  the process of innovation.  ICT is  a fast  growing 
industry in itself,  characterised by shorter product life-cycles and faster technological development. 
lfowever,  its  impact  on  the  efficiency  of production  depends  on  how  far  it  is  combined  with 
organisational flexibility and new forms of  management control within firms,  as well as enhancement 
of human  resources.  Advances  and  increased  productivity  in  the  service  sectors,  in  particular, 
depend on these ICT developments (Petit and Soete, 1997).
3 
The political decision to develop 'telecommunications highways'  (the example of the EU), aims to 
respond to these trends and  to anticipate higher demand for infrastructure networks and  capacity. 
However, political concerns have also moved in other directions, namely the awareness of  new risks 
of social and territorial exclusion on this basis.  It is  now generally assumed that the future of the 
'information society' involves important problems of social polarisation between those social groups 
with the economic and educational resources to follow the fast track,  and those without, who risk 
being marginalised. 
The effects of globalisation 
The globalisation trends examined above have social, economic, cultural and political effects, all of 
.them  deeply interlinked.  This report sets out to examine  the  socio-economic dimension of these 
effects. For this reason it emphasises the process of  market expansion and increased communications 
at world level. 
One of the most widely accepted ideas  about the economic effects of globalisation is  that it  has 
substantially increased market competition.  The expansion of the market in  products and  services 
affects the number of  buyers and sellers, and the competitive dynamics within each of  these markets. 
It is  important  to  remark  here  that  not  all  product  markets  and  industrial  sectors  are  equally 
globalised.  Some,  like the electronics industries,  are truly operating in  a world market,  but others 
such as professional services are only marginally affected by these trends.  Similarly, labour mobility 
is still considerably lower than capital mobility. 
The  next  sections  will  examine  in  depth  the  transformations  taking  place  alongside  these 
globalisation trends. It will be argued that globalisation has not only increased market competition, 
but has also transformed it into market competition based increasingly on knowledge and learning. 
This is  explained by the importance of non-price factors in  market competition, where the learning 
capabilities of firms in terms of producing knowledge,  using it and  making organisational changes 
play a central role. 
3  The European High Level Expert Group on the information society led by Luc Soete has recently 
delivered a substantial report analysing socio-economic consequences as well as policy implications. 
The report is, of  course, much more comprehensive than this one as regards the specific 
consequences of  information technology.  The policy recommendations cover a broader set of  issues 
but where they overlap there is little conflict with the ideas developed here (CEC, 1997b). 
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The innovation process has accelerated considerably during the last decades, together with the rate 
of  technological change, a central element in economic development and industrial dynamics. We will 
nat enter into a discussion of  whether transformation of  the innovation process is a cause or an effect 
of globalisation.  As  Stopford  and  Strange  (1991)  argue,  irrespective  of causal  links,  the  new 
environment for competition is the result of all these changes, which are deeply interrelated and are 
taking place together within the same time frame. 
Changes in the innovation process 
The nature of the innovation process 
What has changed in the 1980s? Recent interest in the nature of the innovation process is  strongly 
related to studies that try to explain the new perception of  the relationship between economic theory 
and technical change by emphasising different aspects of innovation as a complex, interactive, non-
linear  process.  The  old  image  of a  lonely  scientist  in  a  laboratory  discovering  new  things  and 
applying them directly to the production of  a new product is no longer considered realistic. Similarly, 
there  has  been  an  expansion  in  the  activities  understood  as  innovation,  and  it  is  now  generally 
accepted  that innovation not  only  comprises  scientific  research  but  all  the  different  steps  of the 
process - including  organisational  aspects  - until  a new  product or production process  has  been 
launched on the market. 
Two of  the most salient features of innovation are uncertainty and cumulativeness.  As Dosi states: 
"Innovation involves a fundamental  element of uncertainty,  which is not simply the lack of all  the 
relevant information about the occurrence of known events, but more fundamentally,  entails also (a) 
the existence of techno-economic problems whose  solution procedures are unknown,  and  (b) the 
impossibility of  precisely tracing consequences to actions" (Dosi, 1988, p. 222). 
On  the  other  hand,  cumulativeness  refers  to  the  fact  that  technological  change  follows  specific 
patterns, rather than just being random or simple reactions to market demands. Again, in this respect 
Dosi makes three points: "(i) in spite of significant variations with regard to specific innovations, it 
seems  that  the  directions  of technical  change  are  often  defined  by  the  state-of-the-art  of the 
technologies  already  in  use;  (ii)  quite  often,  it  is  the  nature  of technologies  themselves  that 
determines  the  range  within  which  products  and  processes  can  adjust  to  changing  economic 
conditions; and (iii) it is generally the case that the probability of making technological advances in 
firms,  organisations and often countries is, among other things, a function of  the technological levels 
already achieved by them. In other words, technical change is a cumulative activity" (Dosi,  1988  p. 
223). 
It has  also  been  stressed that the innovation process is  an  interactive  process of a  social  nature 
(Lund  vall,  1997b).  Interaction takes place at least at three different levels, namely: 
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1. Interaction between different steps of  the innovation process. 
2. Interaction between organisations. 
3. Interaction between different departments of  the same firm. 
At each of  these levels agents and individuals communicate and co-operate. They need to develop a 
common language and modes of  interpretation and, above all, trust in order to overcome some of  the 
uncertainties characterising the innovation process (Lazaric and Lorenz,  1997).  This is  one reason 
why the learning economy cannot function without a minimum of  social cohesion. 
When considering the previous statements about the nature of  the innovation process, it is necessary 
to question to what extent, and if so in which way, the globalising context of the last two decades 
has affected the innovative process. This report identifies four major trends: 
•  Acceleration. In general terms,  technological change has  speeded  up  substantially over the last 
few decades. This is mainly illustrated by the fact that the time required to launch a new high-tech 
product  has  been  significantly  reduced.  The  process  from  knowledge  production  to 
commercialisation is  much shorter today.  And  product life  cycles are shorter too (for low- and 
medium- as  well  as  for  high-tech  products).  The fast  development  and  wide use of ICT  has 
certainly played a key role in bringing about this change. 
•  Inter-firm  collaborations  and industrial networks.  New  products  are  increasingly  integrating 
different technologies, and technologies are increasingly based on different  scientific disciplines. 
To master such a variety of  domains is impossible even for big organisations. This is also reflected 
in the costs of  developing new products and systems, which have grown. Short product life cycles 
require a rapid entrance into all major markets around the world. Most firms (even the largest) do 
not have the capability or the resources to undertake such initiatives, and this is the main reasor, 
for  the  expansion  of collaborative  schemes  for  pre-competitive  research  and  the  growin~ 
importance of  industrial networks. 
•  Functional integration and networking inside firms.  Speedy adaptation and innovation gives thj 
functionally integrated firm  an advantage. Rapid transformation of new signals from the outsidl 
into action inside the firm  can take place only if departments collaborate closely and  employee 
engage  in  horizontal  communication  inside  the  firm.  Flexibility,  interdisciplinarity  and  cross 
fertilisation  of ideas at the managerial  and  laboratory levels within the firm  are  now importar, 
keys for success. 
•  Collaboration  with  knowledge  production  centres.  The  increasing  reliance  on  advances  i 
scientific knowledge for major new technological opportunities has been an important stimulus fc 
firms  to collaborate with scientific centres like  public  and  private laboratories,  universities  at: 
other basic and applied research centres. 
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a complex mutual interdependence between the globalisation process and the nature of knowledge 
creation and learning. 
Knowledge production and distribution in the new socio-economic conditions 
The previous section examined the factors which explain the increased pace of  technological change 
and innovation. These trends are embedded in a larger context, namely,  the knowledge production 
process and its relation to economic activity. 
The notion "knowledge-based economy" draws attention to the fact that since the post-war period 
the  production  process  has  increasingly  relied  on  knowledge-based  activities.  The  proportion  of 
labour  that  handles  tangible  goods  has  become  smaller  than  the  proportion  engaged  in  the 
production, distribution and processing of knowledge.  The expansion of the "knowledge-intensive" 
sector vis-a-vis other routine and physical production processes seems to be one of  the major trends 
in  economic development in this period.  We shall  go on to argue that it is  better to talk about 'a 
learning economy' than a "knowledge-based economy",  since the high pace of change means that 
specialised  knowledge  becomes  much  more  of a  short-lived  resource,  and  that  it  is  rather  the 
capability to learn  and  adapt  to new  conditions  that  increasingly  determines  the  performance  of 
. individuals, firms, regions and countries. 
Codified and tacit knowledge 
When  discussing  the  role  of knowledge  and  knowledge  production  in  economic  activity  1t  IS 
important to distinguish between tacit and codified knowledge. This distinction goes back to Polanyi 
(1958/78)  and  relates  to the  degree  to  which  pieces  of knowledge  can  be  written  down  and 
transferred (Lund  vall,  1997b  ). 
Codification of knowledge implies that knowledge is  transformed  into  'information' which can be 
easily transmitted through information infrastructures.  It is  a process of reduction and  conversion 
which renders the transmission, verification, storage and reproduction of  knowledge especially easy. 
As explained by David and Foray (1995), codified knowledge is typically expressed in a format that 
is compact and standardised to facilitate and reduce the cost of  such operations. Codified knowledge 
can normally be transferred  over long  distances  and  across  organisational  boundaries  (Foray  and 
Lundvall, 1996). 
In  contrast  to  codified  knowledge,  tacit  knowledge  is  the  knowledge  which  cannot  be  easily 
transferred because it has not been stated in an explicit form.  One important type of  tacit knowledge 
is  skill.  The skilled  person follows  rules  not known  as  such  even  by  the person following  them 
(Polanyi,  1958 p.49).  Another important kind  of tacit knowledge is  implicit but shared beliefs and 
modes of  interpretation that make intelligent communication possible. According to Polanyi, the only 
way to transfer this kind of knowledge is through a specific kind of social interaction similar to the 
apprenticeship relationships.  This implies that it cannot be sold and bought in the marketplace and 
that its transfer is extremely sensitive to social context. 
- 31 -These distinctive features of  knowledge as an economic resource determine the context in which the 
dramatic  changes  in  knowledge generation and  use  are  occurring.  Central  to these  changes  is  a 
transformation in the character of  society's store of  knowledge, involving codification and techniques 
for using codified knowledge.  We shall  consider other aspects of the economics of knowledge in 
Chapter 3 when we discuss the validity of  neo-classical and evolutionary/structural approaches to the 
learning economy. 
Intensified codification trends 
The fast development of  information and communication technologies gives a strong impetus to the 
process of codification by increasing the economic value of codified knowledge. Most  knowledge, 
which can be codified and reduced to information,  can now be transmitted over long distances at 
very limited cost. This in tum makes more attractive the allocation of resources to the process of 
codification. 
Simultaneously, certain stages in the innovation process are characterised by the use of information 
technology and by partial codification.  Testing and designing new products and processes can now 
be done with the help  of information technologies.  It has thus been argued that there is  now an 
intensified knowledge codification process. What we are experiencing today, according to this view, 
is a process of faster and partial codification of knowledge into information bits, which as a result 
become easier to transmit to other people.  This implies that the knowledge production process is 
accelerating along the lines of  faster codification. 
Codification is an important process for economic activity and development for four main reasons 
(Foray  and  Lundvall,  1996).  Firstly,  codification  reduces  some  of the  costs  of the  process  of 
knowledge acquisition and technology dissemination.  Secondly, through codification, knowledge is 
acquiring more and more the properties of a commodity. This implies that market transactions are 
facilitated by codification as it reduces the uncertainties and information asymmetries in transactions 
involving knowledge. Thirdly, codification facilitates knowledge externalisation and allows firms to 
acquire more knowledge than previously at a given (but not necessarily lower) cost.  And finally, 
codification helps directly to speed up knowledge creation, innovation and economic change. 
The limits of codification 
In order to determine the limits to this  codification trend it is  important to realise that the mos1 
important barrier to codification is change. Complexity may increase the cost of  codification but thil 
might be overcome if the knowledge remains  stable.  There is  thus a built in  contradiction in tht 
codification  process.  As  certain elements  of knowledge  or processes  of knowledge  creation  ar1 
codified, the rate of  change speeds up. This makes it less easy and attractive to codify other element 
of  knowledge. 
4  (The fact that some of  the leading information systems producers such as ffiM an 
4  An interesting issue raised by Cowan and Foray ( 1997) is whether and how far codification can 
handle some forms of  incremental as opposed to radical change. 
-32-Apple have had such immense problems with managing their own businesses illustrates the fact that 
it is  not easy to codify management behaviour in the form of expert systems in  an  environment of 
turbulent change.) 
In fact, the clear distinction made above between tacit and codified knowledge may be misleading in 
some regards.  Most codes relating to science,  technology and innovation can only be decoded by 
experts who have already invested heavily  in  learning the codes.  Tacit knowledge may  be  shared 
through  human  interaction  and  this  may  be  the  major  force  behind  the  formation  of business 
networks. This means that codified and tacit knowledge are complementary and co-exist in time. It is 
the constitution of  new ensembles of codified and tacit knowledge which is in question rather than a 
massive transformation of  tacit into codified knowledge. 
Therefore, there are two important limits to the codification process. First, the fact that codified and 
tacit knowledge are complementary and  co-existing means that there are natural limits to codified 
knowledge.  The main  point  here  is  that  codification is  never  complete,  and  some  forms  of tacit 
knowledge will always continue to play an important role.  And second,  increased codification does 
not necessarily reduce the relative importance of  tacit knowledge - mostly skills and capabilities - in 
the process of learning and knowledge accumulation.  Actually,  easier and  less expensive access to 
information makes  skills  and  capabilities  relating to the  selection  and  efficient  use of information 
even  more  crucial  than  before.  This  means  that  tacit  knowledge  is  still  a  key  element  in  the 
appropriation  and  effective  use  of knowledge,  especially  when  the  whole  innovation  process  is 
accelerating. 
Knowledge creation and globalisation 
Despite  the  previous  statements,  the  distinction  between  tacit  and  codified  knowledge  is  still 
important for understanding the nature of  globalisation. In a hypothetical world where all elements of 
knowledge  were transformed  into  general  codes to which  there  was  equal  access  for  everyone, 
globalisation would be extreme in all economic activities and the only reason to specialise in specific 
activities would be access to primary production factors  and  scale economies.  There would be no 
poor regions or countries and experts would not earn more than unskilled workers. It would be an 
economy where there were no incentives to learn new skills  or develop  new technologies because 
there would be no mechanisms to appropriate the fruits of  such investments. 
It is obvious that the real world is very different from this model.  There has been major investment 
in  R&D  activities,  education  and  training  in  most  OECD  countries  over  the  last  two  decades, 
indicating a focus on knowledge production to benefit economic growth.  However, as we shall see 
later, social and regional polarisation between slow and fast learners also accelerated over the same 
period.  This polarisation reflects an increase in the demand for skills rather than the opposite. 
There are several reasons why codification does not have this major effect on the transferability of 
knowledge. The most fundamental one is the rapid rate of  change. When the content of  knowledge is 
changing rapidly it is only those who take part in its creation who can get access to it.  This explains 
the  territorial  concentration  of specific  industries  ('Silicon  Valley  phenomena'  and  also  the 
specialisation of industrial districts in so called low-tech areas like furniture and clothing - Maskell, 
- 33-1996}.  It  also  explains  the  formation  of industrial  networks  and  inter-firm  alliances  aimed  at 
technology development. 
The second set of  factors has to do with the need to invest heavily in order to be able to absorb and 
decode codified knowledge. It may be true that codification increases the possibility of  transforming 
knowledge into a commodity but the value of  this commodity will be very limited for all those who 
do not have the necessary basis for understanding and using the knowledge. Communication between 
two mathematicians operating at different ends of the globe may be completely codified but of little 
value to the most people. 
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There has always been pressure for codification of skills and knowledge,  as illustrated by Taylorist 
modes of work organisation and by the many attempts to create expert systems and Management 
Information Systems. The fact that more and more geographically dispersed economic activities are 
becoming interconnected may give further impetus to such efforts. But they will always run into the 
problem that as soon as they have partially succeeded in formalising a piece of  knowledge - often at 
great  cost  - the  circumstances  will  have  changed  and  the  formalisation  may  actually  hamper 
adaptation to change. 
-34-The learning process and the learning economy 
In a context of increased market competition and rapid innovation, firms  are faced with non-price 
competition factors.  This means that the most important factor for  individual  firms  is  no  longer 
having  a given set of skills,  but rather being  able  to acquire  new ones  effectively.  In this  sense, 
learning has become the key to successful economic and market operations in recent years.  A firm's 
capacity to learn and transform in this new context is  a crucial competitiveness factor.  There is  a 
definite need to constantly rebuild the skills of  the individual and the technological and organisational 
competencies of  the firm. 
This implies,  of course,  a broad definition of knowledge and learning.  Wealth-creating knowledge 
includes  practical  skills  established  through  learning  by  doing,  as  well  as  capabilities  acquired 
through formal education and training. And it includes management skills learnt in practice as well as 
new insights produced by R&D. 
The learning economy is not a high technology economy 
Simply defined, a learning economy is an economy where the ability to learn 
is crucial for the economic success of individuals, firms,  regions and national 
economies. "Learning" refers to building new competences and establishing 
new skills and not just to "getting access to information". (Lund  vall,  1997b, 
p. 6) 
It  should  be  obvious,  from  what  has  been  said  so  far,  that  the  learning 
economy is not necessarily a high-tech economy. Learning is an activity which 
takes  place  in  all  parts of the  economy,  including  so-called  low-tech  and 
traditional sectors. As a matter of fact,  even in  highly developed economies 
the learning taking  place  in  traditional  and  low-tech  sectors may  be more 
important  for  economic  growth than  the  learning  taking  place  in  a  small 
number  of insulated  hi-tech  firms  (Maskell,  1996).  The  learning  potential 
(technological opportunities) may differ between sectors and technologies but 
in  all  sectors there will  be niches where the  potential  for  learning  is  high. 
Finally, it should be noted that all workers have some skills and capabilities to 
learn,  even those misleadingly called  'unskilled workers'.  These remarks are 
intended to prevent misunderstandings of the learning  economy hypothesis 
which might lead to neglect of the developmental potential of  parts of the 
economy less intensive in their use of  formally acquired knowledge. 
As we mentioned at the beginning of  this section, one alternative concept to 'the learning economy' is 
'the knowledge-based economy' (OECD,  1996c).  The most fundamental  reason for preferring 'the 
learning economy' as the key concept is  that it  emphasises the high rate of economic,  social  and 
technical change that continuously underlies specialised (and codified) knowledge. It makes it clear 
that what really matters for economic performance is  the ability to learn (and forget) and not the 
stock of  knowledge. 
-35-The main reason why learning has become more important has to do  with the dialectics between 
learning and  change.  Rapid change implies a need for  rapid  learning,  and those involved  in  rapid 
learning impose change on the environment and on other people. We have argued that globalisation, 
information and communication technologies, and the breakdown of institutional barriers to change 
(deregulation and  liberalisation of markets)  have  worked together to  speed  up  change.  This  has 
created a selection environment which favours those organisations and individuals which are change-
oriented  and  we  have  entered  a  kind  of circular  cumulative  process  which  is  self-reinforcing. 
According  to this  interpretation,  international  competition  and  new  technological  opportunities 
linked to information and  other technologies have forced  all  those involved in increasingly global 
competition to respond to the acceleration in change and learning. For the single firm this is reflected 
in a faster rate of  innovation and more generally in what is seen as an intensification of  competition. 
Social and regional polarisation 
One of  the principal consequences and risks of the learning economy is its tendency towards social 
and regional polarisation. The learning economy, if left to itself,  gives rise to polarisation between 
sectors, regions and people through its impact on the selection of  firms and human resources. 
The  learning  economy  is  the  most  important  factor  behind  the  polarisation  of labour  markets 
observed  in  all  OECD  countries  (see  for  instance  the  OECD  Jobs  Study;  OECD, 1994b  ).  Slow 
learners  are  becoming  increasingly  marginalised  in  a  market  characterised  by  rapidly  changing 
demand  for  skills.  Learning  takes  place  mostly  in  the  work-place,  and  those  with  difficulties  in 
finding  a job in the first  place might very rapidly  miss  opportunities for adapting to the changing 
requirements. 
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Similarly,  firms  respond  to  intensified  competition  (the  most  powerful  selectivity  mechanism 
through  increased  co-operation  aimed  at  sharing  tacit  knowledge.  This  takes  the  form  c 
technological alliances,  formation of business networks and  closer linkages between suppliers an 
customers. But firms with weak resources might tend to be excluded. This mechanism explains pan! 
why the narrowing of regional income gaps -the 'cohesion gap'- has slowed down in Europe ovc 
the last decade. It has been demonstrated that a major factor behind regional disparities is  differe1 
access to knowledge and learning (Fagerberg, 1996). 
-36-There are no signs that these basic mechanisms will weaken in the future. If  anything, the entrance of 
China and the Eastern European countries as  more active players on world markets, and the trend 
toward deregulation of  sheltered sectors will give new impetus to rapid change. 
Policy perspectives 
We have now examined some of  the most fundamental features of  the globalising learning economy, 
which is  characterised by  intensified  competition in  many  product markets  and  faster  innovation. 
Intensified competition stimulates effectiveness in production as well as incremental innovation but, 
as we have seen, it also has a negative effect on income distribution and access to jobs. This means 
that innovation policy cannot be pursued in isolation from broader social goals. As a minimum it has 
to  be  coordinated  with  other  policies  that  affect  the  socio-economic  dynamics  of the  learning 
economy. 
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In the context we have defined we see a growing need to develop more coherent policy strategies. 
Specifically we see a need to coordinate and calibrate three different policy areas: 
1.  Policies affecting the pressure for change (competition policy, trade policy and the direction of 
general economic policy); 
2.  Policies affecting the  ability to  absorb  change  (human resource development  and  innovation 
policy); 
3.  Policies to help the losers in the game of  change (social and regional policies with redistributive 
objectives). 
These policy areas need to be adjusted in such a way that they promote innovation and growth but 
avoid  putting social  cohesion at  risk.  This  is  fundamental  in  its  own right  but also  because it  is 
difficult to see how learning can thrive in a polarised society. This points to the need for horizontal 
coordination of  sectoral policies that have traditionally been regarded as more or less independent. It 
-37-is important to note that this call for coordination is analytically based and is not just putting policy 
coordination forward as an end in itself s 
The three  kinds  of policy  packages  referred  to  (pressure,  capability  and  compensation)  can  be 
combined in  different ways as illustrated in  the box above,  and the specific combination tends to 
define  four  different  major  political  strategies  and  ideologies.  Any  pragmatic  policy  strategy will 
include elements from all the four lines of action outlined below. But we believe that there is now a 
need to reorient policies towards what we call 'the new new deal'  in Europe in order to overcome 
stubborn employment problems, slow productivity growth and social and regional polarisation. 
s The question of  how to achieve horizontal co-ordination of  these policies will be examined in detail 
in the concluding chapter of  this report, Chapter 11, after an analysis of  different policy areas in Part 
II of  the report. 
6 The new new Deal will be examined in depth in Chapter 11  in relation to the different policy areas 
of  part II of  the report. 
-38-Regional, national and European policy responsibilities in the learning economy 
Since the 1980s there has been a process of  decentralisation and intemationalisation of  policy actions 
devoted to innovation and economic development in the EU.  Sub-national governmental and public 
bodies  have  tried  to  maximise  the  potential  of their  local  innovative  milieu  to  enhance  their 
competitive position by making full use of  the legal and political instruments at hand. Thus many EU 
regions and local governments have actively undertaken various policy initiatives devoted directly or 
indirectly to technological development. 
7  These policy trends, together with the importance of the 
regional dimension in the learning economy are two strong arguments for looking at the emergence 
of regional systems of  innovation in the EU, which influence and are in tum influenced by action at 
national and European levels (Sternberg, 1996a and Sternberg, 1996b  ). 
As will be seen in Part II of this report, the EU has developed a number of policy actions which 
directly and indirectly stimulate innovation. 
Parallel to these two trends at regional and European level,  the traditional involvement of national 
governments in this area has been changing.  This  does not necessarily  mean that national policies 
have been 'squeezed' in between the sub-national and supra-national levels with zero-sum negative 
effects. The national level still remains the most important public actor in this policy area, controlling 
important economic and legal resources. 
8 
There  is  a  need  to  foster  vertical  policy  coordination  in  order  to  tackle  more  effectively  the 
challenges  posed by  the globalising  learning  economy.  Responsibilities  for the three  policy  areas 
identified above - policies affecting the pressure for change, policies affecting the capability to absorb 
change,  and  policies  aimed  at  caring  about  losers - are  today  located  at  different  governmental 
levels.  The  EU level  predominates  in  the  first  set  of policies  (e.g.  trade  policy,  anti-trust  and 
7 For an analysis of  regional patterns in Spain as regards globalisation and innovation see the two 
publications from the Verspagen TSER project:  Molero (1996) and Molero and Buesa (1996). 
Similar patterns of  decentralisation and regional activism were observed in the US over this period 
(Schmandt and Wilson, 1990). 
8 In Chapter 3 we shall take a closer look at how national strategies have absorbed some of  the new 
ideas and results developed in academic research on innovation. 
- 39-procurement legislation, and jurisprudence). EMU will concentrate macroeconomic regulation even 
more at EU level.  Main responsibility for human  resource  development policy is  at regional  and 
national level, while Community initiatives are beginning to supplement national ones in the field of 
innovation policy.  The national level has dominated the area of social and regional policy, but the 
Structural  Funds  play  a  growing  European  regional  development  role  in  terms  of territorial 
redistribution. 
This  means,  predominantly,  that  regulating  the  pressure  for  change  has  become  a  European 
responsibility while the ability to cope with change and the social problems it  gives rise to remains 
chiefly  the responsibility  of the national  and  regional  level.  In the  new  context  of the learning 
economy it is not obvious that such a division of responsibilities is sustainable in the long run.  As 
social and regional polarisation becomes more serious, there will be growing demands on European 
authorities  either to reduce the pressure for  change  (neo-protectionism)  or to move  much more 
decisively into innovation and human resource development policies (the new new deal). 
This is the general context in which innovation policy has to be discussed and designed. Innovation 
policy needs to be thought of as an element in broader socio-economic strategies, and this is also a 
major reason why social scientists from different disciplines might help to inspire the policy-makers 
operating in this field.  The structure of  the TSER programme, which encompasses, social exclusion 
and  human  resource  development  as  well  as  technology  policy,  is  well  suited  to tackling  these 
complex issues, but there are important barriers between disciplines that are not easy to overcome 
when designing and selecting research projects. 
In the new context it is obvious that technical innovation is  strongly rooted in social and economic 
structure. This gives the social sciences a prominent role to play through two mechanisms, firstly by 
analysing  in  depth  the  characteristics  of the  innovation  process  and  the  performance  of given 
innovation systems; and secondly, by designing policy prescriptions. 
•  To understand innovation a  broad set of social  science  disciplines  are  needed.  The traditional 
approach  of neo-classical  economics  where  the  focus  is  on  market  failure  is  too  narrow. 
Evolutionary economic models may be more useful since they take into account learning, diversity 
and institutions, but they need to be complemented by behavioural and cognitive sciences in order 
to encompass all the implications of  learning. 
•  Social sciences related to management and organisation theory become increasingly important as 
innovation policy needs to focus more on the organisational dimensions of  innovation such as the 
competence of  users, the functional flexibility of  firms and the formation of  industrial networks. 
As explained in the introduction to this report, the TSER programme aimed to provide the tools for 
undertaking  such an analysis  at European  level.  This  report is  a  step  further  in  the analysis  of 
Europe's technological performance with special emphasis on the policy implications raised by the 
increased  globalisation of the economy and  the  recent  changes  in  the  nature  of the  innovation 
process. 
-40-Chapter 3: A new theoretical rationale for innovation policy 
Introduction 
In Chapter 2 we outlined some of  the new challenges that innovation policy has to cope with and we 
emphasised the need to integrate innovation policy into broader policy strategies. In this chapter we 
focus  more  specifically  on  innovation  policy,  as  such,  and  on  how  it  relates  to  theoretical 
assumptions about the nature of  the innovation process and the role of knowledge in the economy. 
As  the focus,  over the  last  decade,  has  moved from  science  policy with broad  social  objectives 
toward innovation policy, and more specifically its impact on economic performance, the connection 
to  economic  theory  has  become  increasingly  important.  This  chapter  is  about  how  different 
theoretical  approaches  - neo-classical  or  evolutionary  structuralist- to  economics  affect  the 
definition of  innovation policy. 
The  previous  chapter emphasised  the  significant  acceleration  in  the  rate of change  and  the  new 
relationship between codified and tacit knowledge.  These ideas were not developed in a theoretical 
vacuum. The understanding of these phenomena goes hand in hand with new analytical frameworks 
focused  on  economic  change,  and  theoretical  perspectives  which  are,  in  their  turn,  based  on 
extensive empirical research. The empirical insights gained the last twenty years or so in the field  of 
innovation research  have  played  a major  role  in  the  formation  of an  evolutionary,  historical  and 
structuralist approach to innovation in its interaction with economic development. 
Against this new theoretical background, policy-making has begun to take on new tasks and  new 
roles. Public action is no longer exclusively based on the neo-classical assumptions of compensating 
for in-built  'market failures'  and under-investment problems in  relation to R&D  efforts.  The new 
rationale for public intervention goes beyond that, identifying other areas and forms of  action on the 
basis of new and broader types of failures (technological lock-ins,  systemic lock-ins,  and so forth), 
trade-offs  and  dilemmas.  It takes into  account  the interactive  and  systemic  nature  of innovation 
processes. 
This  chapter  summarises  some  of these  general  tendencies  and  pinpoints  their  limitations  in  an 
attempt to indicate the  need  for  a new policy  paradigm  more  adequate to the  challenges  of the 
globalising learning economy. It explains why the predominating focus on problems of appropriation 
and spill-overs inherited from the neo-classical approach may actually hamper the understanding of 
the learning economy. In particular, it points to the need for public policy based on difficult ttade-
offs in areas like exploitation/exploration, integration/flexibility and diversity/homogeneity. 
Economics and innovation policy 
The link between economics and science and technology policy is neither simple nor direct.  Some of 
the complexities arise from the fact that developments in science and technology have a much wider 
impact than those relating to economic performance. It would therefore be unwise to design policies 
guiding activities in this field  exclusively according to economic principles.  On the other hand, it is 
obvious that the linkage between technology and  economic performance has become increasingly 
strong in the minds of  policy-makers in recent years. To a certain extent this may be summed up as a 
-41-movement  away  from  science  and  technology,  and  towards  innovation  policy,  as  described  by 
Dodgson and Bessant (1996).
9 
There are at least two major reasons for  the growing attention given to the economic impact of 
innovation. One is,  paradoxically, the fact that the more or less automatic contribution to economic 
growth from technological progress - 'the residual' or the contribution to economic growth classified 
as  'total  factor  productivity  growth' -suddenly  fell  drastically  at  the  end  of the  sixties  and  the 
beginning of  the seventies. When the contribution of  new technology diminished in spite of  dramatic 
progress in  information technology,  policy  makers  asked  for  explanations  and  thereby  created  a 
demand for new analysis.  A second, more recent factor is  the end of the cold war which, together 
with globalisation tendencies, brought national economies into  more  direct confrontation on trade 
and  foreign  direct investment  issues.  These  changes  have  moved  the policy  focus  towards intra-
capitalist struggles about competitiveness and growth and here especially the dramatic breakthrough 
of Japan and the Asian Tigers in  information technology pointed to technology as  a key factor for 
competitiveness. 
Many  policy-makers  in  the  field  of science,  technology  and  innovation  have  only  a  superficial 
understanding of economics and operate mainly on the basis of common sense and intuition, and by 
copying what  others are  doing  abroad.  But they  compete for  public  funds  with  other important 
public activities. In periods of public financial restraint they have to be able to argue their case with 
the economists at Ministries of  Finance. In some countries the growing realisation that innovation is 
a key to economic growth has shifted responsibility for innovation policy to the Ministry of  Finance 
(Netherlands), and in other countries the ministries in charge of  economic affairs have given the issue 
greater attention than before. 
The point is that policy-makers are increasingly under the influence of  economic theory and that the 
distance  between new theoretical results  and  new  policy  ideas  has  been  shrinking.  Still,  we shall 
argue that there are still major lapses in adaptation that may result in serious misinterpretations and 
mistakes. First, it is a fact that most of the economists now working in Ministries of Finance were 
trained in a version of  neo-classical economics that systematically misspecified the role of  technology 
in their models.  Second, we would argue that the old  dominance of neo-classical economics has a 
negative impact upon the policy debate through its lasting imprint on terminology and  conceptual 
frameworks. Concepts such as market failure, externalities and spill-overs tend to focus the attention 
on just one side of  the learning economy and hamper our understanding of  the new economy where 
networking, interactive learning and communication are absolutely central.  The results of the TSER 
projects covered by this exercise all  tend in  different ways to confirm this general point.  Some of 
them  explicitly  confront  this  perspective,  while  others  prove  that  the  crucial  new  phenomena 
9 As they put it, "innovation policy is different from 'science' policy, which is concerned with the 
development of  science and the training of  scientists, and from 'technology' policy, which has as its 
aims the support, enhancement and development of  technology, often with a military and 
environmental protection focus" (Dodgson and Bessant, 1996, p 4). Innovation policy takes into 
account the complexities of  the innovation process and focuses more on interactions within the 
system. 
-42-analysed can be tackled more successfully using  other conceptual schemes.  One way to overcome 
this  situation would be  to follow  the  recommendation of Christopher Freeman and  reinforce  co-
operation between economists working on innovation and representatives from  other disciplines in 
SQcial science (Freeman, 1994). 
Neo-classical theory and technology policy 
Until  quite recently,  when the new trade and  growth theories  appeared,  neo-classical  theories  of 
economic  growth  and  international  trade  treated  technology  as  an  exogenous  variable.  This  is 
surprising given the results obtained by the first  systematic attempts to measure the contribution of 
technological progress to economic growth on the basis of neoclassical models. These demonstrated 
that more than half of US  economic growth could not be explained by the growth in labour and 
capital inputs,  so this 'residual' was given the name of 'technological progress' (Solow,  1956 and 
Solow, 1957). In the theoretical models technology is assumed to come as 'manna from heaven' and 
everyone has  equal  access to it.  In the predominating Heckscher-Ohlin models  for  foreign  trade, 
firms in all countries have the same access to the global pool of  blue-prints. 
If  these theoretical generalisations reflected what is going on in the real world, there would be little 
innovation in the private sector. Why should a firm invest in developing a new blue-print if it  could 
be copied at no cost by its competitors? Innovation would be accidental rather than systematic and 
R&D laboratories a serious waste of money, possibly reflecting the vanity of capitalists.  Some neo-
classical economists, especially Kenneth Arrow and Joseph Stiglitz, have emphasised the discrepancy 
between model conclusions and real world developments and have made important contributions to 
the understanding of the economics of technological change.  But their contributions have been for 
the sophisticated few and the impact on standard economics, as reflected in US university economics 
text books, has been marginal. 
If  all relevant technical knowledge were a public good - a good to which everyone has equal access -
there is an extreme case of market failure that can be defined as a 'positive externality', or in  more 
recent jargon as  'complete spill-over'.  In the neo-classical world this would constitute a situation 
where governments  ought to  intervene  to support  production  of the  knowledge  (either  through 
subsidies or through own production in public organisations such as universities). The production of 
the commodity ought to be stimulated until the increasing marginal  cost corresponds to the social 
marginal return or until  the rate of return on investment in  knowledge corresponds to the  rate of 
return on alternative productive investments. 
According to Arrow there are three interconnected problems relating to the nature of  knowledge that 
give rise to market failure and call for public action: 
•  lack of appropriability (it is  difficult  to create a market for  knowledge  since  the producers of 
knowledge do not enjoy it in exclusive terms); 
•  uncertainty (in the process of  knowledge production, outputs are not predictable from inputs); 
•  indivisibility (and economy of  scale in producing knowledge). 
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But if the full  message of neo-classical modelling were taken seriously this active role of national 
governments would not be obvious. If  the axiom of  trade theory that technology is a free commodity 
at world level,  and  can be moved without costs across national borders, were correct,  only naive 
gevernments would use tax-payers'  money to support the creation of new technology.  The 'free-
riding', non-interventionist governments would just leave it to their domestic firms  to tap into the 
free pool of  global knowledge. This argument might be less strong in a large technologically leading 
country such as the US,  but policy-makers in  the  rest of the world  could  save  a lot of national 
resources by not engaging in active technology policy. This kind of argument is now reappearing in 
debates  about  'techno-globalism'  where  it  is  assumed  (wrongly  - as  we saw  in  Chapter 2)  that 
national innovation systems have lost their rationale. 
Of course, national governments everywhere did promote the production of knowledge in different 
ways in spite of the fact that the prevailing high theory did not give much of a lead as to why this 
should be done. This was because it was generally recognised, even among economists, that a lot of 
knowledge was embodied in people and that people tend to stay inside their national borders much 
more  than  capital  and  'knowledge  as  information'.  In  the  beginning  of the  sixties  there  was  a 
flourishing literature on 'human capital' as a crucial element in economic growth. Therefore it  was 
uncontroversial to invest in  education and  training  at  all  levels from  primary school to university. 
Also, many grand national projects, and especially the military, nuclear and space programmes in the 
US and elsewhere, meant vast public investment in technology and knowledge that was not intended 
to be freely distributed through a global pool of  knowledge. 
Only in Japan was technology policy explicitly committed to promoting economic growth through its 
impact on industrial dynamics in  the private sector.  Here policy makers  selected  strategic sectors 
with strong growth potential and technology policy became a major instrument in this context.  An 
interesting interpretation of  the success of  Japanese industrial policy by Christopher Freeman is that-
for rather odd reasons to do with the prevalence of  Marxist economists in Japan- it was designed by 
MITI engineers rather than by economists in  the Ministry of Finance,  who were the losers  in  the 
battle on industrial policy design (Freeman, 1987). 
We  would  still  argue  that  the  main  problem  of misspecification  of knowledge  in  the  basac 
neo-classical  models  was  not  the  negative  impact  on  investment  in  knowledge  productson, 
policy-makers  found  their  own  more  or  less  good  arguments  to  invest  in  universttaes  and 
technologies. The major negative impact was indirect, through the formation of a world viev- that is 
still around and seriously hampers our understanding of  innovation in important respects.  In order to 
clarify this we need to return to a discussion we had in Chapter 2,  and take a more detailed look at 
knowledge and learning in the context of  market failure. 
The economic peculiarities of  knowledge and learning 
Market failure in transacting codified knowledge 
Almost without exception neo-classical theories treat knowledge as synonymous with information. 
This is also true for models where the technology created is presented as private property. In these 
cases it is assumed that there is a system to protect intellectual property such as patents or copyright. 
As explained in Chapter 2, what we called 'codified knowledge' may be equated to information and 
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distances.  There  is  an  enormous  and  rapidly  growing  amount  of this  kind  of knowledge.  The 
tendency  is  overload  rather than  scarcity.  Just to find  out - become  aware of- what pieces  of 
information that can be useful is a demanding task and more and more resources are allocated to do 
so (EU, 1997, p.  16). 
But even if we become aware of a relevant set of information we cannot always get access to it 
because we need knowledge to use information.  Codified knowledge does not mean free  access -
not even when there is  no  system of intellectual property protection.  Giovanni Dosi gives a telling 
illustration of  this point. He points out that while a document containing the latest Fermat theorem in 
mathematics may be regarded as highly codified and therefore as  'information', only a dozen or so 
mathematicians  world-wide  have  the  necessary  background  knowledge  to  find  it  possible  and 
meaningful and to work through and evaluate it.  Average people are more like the chimpanzee who, 
if very hungry,  might possibly  feel  like  eating the couple of hundred  pages of manuscript full  of 
mathematical symbols (Dosi, 1996, p.84). 
This means that the effective demand for  'Fermat theorems'  is  rather limited.  If it were a package 
requiring less extreme user skills, like Windows 95 for instance, the scale of  effective demand would 
reflect how much users had, and planned, to invest in learning to master the programme. The general 
conclusion  is  that  a  lot  of information  relevant  for  economic  development  is  neither  completely 
private nor the opposite and that most information needs to be worked on in order to become useful. 
To take an extreme case, the phone book may be free,  but even so you need to know the alphabet 
and how to use a phone before you get any value out of  it.  And even here there will be some (even if 
very small) search costs involved. 
On the other hand, we also know that intellectual property systems are of quite limited efficiency in 
excluding imitators. Firms belonging to sectors where the degree of  codification is high use patenting 
to a certain degree, while others use it much less, and in all sectors they are regarded as rather weak 
in protecting knowledge.  This means that the elements of technology that are codified and take on 
the form of information remain partially excludable because others do  not have access to the code 
rather  than  because  they  have  been  patented.  The  very  act  of patenting  is  in  itself a  form  of 
codification or of making the codes more transparent.  In this  sense  patents have  a  contradictory 
effect on the excludability of the information involved.  These empirically based insights point to a 
different world from the neo-classical one, where information is either public or private property and 
where it is the design of  intellectual property rights protection systems that makes it private. 
Tacit knowledge and market failure 
Returning now to the Dosi example, it is also important to note that what makes it possible for the 
few  outstanding experts to decode the Fermat theorem is  more than just an  enormous amount of 
information accumulated in their heads.  The experts are outstanding in their field because they have 
skills  and  competencies  that  cannot  be  codified,  not  because  they  have  absorbed  many  bits  of 
information. In science, as in business management, these skills are tricks of  the trade that have to be 
learnt  in  interaction  with  more  experienced  colleagues  and  to be  combined  with  creativity  and 
imagination - elements of knowledge that remain tacit.  This tacit knowledge cannot be bought off 
the shelf and while the services of the expert can be bought it is  difficult to prevent others from 
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to get physical control of  the brains of  eminent scientists. Tacit knowledge, as such, is not a tradable 
commodity. 
The classical examples of  tacit knowledge quoted in the literature are typically individuals skills (like 
cycling  and  swimming)  that cannot be  made  explicit  and  that cannot be transmitted through,  for 
instance, telecommunication networks. But, it is interesting to note that this and other kinds of  tacit 
knowledge closer to the economic process,  such as management skills and  economic competence, 
can  be  learnt.  They  will  typically  be  learnt  in  interaction  with  other  people,  through  a  master 
apprentice  or  collegial  relationship.  This  means  that  tacit  knowledge  can  be  shared  through 
interaction and co-operation.  Simple forms may be accessed through imitation of behaviour, but in 
most cases learning is greatly facilitated if  the master or colleague co-operates with the apprentice. 
On  completion  of a  specific  project  people  and  organisations  that  solve  problems  together will 
typically, as an end result, now share some of  their partners' original knowledge, as well as some of 
the new tacit knowledge produced by the interaction. Interactive learning is the key to sharing tacit 
knowledge, which means, of  course, that the social context is important for this kind of  learning - an 
observation which we shall discuss in more detail later. 
Tacit  knowledge is  not to be found  only  at the level  of the individual.  An organisation,  with  its 
specific  routines,  norms  of behaviour,  codes of information  etc.  may  be regarded  as  a  unit  that 
carries within it knowledge, a substantial part of  which is tacit. Management may, from time to time, 
make attempts to codify everything constituting the organisation - perhaps in order to make it less 
vulnerable to the risk that key persons leave the organisation - but,  if they are realistic they will 
realise  that  it  can  only  be  done  in  a very  simplistic  and  static  environment  and  that  the  efforts 
involved may bring the organisation in a stand-still while the rest of  the world keeps moving. 
Even industrial networks and inter-firm co-operation arrangements may be  seen  as  repositories of 
tacit  knowledge layered into  common  procedures and  codes  not reflected  in  formal  contracts or 
other documents. Some of  these procedures might be possible to codify while others would lose their 
meaning if  they were written down.  (Playing golf, drinking cocktails, flirting with professionals from 
another  organisation,  and  sharing  political,  religious  and  literary  tastes,  may  be  fundamental  in 
bringing people from different organisations together in projects of interactive learning but they do 
not look impressive  on paper and  they  undermine  their own function  if they become  part of an 
explicit and  purely instrumental  strategy.) This is  a problem similar to the formation of trust in  a 
market economy.  Arrow makes the point that trust cannot be bought, and even if you could buy it 
would have no value whatsoever. There would always be someone around to pay more for friendship 
and  trust relationships  if they were  for  sale  (Arrow,  1971).  The  informal  and  tacit  character of 
'know-who' kind of  knowledge (Lundvall and Johnson, 1992) is crucial for the strength of  networks. 
A major reason why the neo-classical vision of the world is  inadequate in  the globalising learning 
economy is that the formation of  and access to tacit and shared knowledge has now become the key 
to economic success. The process of interactive learning will  not take place in pure markets where 
individually optimising agents meet; there will be no general equilibrium and the ability to learn is not 
the  same  across  individuals  and  organisations.  The  learning  process  is  socially  embedded  and 
organisational forms  and  institutional  set-ups are crucial to the outcome of interactions.  The next 
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providing a sound analysis of  the learning economy. 
The key characteristics of  the neo-classical approach 
The reason why neo-classical economics is focused on appropriability and spill-over problems is,  of 
course, that all  models in this tradition - including new growth theory and new trade theory - are 
based  on  optimising  agents  aiming  at  maximum  profit  or individual  utility.  This  assumption  is 
necessary to define another major characteristic of  the tradition: the state of  equilibrium. In order to 
determine  what  agents  do  it  is  necessary  to  know  what  returns  they  expect  from  investing  in 
knowledge creation and in order to specify the returns it is imperative to specify the appropriability 
regime as either one of complete spill-overs or one of full  appropriability.  The most advanced new 
growth theories typically introduce a combination where part of  the output is private property while 
another part is public (Verspagen, 1992, p.23 et passim). 
Optimising and innovation 
The assumption of  optimisation in the context of  innovation is of  course highly problematic. Again, it 
is Kenneth Arrow who has pointed out that, in the case of  a true innovation, those who start working 
on it will know in  advance neither its technical characteristics nor its market potential.  To refer to 
this as 'fundamental uncertainty' is an understatement; Keynes' allegory of 'expeditions to the South 
Pole' gets closer to the truth. All empirical studies on significant innovations confirm this.  The first 
version  of new  product  is  primitive  and  reaches  only  a  small  group  of users.  Later  on  more 
sophisticated and less expensive versions develop and new markets open up. Firms with a lead in the 
technology may earn a lot of money but very few of them had any clear idea of what was going to 
happen when they introduced the first version of  a product innovation. 
Trying  to  apply  the  Friedmanite  argument  that  those  that  survived  a  selection  process, 
unconsciously,  acted as if they had been optimising is  not easy in  the light of empirical  evidence 
Many innovation managers confirm that their most successful innovations were made possible by the 
lack of control of management,  by  lax  accounting  procedures and  by  'irrational'  enthusiasm  To 
argue that since they won the race, they were unconsciously doing the instrumental calculations not 
only reduces the whole argument to a tautology, but also misleads management students,  ~  ho  will 
try  to  do  the  right  thing  all  the  way  through.  Most  innovation  studies  indicate  that  the  new 
networking mode of innovation discriminates against firms  that follow neo-classical rules and  one-
sidedly focus on their own profit maximisation; less structured patterns of  behaviour tend to actueve 
more success in the innovation race (Storper, 1997). 
Equilibrium and innovation 
The idea that equilibrium models should be the standard tool in economics is also difficult to apply to 
innovation. The position of Schumpeter in  his  conflict with his mentor Bohm-Bawerk is  still  valid. 
According to Richard Goodwin, Schum peter was excluded from Bohm-Bawerk' s seminar for a long 
period because he argued that capitalism in equilibrium could not be viable. It is the constant creation 
of new ideas, products, services and needs that keeps the system moving,  and if it ever reaches a 
state of  harmony where nothing changes it would not be a capitalist economy anymore. The dynamic 
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critical  growth rates and/or the proportions between inputs  and  sectors remain  constant is  quite 
different from anything witnessed in the real world. As pointed out and discussed in theoretical terms 
by Pasinetti (1981), growth and uneven development are two sides of  the same coin. 
Representative firms in the learning economy 
The  third  characteristic  of neo-classical  economics  that  needs  to  be  considered  is  the  use  of 
'representative agents'. All firms, including the local hot dog stand and General Motors, are assumed 
to follow the same basic rules when making decisions. These abstractions are motivated by the quest 
for a "general theory" of economics and for reasons of parsimony. If it were accepted that agents 
differ not only in regard to their skills,  access to information, and capability to learn, but also as to 
how 'rational' they are, it would be difficult to come up with precisely defined states of  equilibrium. 
This abstraction is a serious problem, however, when the area of study is innovation and change. In 
principle it is  possible to assume that innovation is  a  process where the outcome is  determined 
exclusively  by  a  combination of the  effort  made  and  chance,  and  that  all  firms  have  the  same 
probability for success.  Most innovation studies show that this is  not a  realistic assumption.  Path 
dependency and the cumulative character of knowledge give different firms very different  starting 
points. There are marked differences between firms belonging to the same sector, both in the forms 
of organisation used and in  performance in terms of learning  and innovation.  To disregard these 
differences  prevents  the  analyst,  and  the  policy  maker,  from  observing  and  analysing  a  rich 
unexploited source of  productivity growth (Andreasen et al,  1996). 
Another important result of innovation research is  that the basic characteristics of the innovation 
process differ from sector to sector (Pavitt,  1984). For instance, it is now well established that the 
role of science and  learning by doing differ between specialised  supplier firms  and  science based 
firms. To model average conduct is not recommendable. In the field of  innovation, models have to be 
explicit in recognising the coexistence and interaction of agents with different patterns of  behaviour 
(Cohendet  and  Llerena, 1997).  This  is  not  just  a  call  for  more  realism.  Overall  innovation 
performance in an economy depends on how sectors with different modes of  behaviour interact. To 
disregard such differences is to disregard information of  fundamental importance for policy design. 
Learning in the neo-classical model 
Neo-classical  analysis  assumes  that  agents  remain  the  same  in  crucial  respects  (preferences, 
competence and rules of  behaviour) throughout the process being analysed.  Very little room is left 
for agents to learn new rules of  behaviour and new skills. Bayesian learning leaves room for simple 
adaptation based on feedback about the outcome of  earlier action, but the basic preference schedules 
remain unchanged and so does the 'rationality' of  the agent. The state of  general equilibrium around 
which neo-classical economists build their models may be described as a state were there is no need 
and no incentive to learn. All expectations are fulfilled and "business as usual" is the best kind of  rule 
to follow.  We have already pointed out that knowledge and information are treated as one and the 
same in the neo-classical models, so the closest we get to something called "learning" is "information 
acquisition". The fact that most economically useful kinds of knowledge have a tacit dimension and 
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disregarded. 
Market failure in the learning economy 
Even among economists working within a different paradigm than the neo-classical, basic concepts 
of market failure,  externalities  and  spill-overs  tend  to monopolise  much  of the innovation policy 
debate. 
10  Here we shall  argue that there  are  other concepts more  relevant  to understanding the 
learning economy. 
The problem with using the market failure  concept in  the context of the learning economy is that 
almost  all  aspects  of knowledge  creation  and  learning  are  characterised  by  market  failure. 
Information (we shall come back to tacit knowledge below) is difficult to trade in a market because 
of  its inherent characteristics. 
It is  difficult to arrive at a price since the buyer does not know what he/she is  getting,  and if 
he/she does know he/she does not want to pay for it. 
Even if  you sell information you keep it and it is difficult for the buyer to get guarantees against 
a sale to potential competitors. 
Information may be costly to produce but the marginal cost of copying it is negligible (to use it 
intelligently is not always easy though). 
Information is  not scarce, but the ability to locate it,  select it  and use relevant  parts of it  is 
scarce. 
Typically this ability will grow when you use it; the more you use the resource the more you get 
of  it. 
These  characteristics  make  information/codified  knowledge  a  very  peculiar  commodity  and  all 
transactions involving it will be characterised by  elements of 'market failure'.  Tacit knowledge is 
plain market failure in the sense that it cannot, as such, be transacted in the market. Normally you 
can get access to it only by entering into a process of interactive learning.  This being the case, we 
can conclude that market failure is not a useful concept in the learning economy.  Since this applies 
wherever innovation policy matters it gives little help in locating a need for policy. 
10  See for instance Lipsey and Carlaw (1996). Here the whole argument is built around the concept 
of  spill-overs, while the content is actually about many other interesting problems, like mismatches 
between technology and social structures. 
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The concepts of  externalities and spill-overs take as their starting point the idea that all knowledge is 
originally produced by one individual unit and that a main concern for the producer is to avoid others 
getting access to it. This view is biased since, in the learning economy, networking, co-operation and 
learning-by-interacting are necessary elements in most successful strategies. 
It is true that agents try to keep some strategic information for themselves in specific situations and 
from time to time some of them even enter law-suits when their property rights have been illegally 
infringed. But they also enter into a complex set of  relationships where the aim of  the network is to 
create new knowledge,  to  share  and  pool  different  elements of knowledge  and  to stimulate  the 
spread of knowledge to as many users as possible.  In all  these relationships the main focus of the 
agents is not on hindering access by others to their knowledge but rather on creating a relationship 
that makes interactive learning possible. This implies that instrumental behaviour will become mixed 
up with 'communicative rationality'  where the common goal is  for  partners to understand  better 
what the problems are and what solutions can be developed (Lundvall, 1992). 
This  implies  that  the  rationality  determining  what  agents  do  is  context-specific.  The  academic 
professor who tries to sell his/her knowledge to students in order to maximise his income will found 
it difficult to survive, because learning does not thrive in a context of individual optimising.  Quality 
control would be undermined in such a system. In general, honesty is fundamental for the quality and 
efficiency of  academic knowledge production. If  a professor systematically steals his/her colleagues' 
ideas and does not contribute his/her own ideas through open exchange in seminars he/she will  be 
excluded from academic networks. It is obvious that academia is a world where pure instrumentalist 
behaviour does not pay, which is why there is a shared set of  norms that people should be honest and 
open in  their communication  (this  is  not to say  that real  universities  are purely  oriented  toward 
communication and have no instrumentalists in the staff). Let us now assume that the same university 
professor wants  to  sell  his/her  car  on  the  open  market.  In  this  situation  he/she  might  ~  less 
communicative, and would not feel a strong moral pressure to reveal more about the weakneisn of 
the car than is absolutely necessary to avoid a law-suit. 
At the other end of the scale, there might be a company lawyer who is an expert in  pursUJnt:  Lt""-
suits in intellectual property rights cases. His/her main concern will be that the firm does not  ~·"r too 
much away in  terms of information to competitors.  Even so,  he/she might  regularly  eng.Jttt  an  a 
process of interactive learning with  lawyers  from  other firms  to find  the  right  loop-holes  an  an 
interesting case- a phenomenon von Rippel (1987) calls "know-how trading". Our point here" t~t 
what you do and the context in which you do  it will  affect your rules of behaviour and  ~·m the 
rationale on which you base your behaviour. Engineers, technicians and others engaged in inter1ct1\·e 
learning in order to solve common technical and organisational problems will not be as instrumental 
as sales people and lawyers. They will promote rather than restrict 'spill-overs'. 
New growth theory 
New growth theory and new trade theory represent radical changes in the way technology is treated 
in neo-classical theoretical models, and technology is no longer exogenous in these models. There is 
a  multitude  of different  models  but  they  all  regard  technological  progress  and  its  impact  on 
-50-.. 
productivity and  economic growth as  something to be  explained within the model.  Some models 
emphasise learning by doing (Romer,  1986 and Lucas,  1988a  ),  others investment in human capital 
(Lucas,  1988b)  and  still  others investment in  R&D  to devise  new and  more  efficient production 
techniques (Grossman and Helpman, 1989, and Romer, 1990). Some of  the technological knowledge 
produced is assumed to be protected private property while some is public information. 
In order to include the specific characteristics of  the innovation processes the models abandon some 
of  the neo-classical standard assumptions such as increasing marginal costs and perfect competition, 
although they still retain the more basic set of assumptions discussed above:  firms  are still assumed 
to be homogeneous optimising units and the model is focused on defining a unique equilibrium path 
of  economic growth. 
One  major  conclusion  from  most  of these  models  is  that  it  pays  an  economy  to  have  a  large 
proportion of well-trained people in the labour force.  Another major conclusion is that big systems 
grow more rapidly than small ones.  If we compare these conclusions with historical and  empirical 
evidence  we find  that  the  first  conclusion  is  too  simple  since  the  ability  to  use  human  capital 
effectively is necessary in order to realise the potential. Investment in human capital is a prerequisite 
but not a sufficient  condition for rapid  economic growth.  The  second conclusion has been tested 
empirically by Fagerberg (1995), who found that it is true only for  some specific sectors like cars, 
computers and  electronics, while factors  other than scale  - such  as  investment in  technology and 
wage costs predominate for most other products. 
Nelson (1994) looks at the post-war history of  thought on economic growth and shows that most of 
the ideas contained in both the old and the new growth theory were already present in the survey of 
economic growth made by  Abramovitz (1952).  The real  mystery is  why it took so long for neo-
classical theorists to include them in their theoretical models and,  according to Nelson, there are still 
important pieces of Abramovitz' analysis missing, especially the introduction of institutional factors. 
Nelson argues that the main  impact of formally  modelling what was already well  known,  was to 
legitimise the field of  research and to attract young students to the field of  growth analysis. 
The  focus  on  the  appropriability  and  spill-over  problem  has  remained  central  to  the  debate  on 
technology policy, even in the context of  new growth theory. New growth theory has developed the 
perspective and made distinctions between, respectively,  'excludability' and  'rivalry' of knowledge. 
According to this new interpretation, a significant proportion of knowledge is non-rival in the sense 
that its use by one agent does not undermine its usefulness for others, and part of it is excludable in 
the sense that others can be hindered from getting access to it whereas other parts are open to public 
access (Romer, 1986, and Romer, 1990). 
New growth theory follows the neo-classical tradition in its strong assumptions regarding optimising 
behaviour. Agents are assumed to be homogenous and well-informed about the potential profitability 
of  investment in  'new designs'. The analysis focuses on equilibrium paths of economic growth. The 
models assume all agents to be similar in terms of  behaviour and competence. They treat knowledge 
as synonymous with information and there is no specification of  the institutional context. So even if 
they, in some important respects, have brought the theoretical models closer to reality than the 'old' 
neo-classical ones they are not well-suited for tackling the problems of the learning economy.  The 
advice they can offer to policy-makers is at best very general, and at worst misleading. 
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This lack of precise information has not prevented the implementation of specific forms of policy 
intervention, based on techno-economic and political arguments,  with a mixture of theoretical and 
practical  considerations  as  inspiration.  The  common  approach in  the field,  if not in  all  practical 
measures,  was  based  on  a  linear  model  of innovation  whereby  investment  in  basic  science  was 
regarded as an input into technology development to be introduced later on by business. The further 
away from the market the more legitimate was government intervention. This led to certain types of 
bias in the strategies pursued.  Technology policy  concentrated on the production and  to a lesser 
extent the dissemination of  new knowledge, relying in the first place on the support ofbasic research. 
This strategy directly followed Arrow's assumptions of 'market failures'  and corresponds to the old 
neo-classical model where the absorption of knowledge is without friction.  In practice, technology 
policy has tended to pursue simultaneously two broad objectives: 
to support,  enhance  and  accelerate the development  and  use of technology through financial 
measures 
to regulate the use and  development of technology in  such a way as to eliminate or minimize 
risks posed by technology to health, society and the environment (Braun 1994). 
There  are  some  exceptions  where the  state has  traditionally  been  seen  as  entitled  to  extend  its 
involvement in  technological  development  to fields  closer to the market.  One  case  is  large-scale 
technologies  (known  as  "big"  science)  where  the  massive  financial  requirements  resulting  from 
technological and/or economic indivisibility exceed the capacity of private companies. This kind of 
market failure  argument has been used to justify government intervention in technology fields  like 
transport, space, nuclear energy and  computers. A second argument for state intervention has been 
that of  gaining and maintaining international competitiveness (Rothwell and Zegveld 1980). The state 
has  often placed  direct  contracts with  companies to  develop  specific  technologies  either through 
technological procurement policy,  or through direct  subsidies for  specific R&D  projects.  A third 
powerful argument for state involvement has been the avoidance of  technological dependencies. This 
argument is closely related to the second one, but has tended to justify support of  applied research in 
the field of  military technology. 
New theoretical insights and macro-trends in policy action 
11 
Implicitly the agenda for the new theoretical developments has been presented already by outlining 
the characteristics of  the learning economy and the difficulties in understanding these through a neo-
classical  approach.  The relevant contributions to a new theoretical understanding in  this field  are 
heterogeneous and come from different strands of  thought. Here, we will start by indicating what we 
11 This section is partly based on the contributions ofProf Keith Smith (1997): "Systems approaches 
to innovation: Some policy issues" (unpublished paper) and ofProf Franco Malerba (1996):"Public 
Policy in Industrial Dynamics: An Evolutionary Perspective" (unpublished paper) . 
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new theoretical perspective. These are: 
... ·  Innovation  is  not  a  marginal  phenomenon  in  the  economy  - it  is  central  to the  industrial 
dynamics and growth of  regions and nations. 
Innovation is  an  interactive process rooted in  searching  and  learning.  Interactive learning  is 
socially embedded and there is thus no  'economic sphere' that can be strictly isolated from the 
social sphere. Institutions matter for conduct and performance. 
Agents  differ  in  terms  of competence  and  rationality  and  they  change  in  these  respects  in 
connection with learning processes. Their ability to learn also differs, and reflects earlier learning 
as well as their ability to forget. 
Economic structural change reflects the transformation of agents and  organisations on the one 
hand, as combined with a process of  selection of  agents and organisations on the other hand. 
The internal organisation of  a firm and its positioning in innovative networks are crucial for the 
conduct  and  performance  of the  firm.  Innovative  networks  also  include  knowledge-based 
organisations such as universities and laboratories. 
There  are  systemic  differences  between  countries  (and  regions)  in  terms  of broader  social 
context, organisational forms and patterns of specialisation. National systems of innovation do 
different things and they do them differently. 
One common characteristic of the new approaches is  that innovation  is  perceived  as  a  complex, 
interactive  and  open-ended  process,  with  a  collective  dimension.  It is  essentially  a  process  of 
learning, where formal and informal institutions play a major role. Knowledge is cumulative, building 
up  from  the  knowledge  base  within  given  technological  paradigms  and  along  technological 
trajectories. Knowledge development is regarded as an evolutionary and path dependent process 
1 ~ 
Major contributions to the understanding of  these phenomena have come from: 
evolutionary economics (Nelson and Winter, 1982, and Andersen, 1994) 
institutional economics (Hodgson, 1988, and Johnson, 1992) 
12 Path-dependency refers to technological and scientific dimensions, which should not be confused 
with the linearity of  the neo-classical model of  the innovation process (which refers to the automatic 
connection between expansion of  the knowledge-base and technological development in the 
economy). 
-53-new regional economics (Storper and Scott, 1992, and Storper, 1997) 
economics of learning and knowledge (Polanyi,  1988, Nonaka and Takeuchi,  1995, and Foray 
·  and Lundvall, 1996) 
economics of  innovation (Freeman, 1982, and Freeman, 1994) 
There have been important developments in  each of these fields  and  a lot of interaction between 
them  in  the  last  ten  years  or so.  The  economics  of innovation,  with  people  like  Christopher 
Freeman, Giovanni Dosi, Luc Soete, Paul David and Richard Nelson in key positions, has played a 
major  role in  connecting the different  strands of thought (e.g.  Dosi et al,  1988  - this  piece  of 
collaboration represented a break-through for the new ideas). Each field  has contributed in its own 
way to the formation of  the new theoretical paradigm. 
Evolutionary economics has been helpful in emphasising the importance of diversity as a source of 
innovation and in modelling the innovation process as both cumulative and stochastic. It also helps 
to understand processes that include reproduction and transformation as well as selection. In relation 
to innovation policy it gives the policy-maker a less ambitious role than the optimising one implicit in 
neo-classical analysis (Metcalfe and Georghiou, 1997). 
Institutional  economics  places  itself at  the  border  between  theory  and  history,  and  offers  a 
conceptual framework well-suited to encompassing the regularities in behaviour that characterise an 
economy where change and uncertainty is the rule rather than the exception. Norms and routines, 
shared perceptions and  modes of interaction are often implicit,  and  are  important since they  are 
regularities without which little learning and innovation could take place.  In relation to innovation 
policy this approach points to the opportunities and limitations of institutional learning, e.g.  across 
national systems of  innovation (Johnson, 1997). 
Regional economics has always been more open to interdisciplinary influences than most other sub-
disciplines  in  economics.  The  new  contributions  from  Scott,  Storper  and  a  number  of French 
economists  include  elements  from  the  other  subdisciplines  mentioned  and  combine  them  with 
broader social theory in a creative way.  They analyse how the different (inter-personal, intellectual, 
industrial  and  market)  worlds  are  constructed  and  built  around  conventions  and  common 
interpretations. In relation to innovation policy this approach points to the need to build and renew 
local  knowledge-intensive  networks  in  order to  create  strongholds  in  global  markets  (Storper, 
1996). 
The economics of  innovation has developed into a field  of research which uses different theoretical 
tools  often  combined  with  historical  analysis,  and  was  central  to  the  theoretical  transformation 
discussed here.  The enormous amount of empirical data gathered at different levels of aggregation 
has played a key role in stimulating new theoretical contributions and  most of the  'stylised facts' 
referred to above emanate from  such research. Major contributions to innovation policy have been 
the analytical work on national systems of innovation (Freeman,  1987, Freeman,  1995a, Lundvall, 
1992, and Nelson, 1993). 
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it is  only recently that it has been given an  explicit emphasis (Dosi,  1996}.  It has been helpful in 
getting  a  better understanding  of the  organisational  and  spatial  dimension  of innovation.  Much 
,remains to be done in testing some of the basic concepts, such as tacit versus codified knowledge, 
and in connecting with other disciplines with more experience in working on these issues. One of  its 
major contributions to innovation  policy is  to  direct  the  attention of policy-makers  to forms  of 
knowledge  creation that are  not  easily  covered  by  traditional  statistical  measures  (Lundvall  and 
Johnson, 1992}. 
These sub-disciplines cannot be used in isolation to analyse the learning economy. They need to be 
connected to history, and some of  the most interesting recent contributions in the field represent new 
combinations oftheory and history (Nelson,  1994, and Freeman,  1995b).  Such analysis is useful in 
highlighting  the  need  for  policy  intervention  in  relation  to  potential  mismatches  between  new 
technological opportunities and the organisation of  the economy (Lipsey and Carlaw, 1996). 
The new policy rationale 
The evolutionary and systemic approach to the innovation process provides a new understanding of 
the role of  policy action, and its rationale. This will be reflected in the next major part of this report 
where different aspects of innovation policy will be considered. Here we shall mention some of the 
TSER contributions that transgress the market failure perspective. Keith Smith and Franco Malerba 
have, respectively, developed a typology of 'failures' as a basis for policy action rationale. This does 
not, a priori, invalidate the Arrow-inspired 'market failures'  and the risks for under investment, but 
both typologies go beyond the interpretation that failures are exclusively related to the properties of 
scientific  knowledge.  Failures  are  also  related  to  other activities,  processes  or organisatio1;1s  that 
affect directly the technological performance of  a given system. 
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-56-The identification of theses new types of failures  is  intrinsically related to the rationale for public 
action. 
13  This means that the typology of  failures contains in itself a typology for public intervention. 
This  second  implied  typology  is  based  on the goals  pursued  rather than  on the  mechanisms  or 
procedures used. (see the two boxes above). 
These  two  overlapping  typologies  give  a  clear  picture  of the  policy  concerns  raised  by  the 
evolutionary perspective. In order to move along these lines, they can be reformulated here into three 
general trade-offs: 
•  The  exploitation-exploration dilemma.  Lock-in failure,  exploration failure  and  tough selection 
regimes all indicate that the design of the innovation system tends to make firms pursue narrow 
strategies and that radically new innovations and directions of change are not opened up.  On the 
other hand, narrow trajectories may sometimes be the most efficient for moving rapidly ahead in 
terms of  incremental innovation, dissemination and efficient use of  innovations. We could perhaps 
follow Malerba and put these considerations together under the heading 'exploitation-exploration 
dilemma '. 
14 
•  The  integration-flexibility dilemma.  Transition, complementarity and learning failures mean that 
the innovative organisation (firm, research institution, etc.) should be organised in such a way that 
it becomes an integrated learning organisation and cannot normally stand alone because it  has too 
narrow  a  knowledge-base.  Therefore  it  needs  to be  connected  to  other  firms  or knowledge 
centres. Such connections may be a key to innovation along a given trajectory but may also be a 
major  factor  in  creating  'lock-in'.  We  could  gather  these  aspects  under  the  heading  'Jhe 
integration-flexibility dilemma'. 
•  The  diversity-harmonising dilemma.  The  strong  selectivity  context of the globalising  learning 
economy is a real incentive for harmonising and standardising technologies and institutions in  an 
13  Arundel and Soete (1993) set an important precedent for this new rationale of  policy making, and 
deal specifically with the EU context. 
14 This dilemma played an important role in the Maastrich manifesto on innovation policy (Arundel 
and Soete, eds., 1993). Many of  the ideas in this report overlap with those in the Maastricht 
document. In some areas related to the importance of  competition and selection in the learning 
economy we go further than our predecessor, while in other areas we continue the debates already 
begun in this document. 
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attempt  to  benefit  from  economies  of scale  (for  example,  creating  early  standards,  and 
homogeneous intellectual property rights,  on a European and world scale). In fact,  there are still 
important  'standardisation  failures'  in  the  EU.  However,  the  institutional  and  technological 
.. learning capacity of  the systems depends on the diversity of the knowledge-base and institutional 
structures.  Diversity  of factor  endowments,  of products  and  processes,  of institutional  and 
collective behaviour, and of learning abilities are four essential dimensions that make diversity a 
crucial source for learning. Therefore policies at all levels of government in the EU have to take 
into account the benefits of diversity while pursuing standardisation in some crucial areas where 
technologies have begun to be stabilised. 
Infrastructure,  legal  instruments for  appropriation,  or more generally institutions and  regulations, 
may be treated at a different level of  analysis. They should be designed in such a way that they create 
an  acceptable balance in  the trade-offs  referred  to  above.  But they  are  not the  only  options  for 
policy.  Programmes  designed  to  stimulate  organisational  and  institutional  learning  inside  and 
between firms and assist them in developing organisational innovation are becoming more and more 
important.  Macro-economic  regimes  play  a  major  role  in  determining  the  general  direction  of 
innovation.  Financial  markets  and  governance  modes  affect  the  short-termism  of innovative 
activities. 
It is obvious that the three dilemmas reflect a theoretical universe that is quite different from the neo-
classical  one.  In  the  neo-classical  universe,  representative  firms  will  do  what  is  best  for  them, 
especially if  left to themselves by governments, and there is little room for alternative strategies when 
it comes to developing new technology or designing the organisation and network position. A major 
difference is that in evolutionary economics, agents differ in  crucial respects. Not only do they do 
different things on the basis of different capabilities, but their general economic competence  ~s also 
different.  Since  capabilities and  competences can  be  acquired  through learning  there is  room for 
governments to support  these learning processes. 
It is a major task for socio-economic research to analyse which factors and institutional set-ups are 
most important in  striking a balance between exploration and exploitation and between integration 
and flexibility. One specific important issue is how European policies should strike a balance between 
exploiting diversity and pursuing standardisation strategies at the Community level. 
New directions for innovation policy over the last two decades 
Picking winners or creating general framework conditions? 
One factor that has delayed the development of appropriate policies has been the ideological debate 
about the old plan-versus-market controversy.  As  indicated above,  analysis focused  on innovation 
will demonstrate that 'pure markets' are problematic when it comes to stimulating innovation. It will 
also  show that modes  of interaction  between  firms  involving  a  mixture  of competition  and  co-
operation are more efficient than 'pure competition'. The invisible hand is not so invisible anymore 
and the issue is not whether governments should interfere in a near-perfect market economy. This is 
not an argument for massive and detailed government intervention, but rather for  a pragmatic and 
realistic assessment of  what governments could and should do. 
-58-A favourite theme in the eighties was that governments cannot 'pick winners' and that this implies a 
move away from selective policies and a stronger focus on framework conditions, i.e.  conditions that 
are in principle common to all firms in a national economy. This argument is sound but perhaps goes 
too  far.  On  the  one  hand  there  is  always  a  risk  that  governments  become  captives  of specific 
industrial  interests  and  detailed  interventions  and  specific  subsidies  may  create  a  culture  of 
'clientelism'  among  firms.  On  the  other  hand  the  concept  of 'general  framework  conditions'  is 
misleading  in  the  sense  that any  set of framework  conditions  will  affect  different  types  of firms 
differently (for instance knowledge base, financial  requirements and infrastructure needs will  differ 
according to firm size and sector). 
An interesting compromise between moving towards general framework conditions and taking into 
account that the most important framework conditions differ from firm to firm has been developed in 
some  of the  smaller  OECD countries.  In  the  Netherlands  there  has  been  a  growing  focus  on 
industrial clusters which encompass vertically organised sub-systems of firms,  while Danish analysts 
and policy-makers have broken down the whole economy into nine 'resource areas' with a forum for 
each  of these  areas  including  policy-makers,  analysts,  trade  unionists  and  industrialists.  These 
forums conduct informal debates as to which changes in the existing framework conditions are most 
needed and there is a close connection between these debates and new law proposals. 
The  major  problem  with  such  a  model  has  to  do  with  the  exploitation/exploration  and 
integration/flexibility  dilemmas.  In  general,  industrial  policies  are  normally  more  efficient  in 
consolidating exploitation of  existing opportunities than in opening up new avenues. This comes out 
clearly when comparing national systems of innovation and the role of governments in this context 
(Edquist and Lundvall,  1993). And the normal tendency is to reinforce patterns of connectivity and 
linkages  which  are  already  there.  Bringing  policy-makers  into  close  dialogue  with  groups  of 
industrialists  who  command  a  common  position  in  the  economy  will  normally  reinforce  these 
tendencies. 
What may be needed is  to supplement these institutional  set-ups with new bodies debating policy 
issues  which  are  neither  economy-wide  nor  sector-specific- rather  like  when  innovative  firms 
establish task forces to develop new products and services.  These bodies would bring together the 
front  runners  and  individual  industrialists  rather  than  representatives  of the  mainstream  and  the 
laggards. 
Finally, it might be useful to link policy considerations to the 'learning economy' in a more specific 
way. Learning is  a process that is not promoted by detailed regulations and intervention.  The ideal 
learning environment is characterised by a predictable institutional framework and by incentives that 
make it attractive to learn in interaction with others. In this sense, the learning economy concept also 
gives priority to the creation of  framework conditions rather than to detailed intervention. 
-59-Recent trends at nationa//eve/
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OECD  and  EU monitoring  of the  development  of the  technology  and  industrial  policies  of its 
member countries provides a unique view of  the most recent developments. The latest editions of  the 
different country reports show that countries are beginning to shape their policies taking into account 
factors  characterising  a  learning  economy.  It is  possible  to  recognise  six  different  trends  in  the 
formulation of  national innovation policies. 
Firstly,  the  distinction  between  industrial  and  technology  policy  is  becoming  less  and  less 
pronounced.  Innovation is tending to become the main cornerstone of all  industrial policy strategy 
consequently producing policies that aim  to influence  all  the factors which promote technological 
innovation. In this context, it is interesting to note that more and more OECD countries are now in 
the  process  of carrying  out  analyses  of what  the  OECD  describes  as  'their  national  system  of 
innovation'. It orients the attention of  policy-makers to linkages and interactions within and between 
different  sub-systems.  For instance,  it  is  now unthinkable to optimise university  systems without 
taking into account connections and interactions with industry and other major users of  research and 
higher education. 
Secondly,  greater attention is  being paid to the wide-ranging internationalisation of technological 
development  and  implementation.  The  ability  to  incorporate  technology  developed  outside  a 
country's borders is perceived as a decisive factor of competition. Firms are increasingly involved in 
international co-operation involving the development and use of new technologies.  It is recognised 
that firms of  limited size have difficulties in following this trend. Therefore, it has become a new task 
for  governments to support firms  in  their  efforts  to internationalise their activities.  This  includes 
technology forecasting and the establishment of international rules for the sharing and protection of 
intellectual property rights. 
Thirdly, a clear policy trend, already mentioned, is to move away from sector-specific subsidies and 
equivalent  industry-specific  arrangements.  Industrial  policy  is  gradually  focusing  on  aggregated 
development blocks (also  called  'resource areas'  or 'clusters'),  which consist of several  mutually 
related sectors (Carlsson and Henriksson, 1991). It is also becoming increasingly common to look at 
how service activities are linked to different parts of manufacturing.  There is  a general tendency to 
recognise that services are becoming more important in relation to innovation and learning too and 
that the borderlines between services and manufacturing are gradually becoming less clear (OECD, 
1996b). 
Fourthly,  there  is  growing recognition that  new  technology  alone  can  not  solve the  problem of 
industrial and economic performance. Learning and knowledge are tied to people, and if the people 
cannot keep pace, there is little point in having access to advanced machinery or advanced computer 
programs.  Not least  experience  with  the  application  of information  technology  has  shown  that 
15  This section is based mainly on the contribution by Bengt Ake Lund  vall ( 1996): "Technology 
Policy in the Learning Economy" (unpublished paper). 
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dramatic  reductions  in  efficiency.  The  need  to  stimulate  investment  in  human  resources  and 
organisational  change  at  the  firm  level  has  become  more  widely  recognised  by  policy-makers 
(OECD, 1996a). 
Fifthly, along with the gradual realisation of  the systemic nature of  innovation process, the emphasis 
on development of technology policy has  shifted  from  the supply  side towards the demand  side. 
Given  that the  innovation  and  learning  processes  are  interactive  and  involve  both  technological 
knowledge and knowledge of  user needs, it is natural that the one-sided focus of technology policy 
on the producer side is gradually being abandoned in favour of a more balanced approach.  In fact, 
those technology policies which seem to provide the most visible and positive results are those which 
place  most  emphasis  on  the  user  in  development  projects.  In  practice,  this  entails  supporting 
measures  to  improve  user  competence,  promoting  co-operation  projects  which  comprise  both 
producers and users, or providing direct support to users who in tum - via co-operative purchasing 
mechanisms - stimulate producers to develop new and better products. 
Finally,  there  has  been  a growing  understanding  of the  importance  of innovation  policy  for  the 
performance  of the  economy  as  a whole,  and  of the  need  to  coordinate innovation  policy  with 
macro-economic policy.  The OECD study on technology, productivity,  employment and economic 
growth initiated by the G7  countries marked a new step in  this  direction by  showing that flexible 
labour markets and non-inflationary general economic policies are not sufficient to create attractive 
jobs and social cohesion.  This was also a major theme in the EU White Paper on employment and 
growth. 
These new tendencies are transforming the nature of  government intervention.  They indicate _a  shift 
in the perceptions and focus of  policy-makers towards a wider understanding of  the complexities and 
dynamics of  innovation, and of  the crucial role oflearning in the economy. 
However, developments in these respects are partial and very uneven.  Often small countries tend to 
take the lead in introducing the new ideas.  The Netherlands is most advanced in its cluster policies, 
Denmark in its focus on organisational change,  Sweden in procurement policies to encourage users 
of innovation and Finland in using the innovation system perspective. In many countries and also in 
some parts ofEU policy, there is still a tendency to take the linear model of  innovation as the starting 
point and to neglect the new systemic perspective. 
A general problem is that there is  still little awareness of the fundamental dilemmas and trade-off's 
referred  to  above.  Government  policies  still  tend  to  promote  movement  along  well-known 
trajectories  and  the  reinforcement  of already  established  networks.  Actually  it  seems  that  policy 
action normally tends to reinforce what is already comparatively strong rather than to strengthen the 
weak parts of  the innovation system. To indicate ways government can contribute to the opening up 
of new trajectories and the establishment of new patterns of co-operation and interactive learning is 
one of  the main tasks of  this report. 
-61-Concluding remarks 
It is now possible to sketch the outlines of a new policy paradigm that takes into account both the 
characteristics of the learning  economy  and  new theoretical  developments.  This  new  paradigm is 
oriented towards shaping an efficient innovation system that can adapt to rapid change. 
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In order to transform these results into effective policies there will need to be stronger connection 
between  policy  learning  based  on  practical  experience  and  systematic  evaluations  of policy 
programmes. This is the subject of  the next chapter on policy learning. 
-62-C·hapter 4: Policy learning 
Introduction 
In the last chapter we examined the theoretical background of new policy trends and  the need to 
design policy actions in new ways. From the theoretical understanding of  the challenges and risks of 
the globalised learning economy a new policy rationale emerged, with a broader view about failures 
and the role of public action.  However, two further points deserve attention.  Firstly,  the idea that 
policy  should  focus  on institutional  learning;  and  secondly,  that  policy-making  itself should  be  a 
learning process. 
Interactive learning is essentially an institutionally-embedded process (Dalum, Johnson and Lundvall, 
1992, p 311). This statement rests on two interrelated assumptions.  Firstly, the fact that economic 
performance might relate more to the existence of institutional barriers to change than to the lack 
of technical knowledge as such;  and secondly, that institutional learning is central to  the growth 
patterns of each  economic  system.  We now  go  a step  further in  this discussion by relating  the 
·exploitation  of the  knowledge  base  to  the  institutional  set-up.  Institutional  learning,  or  the 
capacity to adapt the institutional set-up to  new circumstances and environments, is a key  factor 
for technological development. As in the case of knowledge, it is possible for innovation systems 
to  borrow  institutional  set-ups  in  the  search  for  better  performance.  The  following  box 
distinguishes between institutional borrowing and learning. 
Institutional borrowing has  some clear limits,  as  foreign  institutions are never fully  transferable 
into a different systemic context from the one in which they where created. Therefore, borrowing 
implies to a greater or lesser extent a process of institutional learning and adaptation to  the new 
system. This is inherent in the 'national system of innovation' concept. 
The second element mentioned earlier, namely policy-making as a learning process will be examined 
in this chapter. This can be seen as the 'soft side'  of innovation policy,  which should be carefully 
designed too, in order to enhance policy solutions and strategies which are more effective, adaptable 
and accountable. This is based on the perception that public policy forms part of the innovation 
system  (be  it European,  national  or regional)  and  in  this  sense  can  no  longer be perceived  as 
-63-static,  but  rather  as  a  dynamic  element  (indeed,  a  central  element)  that  affects  the  overall 
performance of the system. 
The new theoretical perspectives presented in the last chapter also point to  policy learning as  a 
natural ingredient in  the  innovation  system.  While  the  neo-classical  approach  focuses  on  well 
defined ideal states (general equilibrium) and assumes rational agents,  evolutionary economics is 
more modest in  these respects.  While neo-classical economics presents the policy-maker as  'an 
optimising technology policy planner' (Metcalfe and Georghiou,  1997, p.1), evolutionary models 
'suggest  how  informed judgement can  direct  policy  to  areas  in  which  the  chances  of useful 
intervention is high' (Lipsey and Car  law,  1996, p.  1). It is obvious that there is much more room 
and need for learning in the context of the evolutionary perspective. 
This chapter therefore centres on this second dimension of the policy implications of the learning 
economy, with special attention to the need to enhance the learning abilities of public institutions 
and actors. A number of questions therefore arise in relation to  the ideal policy definition,  which 
depends on  the nature of policy-making.  What is  the nature of policy change and  what are the 
conditions  for  policy  learning?  How  can  this  be improved  at  European,  national  and  regional 
levels? 
Enhancing policy learning 
The literature on  policy  analysis  largely  considers  the  nature and  forms  of policy  change  and 
continuity. Due to the limits of the current report,  it is not the intention here to review this rich 
literature within the discipline of political science,  but rather to  refer succinctly to  some of the 
most salient and recent works on this topic. 
Studies of policy change have traditionally  taken  as  a  starting  point the  so-called  policy  cycle, 
based on the different ideal stages of the policy process, namely decision-making, implementation 
and  evaluation.  The learning  approach  criticises  this  assumption  because  it does  not  appear  to 
provide a satisfactory account of what happens  after the  decision-making  phase,  and  especially 
because change is  perceived as  somehow  automatic after the political impact of the  evaluation. 
The learning  approach,  on  the other hand,  provides  a  fluid  perspective of a policy  process  in 
continuous transformation and evolution where no clear stages can be discerned (Teubal,  1997, p 
1180).  In  this  sense  the  learning  approach  has  been  considered  an  advance  on  the  traditional 
policy cycle model by providing an integrative framework for viewing change in the process from 
a non-linear perspective (Parsons,  1995). 
This  relatively  new  approach  suggests  that  the  keys  to  understanding  policy  change  and  the 
implicit learning  dimension  of the  policy  process  are  transformations  in  the  collective  beliefs 
within  the  political  system  (Sabatier  and  Jenkins-Smith,  1993).  This  contrasts  with  previous 
models which identified different ideal types of change (Hogwood and Peters, 1983). 
The learning approach includes a set of normative insights which tended to be absent in previous 
approaches. The key normative statement centres on the need to improve and speed up learning in 
-64-the  policy-making  process.  In this  sense,  Metcalfe  emphasises  the  need  to  design  adaptable 
systems and create conditions for policy learning. 
Creating  an  adaptable  system  means  two  things.  Firstly,  as  we  mentioned  earlier,  enhancing 
institutional and  individual learning within  the innovation  system;  and  secondly,  improving  the 
·conditions for the innovation policy learning process. 
We will now  focus  on  this  second  aspect,  and  identify three specific  measures  for encouraging 
policy  learning,  namely,  making  more  extensive  use  of external  and  independent  sources  for 
policy  (re)formulation,  enhancing  social  and  political  participation,  and  improving  the 
possibilities for learning from others. 
Making  more  extensive  use  of  external  and  independent  sources  for  policy 
(re )formulation
16 
Policy evaluation mechanisms have traditionally been the chief source of policy (re)formulation in 
the national context. In science and technology policies, evaluation mechanisms started mainly as 
mechanisms for checking the quality  and  relevance of draft and  final projects subsidised by  the 
state.  The procedure most commonly  used  for this  purpose in  the  different European countries 
was peer review. The current forms and mechanisms of evaluation of S&T policies have evolved 
from  these  procedures  for  controlling  researchers'  activities,  to  include  examination  of RTD 
programme performance, and an overall critical analysis of the S&T policy. 
16 This section owes much to the contributions ofLuis Sanz (1997) and Svend Otto Remoe (1996). 
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country.  Similarly, the organisational arrangements to carry them out diverge in important ways 
between  national  contexts.  This  national  diversity  is  linked  to  the  different  forms  of control 
activities  developed  according  to  specific  historical  processes,  and  more  generally,  to  the 
development of (national) public management styles. Moreover, the use and impact of evaluations 
are also local and  specific to  each  national context.  On-going  analysis of these differences and 
similarities shows that there is still no systematic approach to evaluation in most EU countries.
17 
However, in most EU countries there are clear signs that these patterns are changing. Monitoring 
is now well established and overall evaluation practices are becoming more politically relevant for 
the redefinition of policy strategies. In many countries, this has happened as a result of domestic 
forces.  In others,  like Greece and  Portugal,  where S&T policies have been established in close 
relation  to  the  European  Structural  Funds,  evaluation  procedures  have  become  a  requirement 
imposed mainly by external forces  (European Community rules)  with the purpose of controlling 
the good use of funding. 
Given these general trends in Europe, there is clearly a need to go further down this road towards 
more  systematic  evaluation  procedures  and  more  extensive  use  of evaluation  results  in  the 
redefinition of policy.  In other words,  it is  still  necessary in  Europe to  maximise  the potential 
feedback benefits from  systematic S&T policy evaluation.  This is supposed to stimulate learning 
within  each  innovation  system,  and  between  systems,  and  thus  to  increase  the  adaptability  of 
policy strategies to the new globalising learning economy. 
Some authors have gone further along  these lines  by  stressing  the need  to  enhance the role of 
international  evaluation  (Remoe,  1997),  which  is  taken  to  include  four  different  types  of 
operation:  evaluations  conducted  in/for  international  organisations;  the  development  of 
international  evaluation  teams  to  operate  in  national  contexts;  international  benchmarking  and 
comparative studies of national contexts;  international user groups and  knowledge transfer units 
of national policy-makers. 
17 See "Advanced Science and Technology Policy Planning- Towards the Integration of  Technology 
Foresight, Technology Assessment and S&T Policy Evaluation" in a research project (ASTPP) under 
the TSER programme. 
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and key elements in the policy learning process. 
Besides evaluation mechanisms, which are generally of an internal nature, there is a need to make 
more extensive use of external and independent technology assessment and forecasting resources. 
Independent technology assessment can decisively contribute to the definition and improvement of 
technology  and  innovation  policy  strategies  from  a  medium- or  long-term  perspective. 
Technology assessment works also as a bridging institution at the highest level,  in the interface 
between technical and economic expertise and  society.  In this  sense,  technology assessment has 
the dual task of promoting and controlling activities under the chosen technology options. 
There have recently been attempts to re-emphasise the importance of technology assessment in the 
formulation  of S&T  policy  alternatives.  The  notion  of "constructive  technology  assessment" 
follows  new  efforts to  introduce dynamic elements into the previous  more static approach.  The 
traditional assessment analysis of the unequal distribution of negative and positive externalities in 
society,  needs  to  be  complemented  with  a  more  dynamic  approach  "focusing  on  the  broad 
societal integration of technology in society and the adaptation of technology to  society's needs" 
(Soete,  1995,  p.  45).  This new  approach is still based in  the notion of externalities,  but from  a 
dynamic and systemic point of view. 
Enhancing  the  social  and  political  participation  in  the  definition  of  technological 
alternatives 
Most national decision-making procedures in the field of S&T policy include a form of social and 
political participation.  One of the  most  common  forms  is  representative committees,  on  which 
different  sectors  of  society  are  represented  (such  as  trade  unions,  environmental  groups, 
scientists,  political  parties,  business  associations,  etc.),  and  which  are  independent  from 
government  structures.  They  usually  have  only  advisory  and  consultative  responsibilities, 
producing reports and statements with a greater or lesser impact on the decision-making process. 
In most European countries, such committees officially play a prominent role in the definition of 
technological  strategies.  However,  in  most  cases,  their  real  power is  much  smaller  than  what 
officially recognised.  In  some European  states,  these committees are organised at sector level, 
either by  scientific  area  or by  industrial  sector.  In  others,  there  is  only  one  committee,  with 
aggregate functions and interests. Whether or not they are centralised or decentralised does not a 
priori determine their impact on the social debates initiated by them.  A wide range of structural 
and  political  elements  determine  their  impact  and  their  influence  on  decisions  and  policy 
outcomes. 
A more classical form  of socio-political participation is of course the parliament, and its role in 
the  policy  formulation  stage.  Most  national  parliaments  have  parliamentary  committees 
specialised in technology  matters.  These obviously include members of parliament representing 
the  formal  opinions  of  the  different  political  parties.  They  are  an  interesting  forum  for 
preliminary debates and  decisions,  which will eventually be voted in plenary session,  recording 
the opinion of parliament on  given  technological strategies.  In order to  assist these committees, 
most parliaments have set up their own technology assessment units of scientists and specialists as 
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national  parliaments that  have  no  such  units,  leaving  them  entirely  dependent  on  the  technical 
expertise provided by the executive arm of government. 
It is important to note here that the Member States and  the EU already have formal institutions 
and  organisations  which  directly  or indirectly  encourage  social  participation  in  decisions  on 
technological  alternatives.  However,  it  is  equally  relevant  to  point  out  that  many  local  and 
regional authorities  have no  such  formal  participatory  mechanisms.  Debates are therefore held 
almost exclusively between political parties and groups of experts. 
Opening up more real social participation at all levels of policy-making (European,  national and 
sub-national) could be a way of stimulating the emergence of a collective vision on technological 
development alternatives, a positive input into long- and medium-term policy strategies.  Another 
positive  aspect of a higher  level  of,  and  more  meaningful,  social  participation  is  wider  social 
acceptance of technological development.  Interesting experiences of large consultative meetings 
(the so-called 'consensus conferences in  Denmark'  where experts and all kinds of social groups 
debate problems, strategies and their alternatives) show that there is a tendency for these activities 
to foster,  on  the one hand,  better informed and  more critical debate but also,  on the other hand, 
wider social acceptance of new technologies. 
However, there might also be initial problems in combining the interests of very different socio-
economic sectors,  and in mobilising different social groups to engage them in  the debate.  Mass 
media could play a useful role here by echoing and  'translating'  the different experts' views on 
technological alternatives. Similarly, fostering such debates in the educational system could  ~ake 
citizens interested in technological matters. These are both ways of solving, at least in part and in 
the medium term,  the problem of effective social mobilisation and participation in Europe at all 
different levels of government.  It is  generally  true  that  those  most  sceptical  to  technology  are 
those who  run  the biggest risks of losing  their jobs and  those who  have least influence on  the 
decisions  taken.  Reestablishing  full  employment and  making  economic life  more democratic in 
Europe  are,  in  this  sense,  perhaps  the  most  important  ways  of  creating  a  more  positive 
atmosphere for innovation. 
Learning from others 
Learning  from  others  relates  here  partly  to  the  discussion  about  institutional  learning  and 
borrowing.  Policy-makers  today  face  the  increasingly  complex  task  of  providing  effective 
incentives to foster innovation processes. This requires a substantial pool of new ideas, strategies, 
and experiences. Social participation and independent sources for policy re-formulation help with 
this.  However, policy makers also need to look carefully at initiatives taken in other countries as 
a source of further inspiration. 
We considered  earlier the limits of institutional borrowing,  and  the  conditions  for  institutional 
learning  (related  to  the  diversity  of  each  system's  knowledge  base  and  organisational 
performance), concluding that it is possible to  'learn from others' on the basis of diversity. 
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across national borders. 
• ·  The concept of science parks has been transferred from the USA to Europe and Asia. 
•  The policy of collaborative R&D programmes,  stimulated by the Fifth Generation Computer 
Project in Japan, has been replicated by most industrialised nations. 
•  The promotion of venture capital in the USA has been successfully copied by Europe and is 
being encouraged in Japan (op.cit., p. 204). 
The question is how to exploit effectively European institutional and systemic diversity in order to 
enhance  mutual  policy  learning.  As  mentioned  earlier,  some authors  insist  on  the  creation  of 
international  evaluation  schemes  and  operations  to  help  achieve  this  exchange  of ideas  and 
experiences  from  a  comparative  starting  point.  However,  this  is  not  the  only  way.  A  more 
effective solution might be to create and support flexible international forums for the pooling of 
ideas and experiences. 
The European dimension of policy learning 
In a special contribution to this report Dominique Foray raised an interesting question: What is the 
true domain of 'a European policy'  (see also Foray,  1997)? He argues that the European domain 
should be unique and  not overlap with policies at regional  and  national levels,  and concludes that 
there are two dimensions for European policy:  harmonising and making technologies more uniform, 
and  exploiting and reproducing technological variety.  His point is  that the unique characteristic of 
Europe is its multi-national character and variety between nations, and that exploiting this variety is 
possible only at European level. 
This view can also be applied to policy learning.  On the one hand  policy learning across national 
borders may result in copying and in making institutions and policies more similar. On the other hand 
the variety leaves  ample  room for  experimenting  at  local  and  national  level,  and  for  sharing  and 
analysing the experiences from such experimentation. 
One  area where  some  standardisation  might  be  useful  is  in  relation  to the university  system.  In 
another contribution made especially for this project Jan Fagerberg proposed the following text: 
«The European knowledge base is characterized by a high degree of  diversity. In an innovation policy context, 
this may be a strength,  since diversity breeds innovation.  But this is only so  as long as the knowledge base 
remains integrated, characterized by a high degree of  interaction between the constituting part. As emphasised 
by Schumpeter,  innovation consists of  new combinations of  existing elements. A disintegrated knowledge base 
may hamper innovation (i.e.  new combinations) in spite of  considerable diversity. 
The university system, and education more broadly, plays an important role in unifying the knowledge base. It 
is therefore imperative that the university system acquires a European dimension.  Although universities will 
remain  a national responsibility,  it will be  an  important task for the  European  institutions to  support the 
creation of  a European  dimension  within  the  university system.  This should not be  limited to  exchange of 
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field, such as the creation of  European curricula, degrees, etc.  » (Fagerberg). 
At the same time the university sector, as will be argued in the next chapter, is one where there is a 
need to experiment with new forms  of organisation that respond better to the new context of the 
learning economy and to new needs for skill formation and inter-disciplinary work. In this, as in most 
other areas, the European project might provide unique opportunities for policy learning that create 
more diversity by supporting experimentation while at the same time making systems more uniform 
in dimensions that make European-wide academic training possible. 
In  general  EU  Member  States  have  great  opportunities  for  engaging  in  and  exploiting  such 
learning processes. The EU institutions, the implementation of the R&D Framework Programme, 
and  technological  measures  under  the  Community  regional  policy  support  frameworks  provide 
formal and informal mechanisms for pooling and exchanging experiences.  Similarly,  the studies 
undertaken  by  the  Commission  on  S&T  indicators  in  the  EU,  and  on  national  systems  of 
innovation are valuable analytical tools for this type of mutual learning process. 
However,  regions  and  local  governments  do  not  have  similar  opportunities  as  the  national 
authorities. Learning from others generally takes place through the (sometimes) intense exchange 
·of experiences  within  specific  cases  of cross-border  regional  co-operation  agreements  (like 
'Atlantic  Arc',  or  'The  Four  Motors  for  Europe').  The  recently  created  'Committee  of the 
Regions'  - a  new  EU  institution - is  a  more  formal  example  of an  interesting  and  flexible 
institutional basis for pooling ideas. 
Further international initiatives of this kind could be useful,  enhancing cross-border interactions 
and mutual knowledge.  This will be especially significant for the sub-national levels,  which are 
apparently less active in this process. 
Change, continuity and effectiveness in S& T policies 
In  the  field  of innovation  policy,  policy  learning  relates  to  the  way  in  which  policies  and 
strategies  change.  Policies  tend  to  evolve,  but  seldom  through  radical  change  based  on  the 
introduction of a new theoretical paradigm.  Gradual adjustments based on the intuition, common 
sense and political strategies of policy-makers, and clear continuity of strategies co-exist in time. 
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Countries  and  regions  have  their  own  politico-administrative  and  socio-economic  traditions, 
which  define  particular  combinations  and  styles  of policy  change  and  continuity.  Politico-
administrative  traditions  tend  to  develop  policies  which  reinforce  existing  industrial  and 
productive processes.  In this  sense,  continuity in policy decisions and  objectives  might result in 
policy  lock-ins  where  alternatives  and  change  are  problematic  and  slow.  However,  change  is 
always difficult,  especially if it entails radically  new  elements in  a decision.  The difficulties in 
breaking  away  from  policy  lock-ins  to  define  new  policy  orientations  (for  establishing  new 
industrial and economic trajectories) are diverse. We can identify three here, namely, the lack of 
a constituency (interest groups and relative socio-economic mobilisation) openly interested in  the 
new orientation; the lack of experienced policy-makers in the area to effectively carry out the new 
measures;  and  the fact  that policy  mistakes are both  more probable and politically  more  visible 
when there is a new policy. 
The identification  of possible  policy  lock-ins  in  a  system,  due  to  a  perverse  form  of policy 
continuity,  is an  important question.  The evolutionary and  learning perspective assumes  that  the 
success of the innovation system depends on its capacity to adapt constantly through a process of 
learning  by  knowledge  accumulation  and  forgetting.  This  perspective  thus  has  an  initial  bias 
towards the positive effects of policy change. However, in practical terms, all systems and policy 
styles have specific combinations of change and continuity. In other words, both coexist in  time. 
The point is then not only to  examine the ability of the system to  introduce change,  but also to 
consider the characteristics of the socio-political context in which the decision was taken. 
We have identified two variables that form  the socio-political context:  on the one hand,  whether 
there is a tendency towards short- or long-term political strategies, and on the other, whether the 
political  tradition  is  of consensus  or conflict in  policy-making.  These two  variables  give  us  a 
basic  typology.  This typology  is  not normative in  its intentions,  but serves to  analyse concrete 
empirical  cases.  It should  therefore  be possible  to  position  specific  examples  of countries  or 
policy instruments in the four boxes below. 
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Short-term 
Conflict 
We are not assuming that one of the above types is  'per se' any better than the others.  A priori 
consensus-based  decisions  will  be  more  accepted  and  less  problematic  than  those  based  on 
conflict. But the question is, how wide in fact is the consensus in social terms, and how effective 
and adequate is the decision (consensus might be based on preserving the status quo rather than 
on  opening up  new  perspectives in  the policy  decision).  Decisions taken  in  conflictual  contexts 
may seem a priori to be inefficient, but this might not be the case if different interests and visions 
have  competed  in  an  open  democratic  contest  for  alternative  solutions,  and  have  chosen  an 
effective one. 
The same is true of the distinction between long-term or short-term decisions.  How efficient they 
are will depend on the type of decision,  and  the way  in which it affects the system,  rather than 
the time perspective. An accumulation of effective and efficient short-term strategies with precise 
goals  might work more positively than  a long-term  strategy  that is vague and  ill-implemented. 
Still it might be true that short-termism in  policy-making is  a major problem when  it  comes  to 
environmental issues and that it might be necessary to build new forms of organisation wath  more 
long-term  emphasis  to  make  sure  that  economic  growth  remains  socially  and  ecolog•cally 
sustainable.  This  should  not  be  confused  with  current  attempts  to  move  responsiblhty  for 
economic policy away  from  popular influence and  put it in  the hands of central  banks.  These 
attempts may actually end up reinforcing short-termism in the system as a whole. 
If this typology does not entail any normative assumption, how can it be possible to evaluate the 
effectiveness of S&T policy-making in a given  system? The answer might be to  focus  more on 
the  appropriate balance between  change and  continuity and  the policy dilemmas  spelled  out  in 
chapter 3, where the conditions for policy are such that the 'fine-tuning' of decisions is possible 
and relatively unproblematic. 
-72-_. 
Johnson contributes to this question of effectiveness by identifying different levels and dimensions 
of policy learning in innovation policy: 
1:  Forming  visions  about  the  learning  economy  as  an  environment  for  innovation  acttVIttes.  This 
includes negotiations between private and  government policy-makers leading to consensus in some 
areas, and to compromises or recognition of  conflicting interests in other areas; 
2.  Developing  new  concepts,  data  sets  and  theories  of innovation  which  increasingly  build  on  an 
innovation systems approach, explicitly or implicitly; 
3.  Building up new institutions and organisations to support innovation; 
4.  Gradually trying,  testing and  establishing new  practices and  routines in  the conduct of innovation 
policy" (Johnson, 1997, p.  16). 
Here we would refer back to Chapter 2,  and  add to that list the need to get a proper understanding of 
innovation  as  an  integral  part  of wider  strategies.  There  is  a need  to  calibrate  innovation  policy  in 
relation to:  policies that increase the pressure for change;  human resource development policies;  and 
social policies aimed  at compensating the losers in the process of creative destruction.  Policy learning 
must be open to wider signals and  feed-backs than those coming from  the immediate sectoral interest 
groups. 
The need for further socio-economic studies 
Despite the general remarks we have  made and implications for enhancing policy learning,  we 
still know little about the characteristics of policy change and development in this area at national 
and  EU levels.  The dimensions of policy  change are transformed according  to  institutions and 
institutional  dynamics,  administrative  culture,  political  ideology,  interest  representation 
mechanisms and the formation of ideas, and there needs to be further analysis in the specific area 
of innovation policy and its connection with wider policy strategies. 
Different conceptual frameworks and policy analysis notions have been used in empirical studies 
of these policies.  However,  a more systematic approach  is still badly needed,  both in terms of 
conceptual and  theoretical  frameworks,  and  in  terms  of the object of study.  Firstly,  a  specific 
conceptual  framework  has  to  be established  which  looks  specifically  at  the joint evolution  of 
policy  actions,  and  industrial  and  innovative  dynamics.  Secondly,  we  can  then  make  a 
comparative  analysis  of different EU  national  contexts,  which  could  be useful  in  providing  a 
range of evidence about how and why  (or not)  policy learning takes place effectively (meaning, 
jointly  with  industrial  dynamics).  This  opens  up  an  ambitious  research  agenda,  the  results  of 
which  could  provide  useful  information  for  policy-makers  about  the  institutional  bottlenecks 
effective policy learning, and about interesting alternatives provided by other national or regional 
contexts. 
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stressed the need to enhance vertical and horizontal coordination of public policies as an essential 
issue  in  the  (re  )design  of an  effective  strategy  for  technological  innovation  in  Europe.  The 
following  chapters,  Chapters  5-10,  all  in  Part II  of this  report,  will  look in  greater depth  at 
different policy areas which together form  the  'core' of innovation policy at all three levels of 
government, reaching sector-specific conclusions about the policy implications of the globalising 
learning economy in Europe. 
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-75--76-Chapter 5: Science policy in the new context 
Introduction 
What resources should governments allocate to basic science?  According to what criteria· should 
these resources be allocated between different scientific fields?  How should scientific activities be 
organised  - by  specialised  and  autonomous  public  organisations  or within  private  firms?  Such 
questions have become increasingly important as  the volume of public expenditure to science has 
grown and the pressure on public expenditure has increased.  In this chapter we shall address only 
some aspects of  these questions.  Evaluating science as regards its importance to innovation gives a 
limited perspective on the role science plays in modem society. 
First, science has become an integrated part of modem culture, and the insight it gives into the laws 
of nature  should  be  seen  as  a  constituent  element  of a  developed  and  civilised  society.  It also 
represents a critical reflection on society and the way we interact with nature, which may be said to 
be part of  a modem democracy.  In this sense science may be regarded as a kind of  basic commodity 
in any highly developed society. So, even if scientific endeavour gave no economic benefits at all it 
would still be worth continuing to fund a fair amount for cultural and political reasons. 
Second,  there might be political priorities which  are more important than economic ones when it 
comes to allocating resources between different scientific areas. The classical example is expenditure 
on scientific activities connected with military technology, but there are also more or less absolute 
targets for science in other areas such as conquering space, eliminating certain health problems such 
as Aids and cancer, or finding ways to avoid long-term threats to sustainable development such as 
global warming and pollution.  Such programmes will  normally  have  a major effect  on innovation 
and, as we shall see in the chapter on public procurement, they may be some of  the most important 
vehicles promoting innovation, but their primary aim is to contribute to specific non-economic goals. 
What we shall  focus  on in  this  chapter is  scientific  activities  only  insofar  as  they  are  linked  to 
technical innovation and economic performance. To a certain degree this means focusing on specific 
organisations  such  as  universities  and  public  research  laboratories  and  on  their  interaction  with 
technological institutes and private firms. 
Evident  in  the  most  recent  literature,  including  TSER-related  projects,  are  differences  in 
interpretations of  what is currently going on in these respects.  On the one hand it has been argued 
that science should not be expected to make its contribution to economic growth through specific 
inventions.  Its role is rather to build the capacity to solve complex problems, for instance by training 
students at universities.  According to this view, attempts to measure its economic impact primarily 
via the specific innovations it has inspired are missing the point.  The allocation of resources should 
be based on peer reviews rather than on cost-benefit analysis.  A certain autonomy is important in 
order  to  create  an  environment  where  high-quality  science  promotes  training  for  high-quality 
solutions to problems. 
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technology and science whereby technological advances have become much more directly connected 
to scientific advance so that there is now a growing potential for exploiting scientific results in the 
ferm of  innovations and economic profit.  Also, it has been emphasised that linking universities much 
more  directly  to  industry  is  both  possible  and  useful,  both  for  the  universities  and  for  the 
competitiveness of  innovation systems. 
Instead of  trying to establish a middle-of-the-road compromise on these issues, we shall argue that 
they reflect different real trends and therefore that the apparent contradictions reflect contradictions 
to be found in reality.  In general, it is true that the major contribution of science is that it  builds 
skills rather than serves a direct source of  innovation.  But, at the same time, the connection between 
science,  innovation,  and  economic performance is  becoming much closer in  some sectors of the 
economy such as biotechnology and software development.  To this we shall add some reflections on 
how the role of  science is redefined by globalisation and by the acceleration of  innovation.  We shall 
end up by arguing that there are dilemmas and trade-offs in these areas which have to be worked out 
through a political process and through the establishment of new forms of organisations which place 
themselves  between  and  interconnect  the  world  of academia  and  the  world  of technology  and 
industry  .. 
18 
Scientific activities take place in an artificially simplified environment 
In order to reach conclusions it is important to specify some of  the major differences between science 
and technology. We shall do so at two different levels. First we shall analyse how scientific activities 
differ in terms of form and content from activities in the field  of innovation,  and  second we  shall 
focus on differences in the rules of the game and institutional set-ups between the world of basic 
science and the world of  technology and industry. 
One traditional difference between the scientific activities carried out in research organisationi and 
the innovation activities in  firms  is  that the first  is  generally pursued in  a  controlled  en"1ronment 
while  (Pavitt,  1995) R&D  in  the business  sector has  to confront  a  radically  different  d~r~ of 
complexity and on-going change. 'Under laboratory conditions' and 'everything else being c-qu&J·  are 
terms indicating the limited validity of  scientific experiments. In science-based firms,  laborato~ -or~ 
may  be  a  part of the innovation  process  but there  will  always  be  processes  of scalang  up  and 
adaptation that involve elements of trial and error.  Another difference is the kind  of sp«•&l•Ytton 
taking place in the two fields.  In science, continuity seems to be a major element, and the C'ftOf'mOUS 
growth in  scientific activities makes narrow specialisation necessary in order to reach  high..qua.ht)' 
performance. In the productive sector, the problems to be solved are complex and rapidly chan8mg. 
which means combining different kinds of expertise and often an individual has to move  from  one 
field of  specialisation to another. 
18 This chapter has drawn extensively on two recent papers by Keith Pavitt (Pavitt, 1995, and Pavitt, 
1996) and on a contribution by Dylan Jones-Evans produced especially for this report. The 
conclusions and recommendations remain the responsibility of  the authors however. 
-78-Thus the differences in what science is doing and what business is doing in relation to the innovation 
process  are  reflected  in  the  way  activities  are  organised,  the  incentive  systems  used  and  their 
respective ways  of producing knowledge.  Together,  all  these  differences  have  traditionally  been 
perceived mainly as a sort of natural 'barrier' between the two worlds, restricting personal mobility 
between the two - which limits the efficiency of the interaction between those operating in the two 
different worlds.  This is the view that science and industry will  typically speak different languages 
and operate on the basis of  different sets of  value premises. 
However, this characterisation gives a rather static view of  the role of  science in innovation systems -
and specially in relation to industrial activities - which is partly inaccurate. "Science does not stand 
outside of  society dispensing its gifts of  knowledge and wisdom; neither is it an autonomous enclave 
that is  now being crushed under the weight of narrowly commercial or political interests.  On the 
contrary, science has always both shaped and been shaped by society in a process that is as complex 
as  it  is  variegated; it  is  not static but dynamic"  (Gibbons  et al,  1994,  p.  22).  Whereas  structural 
differences might still  separate both worlds, there are two further points to consider.  Firstly,  there 
has been a change in the predominating mode of knowledge production.  Secondly,  in  spite of the 
barriers,  science has made  important contributions to the innovation process and  to technological 
development in the industrial world. 
Fallowing the  attributes  of the  new  mode  of knowledge  production identified  by  Gibbons  et  al 
(1994), science is progressively becoming transdisciplinary by transcending the traditional boundaries 
between disciplines, it is being produced in a context of application rather than one of problems set 
and solved by  a specific community,  it  is  increasingly heterogeneous,  non-hierarchically organised 
and is becoming more socially accountable than before. 
19  One specific example of the new mode of 
knowledge production is the role of scientists,  who by adopting a strategic approach to their own 
careers are becoming 'entrepreneurs' and are crossing the boundaries between disciplines. 
The  next  section  will  examine  the  barriers  between  science  and  industry,  showing  how  the 
contribution of  science could become particularly significant in a period of  accelerating change in the 
business world.  The major inputs to innovation are the very specialised  skills  learned in  scientific 
activities, and the instruments developed and networks built around these skills. While most scientific 
discoveries might have a long way to go from  the university laboratory to the market place,  the 
limited direct effects do not reduce the relevance of  the indirect impact. 
20 
19 It is important to remark that the distinction between the old mode of  knowledge production and 
the new one is a hermeneutic one. Reality is further more complex, and both modes coexist in time. 
This is to say that the real world of  scientific production is being gradually transformed, and new 
practices take place alongside old ones. 
20 One of  the considerations to be raised in this chapter is that acceleration of  the rate of  change in 
the private sector, which we refer to as 'the learning economy', creates new tensions in these 
respects. The differences in the rhythm of  change between academia and business create new 
conflicts in the interaction between the two. Another consideration relates to possible globalisation 
-79-Barriers  between  research  institutions  and  industry  are  functional  and 
dysfunctional 
In the last twenty years or so a number of innovation-oriented programmes which aim at reducing 
the barrier between research institutions (universities,  research councils,  laboratories) and  industry 
have been designed and implemented.  Therefore it is important to note that the barrier is functional 
and dysfunctional at the same time and that should the barrier disappear completely we might end up 
with a less efficient innovation system than the one we have.  The barrier is functional in the sense 
that it gives science the possibility of building up, in the long term, highly specialised competencies 
which are in great demand among innovating firms.  It is also functional in the sense that it allows a 
broadly  oriented  search  for  new  insight  which  from  time  to  time  will  result  in  scientific  and 
technological breakthroughs.  Discoveries  through  serendipity  (cases where  the  most  interesting 
findings  come unintentionally and  to the surprise  of the  scholars  involved)  are important for  the 
overall innovation process and there will  be more scope  for such discoveries in  organisations less 
strictly governed by economic incentives. 
On the other hand,  the very rapid rate of change in  the market sphere,  which is  a feature  of the 
learning  economy,  tends to make the dysfunctional  aspects of the barriers  more apparent.  Such 
negative aspects may involve different phenomena. 
•  The very specialised and discipline-oriented training in universities may result in bad habits among 
students  which  have  to  be  reprogrammed  when  employed  in  business  in  order  to  master 
interdisciplinary collaborations and to be willing to extend their specialisation into new fields. 
•  There are well established competencies at the universities which could be made more accessible 
to industry without compromising university autonomy if the appropriate organisational set-ups 
were established. 
•  The agenda of academic research may be conservative mainly because of a lack of information 
about what is going on in industry. 
•  In some very rapidly changing science-based areas such as electronics and software there may be 
a growing gap between the competencies needed  in  industry and  what universities  can  deliver 
because industry  tends  to become  the  intellectual  leader by  investing  the biggest  amounts  of 
resources in science and attracting the intellectual elite in the field. 
•  In certain new fields such as biotechnology and software the step from scientific discovery to the 
establishment  of profitable  production  is  short,  so  given  the  right  organisational  framework 
university research would be transformed into new knowledge-intensive start-up firms. 
The  question  about the  positive  and  negative  effects  of the  barriers  between  scientific  research 
institutions and the industrial world relates back to the integration/flexibility dilemma mentioned in 
Chapter 3.  Individual firms and research centres need to be connected to other type of organisation 
in  order to expand their own narrow knowledge base.  However,  this connectivity does not have 
positive implications per se.  Connections to other organisations might end up as a sort of 'trap', in 
the form of  a technology 'lock-in' for the individual firm or research institution. 
of  the production and distribution of  knowledge. Is it still rational for governments to invest in basic 
science in a world where science is becoming more and more internationally fluid? 
-80-One  major task for science policy is  to find  ways to reduce barriers when they are  dysfunctional 
without undermining the functional  aspect of these barriers.  Taking the first  three elements from 
above as the starting point, the following policy remedies could be suggested: 
• · make university studies - or at least part of them - problem-oriented and promote co-operation 
between students and scientists working in different disciplines 
•  give stronger incentives for scientific staff to move between academia and industry 
•  create new forms of  organisation which open up access to the knowledge-base of  universities but 
which also shelter the academic community from too much profit-orientation. 
The  last  two  issues  in  the  list  of negative  barriers  point  to  policy  options  such  as  stimulating 
entrepreneurship among academic staff and giving more attractive salaries to academic staff in  the 
most  dynamic  science  and  technology  fields.  Here,  there  are  real  dilemmas.  As  the  material 
conditions of universities  and  their  staff become increasingly  dependent  on  exploiting intellectual 
property rights and as staff become increasingly focused on material incentives, some of  the specific 
functions  of the university (worldwide dissemination of results,  quality  control as  more important 
than profit, etc.) may be jeopardised.  There is a strong need for ingenuity in finding new institutional 
and organisational solutions which make it possible to combine the two considerations.  Sometimes 
these will  result in  the creation of new  organisations which  can work both as links  and  as  gate-
keepers between the two worlds. 
Does it pay for national governments to invest in basic science? 
As discussed in Chapter 3, one classical reason for why governments need to invest in basic science 
is that it is  impossible for private operators to appropriate the benefits from such investment,  the 
uncertainty  about  outcome,  and  indivisibilities  in  the production of knowledge.  The  absence  of 
effective  appropriability instruments is  a specific form  of market failure  which  according to  neo-
classical  analysis  gives  a legitimate reason for  government  intervention  supporting  basic  science. 
However,  investment  in  the  development  of technology  may  be  left  to  private  firms  when 
technologies are specific and where intellectual property rights can be established. 
This  perspective  is,  as  we  stated  in  Chapter 3,  too narrow  since  it  tends  to  neglect  imponant 
dimensions of the innovation process which have to do with the need for diversity and  the  nsk of 
lock-in.  Here we would  emphasise that the  distinction  between knowledge which  is  pubhc  and 
knowledge which is  private is blurred in  real life  and that the question of appropriability  becomes 
correspondingly more intricate. 
21 
Again, this is an area where there are different interpretations of what is going on in  the economy. 
On the one hand, there is a tendency to emphasise the tendency towards codification of  knowledge in 
the economy as a whole.  Advances in information technology provide both instruments and stronger 
21 We shall return to this in connection with the chapter on networking where it will be argued that 
one main rationale for the formation of  networks is the collective production, sharing and 
appropriation of  knowledge. 
-81-incentives  to  codify,  and  it  creates  world-wide  commurutles  and  networks  which  can  share 
knowledge. On the other hand, other scholars emphasise the limits for codification and the strategic 
importance of  tacit knowledge which cannot be shared over great distances. They emphasise that one 
of the  main economic impacts of scientific production is its capacity to  build crucial skills and 
competencies in  the  system  which  are  tacit and local and which  constitute  a  critical asset for 
appropriating more rapidly and efficiently the rapidly changing innovation process. 
There has been a change in the willingness of governments to support basic science.  To a certain 
degree  this  change  reflects  an  exaggerated  view  of the  globalisation  of knowledge  production. 
Scientific knowledge may seem to be the most codified and global part of knowledge and therefore 
the question of appropriability is  now raised at a new and higher level.  Why should national (and 
regional) authorities use tax-payers money for something which can be obtained just by plugging into 
foreign university systems? There has been a change towards a model based on 'value for money'. 
This is what some authors have identified as  'a new social contract for basic research' emerging in 
different national contexts (Martin and Salter, 1996). The previous model, which operated since the 
war,  was characterised by  limited  public concern about exactly what kind  of benefits  support for 
basic science would produce in the system.  This scenario has now changed.  At the beginning of  the 
1980s, public expenditure came under strain and  demands for greater public accountability grew in 
the US  and  UK administrations.  Today,  in  most  OECD countries the amount and  distribution of 
public  resources to basic  science  is  under discussion;  evidence  too that the linear  model  of the 
innovation process (financing science will unequivocally result in innovation) is no longer taken for 
granted. 
On the basis of  these social and political concerns, many econometric studies have tried to estimate 
the impact of research on productivity,  almost all  of them showing that there is  a positive rate of 
return  on  funds  supporting  basic  science.  "The econometric literature  on localisation  effects  and 
spill-overs suggests that advanced industrial countries need their own, well-developed basic research 
capabilities  in  order  to  sustain  technological  development"  (Martin  and  Salter,  1996,  p.  50). 
Similarly,  economic  studies  of the  relationship  between  basic  science  research  and  its  economic 
impact show a positive correlation.  The following box summarises the findings  of these studies as 
regards the six most direct benefits from public support of  basic research. 
The idea that basic science  increases the stock of information,  which is  a public good,  has  been 
traditionally argued as the primary rationale for public support of  scientific activities. This cannot be 
denied, but basic science does not only produce information, in the form of codified knowledge.  It 
also  produces  tacit  knowledge,  of paramount  importance  for  the  innovation  capabilities  of the 
system. The role of  basic science in the development of human resources in the system is especially 
crucial. This takes three forms:  firstly, through the creation of skilled graduates who move on from 
basic  research,  carrying  with  them  both  codified  and  tacit  knowledge;  secondly,  because  basic 
scientific research is essential in order to take part in national and international networks of  scientists 
where knowledge is exchanged and generated through intensive interaction; and thirdly, basic science 
is itself oriented towards problem-solving, which provides optimal training for researchers moving on 
to other more applied scientific research and technological development. 
Basic science builds and enhances the scientific capability of a system, and it is necessary in order to 
get  meaningful  access  to and  exploit  advanced  science  and  technology  developed  abroad.  It  is 
-82-possible, for example, for anyone to log in to the home-page of the leading groups of scientists and 
down-load their latest articles, but it is only meaningful if you have reached almost the same degree 
of excellence. It is certainly true that global interaction takes place in the field of basic science and 
that new IT development, like the Internet, increases the intensity of this interaction. But the main 
impact might be that the leading centres form elitist networks and move further ahead, which means 
that having a solid international reputation in  science is a prerequisite for future economic success. 
We  then  have  a  new  form  of appropriability  where  networks  rather  than  single  individuals  or 
organisations realise the potential benefits. 
Other benefits are identified by the SPRU report. For example, the fact that basic science makes an 
exceptional  contribution to the creation  of new  instrumentation  and  methodologies,  which  when 
transferred to firms can open up new technological opportunities.  Also, as discussed earlier, despite 
the  barriers  between  research  institutions  and  firms,  in  some  sectors  basic  science  can  produce 
important spin-off effects in the form of SME creation. Interesting evidence to this effect has been 
found in one of  the TSER projects, showing that basic science is no longer the exclusive domain of 
public research institutions and giant firms,  but that there are many  S:MEs  which are increasingly 
undertaking such scientific activities (Keeble and Lawson, 1997). 
Finally, basic science is an invaluable asset to the innovation system, providing openings for radical 
innovations. In the present era of  intensified competition there is a tendency to make firms and other 
innovative  organisations  pursue  relatively  narrow  innovative  activities  searching  for  short-term 
profit,  'market niches'  and  the  benefits  of narrow  specialisation.  However,  while  rational  as  an 
-83-individual  strategy,  this  might tum out to be negative for  the system  as  a  whole,  since too few 
resources may be used to open up new scientific frontiers  and technological breakthroughs. Basic 
science could play a pivotal role in this context. The fact that it is not completely under the regime of 
the market but follows a different logic leaves room for exploration and unplanned invention. In the 
context of the accelerated innovation process, this ability  of basic science might be regarded as  a 
crucial element in avoiding technological lock-ins in the system. 
On the importance of  advanced demand 
It is obvious that having a strong science base may give a competitive advantage to certain industries 
such  as  the  chemical,  electronics  and  biotechnology  industries.  Universities  and  other  public 
research institutions can contribute by producing competent employees who can use their skills to 
pursue technical innovation.  But other sectors use the inputs from basic science much less directly. 
In some sectors - for instance furniture and clothing - design skills are as important as the input from 
scientists.  In mechanical  engineering many  different  scientific  disciplines  and  technological fields 
may be involved (new materials, electronics and scientific instruments) but the core competence is 
more practical than theoretical and access to skilled  workers may be the key to competitiveness. 
This  implies  that the role  of science  and  its  connection to the  demand  side  is  very  different  in 
different parts of  the economy. 
This becomes even more obvious when we take the service sector into account.  The debate about 
science and innovation has so far focused mainly on the needs of  the manufacturing sector in relation 
to different aspects of  technical engineering.  As the service sector becomes more important in terms 
of volume  and  begins  to  play  a  more  important  role  in  serving  the  rest  of the  economy with 
information  and  knowledge  there  may  have  to  be  a  change  in  priorities.  Social  science  and 
humanities have more to say about human interaction and communication than sciences related to 
engtneenng.  Within engineering,  software development will become more important than material 
sctences. 
In all these different areas it is important to realise that the quality of  the science base will to some 
extent reflect the quality of  the demand side.  Having access to interaction with the most advanced 
users outside the academic world might be a key to long-term success.  Advanced users will typically 
force the academic community to stretch the imagination, while taking into account and respecting 
the specificity of  basic research.  Therefore policy alternatives which enhance the capability of  users 
of  science may be an important part of  an innovation-oriented science policy.  In the next section we 
shall  argue that when there are no advanced local users and when they cannot be expected to be 
upgraded as users, research institutions should be stimulated to find partners abroad. 
This interpretation points to the need for an innovation policy involving a complex mix directed at 
the science system.  On the one hand there is a need to promote excellence in order to gain access to 
the most prestigious and dynamic global networks.  On the other hand there is an immanent tendency 
in the global academic system toward increasing disparities.  The weakest players will be those with 
weak scientific capability in the most dynamic fields of science and technology. Therefore, science 
policies should combine excellence and egalitarianism in terms of  human resource development. 
-84-Similarly,  complete specialisation in  specific  scientific  fields  cannot be  recommended,  neither  for 
regions nor for national scientific production systems. In order to absorb knowledge from abroad a 
certain  minimum  of scientific  capability  is  necessary.  Since  most  technologies  represent  an 
amalgamation of  many different scientific disciplines,  a very narrow knowledge base in the scientific 
research institutions will hamper technological developments. 
When timing is crucial for economic success, it might be tempting for national governments to try to 
limit  the access by foreigners  to new  scientific  results,  as  in  the US where there has been fierce 
debate on this issue. But such a strategy can easily lead to retaliation and result in a situation where 
co-operation  has  to involve  local  partners  that  are  second  rate  because  access  to  international 
networks has  been  restricted.  The  opposite  strategy,  whereby  scientific  research institutions  are 
encouraged to establish international alliances between themselves and with foreign firms,  has more 
to recommend it, perhaps in combination with regional and national efforts to create local feed-back 
from these alliances for extra-regional co-operation. 
The international flow of scientists is  still  limited  as  compared to the flow of finance,  capital  and 
commodities,  and  stimulating the exchange worldwide  might  give  a  'brain-gain'  as  illustrated  by 
some of  the Asian economies. Moreover, in certain fields, labelled as  'mega-sciences' by the OECD, 
international collaboration is necessary because of  the enormous scale of  the efforts to be made. 
The regional, national and European levels regarding science-policy 
The EU shows great diversity in the division of tasks between these three levels of government as 
regards public support for basic research. On the one hand,  national governments still play a central 
role in devoting economic resources to basic research by funding research groups. The same can be 
said about the role of public national research centres and institutions, which have been reformed in 
recent decades by improving administration and  scientific relevance within the national system.  and 
which  continue to be in the hands of national  governments.  On  the other hand,  there  have  been 
important trends towards decentralisation and Europeanisation of  these public actions.  The regional 
governments in some large federal or semi-federal European countries are in charge of  the university 
system,  and have increased their share of public support for scientific research (this is  the case  in 
Germany  and  Spain,  for  example).  Europeanisation,  as  mentioned  earlier  in  this  report.  became 
apparent with the creation in the mid-1980s of the two main European co-operation programmes. 
namely  the EU Framework Programme,  and  the  pan-European Eureka Programme,  which  have 
stimulated scientific co-operation across European borders. 
These trends show that the 'national systems of  innovation' are still valid and central to the European 
scene.  National  differences  in  scientific  and  technological  performance  are  deeply  related  to 
questions such as the range of  scientific research, the industrial structure, the educational system and 
the broader institutional set-up.  These elements are never static,  but in  a continuous state of flux 
along  with  trends  in  European  and  global  economies  and  societies.  The  recent  trends  towards 
decentralisation and Europeanisation of  science policy has not reduced the importance of  the national 
-85-systems,  but, instead they are an  important reminder of the limitations of the national  level  in  an 
economy where innovation is accelerating. 
22 
It ·is far from obvious to what extent the present division of  labour in terms of policy responsibilities 
will and should change in the future.  Moreover, it is not the purpose of this report to question the 
current political basis for the subsidiarity principle at national or EU level by giving a closed list of 
policy instruments or scientific areas which should be supported at each level. Rather, it is our goal 
to pinpoint the relevance of  the trends we have mentioned, and to make some suggestions about how 
to grasp their positive elements through policy lines which can help  to maximise the opportunities 
available. 
The suggestions are based on two general points: 
1.  The EU level has a crucial role to play in supporting and guiding the growth of international and 
European collaboration involving different types of  public and private institution in terms of  basic 
science. 
2.  The sub-national, and more specifically the regional level, is increasingly becoming a crucial level 
of public  action  in  this  area  due  to the  localised  nature  of scientific  excellence  as  rooted  in 
elements of  tacit knowledge. 
It has been argued that the problem of  the EU is that it has a good scientific base but that it is weak 
when it comes to translating this into technological development and innovation. This 'technological 
gap'  between Europe and  its  world  competitors,  Japan  and  the US,  was  the  main  political  idea 
behind the creation of the collaborative schemes in the mid-1980s.  How far is this still  valid?  And 
how have these programmes helped to narrow the gap? 
A whole range of evaluation studies of EU programmes and Eureka have been conducted almost 
since their creation.  Virtually all  of them tend to find  the impact of these programmes at national 
level positive (Sharp and Peterson, 1997). However, a different picture emerges when they examine 
the industrial impact of European collaborative programmes.  Here there is  an  important paradox, 
especially for the EU programmes.  The projects supported under these programmes should have a 
pre-competitive nature, as stated in the regulations, but they have been politically evaluated in terms 
of  their specific contribution to improving European competitiveness (looking at the number of new 
products they  have  helped  to launch,  or the  number  of jobs they  have  indirectly  created).  The 
problem of this paradox is the way in which 'competitiveness' has been interpreted. It is no longer 
viewed  as  a  process,  but  rather  as  a  political  objective  in  itself  The  pre-competitive  research 
supported by EU programmes: 
22 For an analysis of  national systems of  innovation in the context ofEuropean integration see 
Johnson and Gregersen (1997). 
-86-"should be viewed as a sort of  insurance policy to ensure that Europe has the technology and skills base to 
compete  in  the  long-term;  it can  never be  a panacea  that  delivers  'competitiveness'  in  the  short-term. 
European technology policies may not have succeeded to  date  in  pushing EU firms and institutes into  the 
leading position in the development and application of  all new technologies. However,  they have succeeded in 
encouraging collaboration between firms and research institutions across the EU.  They also have opened up 
opportunities for upgrading knowledge  and skills on  the part of  many participants,  widening horizons and 
improving  understanding  and information flows.  In  this  respect,  European  programmes  have  played an 
important role in shifting European firms and institutes out of  their national champion 'bunker' mentality of  the 
1970s and early 1980s" (Sharp and Peterson, 1997). 
This analysis implies that the policy interest of the European Union has to move beyond the strict 
limits  of the research programmes,  and  must develop further four general roles  in  the context of 
enhancing European basic science: 
•  mapping future trends in  science and technology and making the maps useful for regional and 
national policy-makers through technology assessment and foresight; 
•  stimulating worldwide  collaboration in  science  and  connecting the leading  European  sc1ence 
groups with global networks; 
·  •  establishing mechanisms which enhance the quality of  science of  weaker regions and countries; 
•  forming a clearing house for learning about new modes of  organisation of science and the use of 
science in innovation systems across the Member States, and also drawing on the experiences of 
non-Member States. 
In addition, EU programmes should reinforce their European added value. To this end the box below 
suggests five policy prescriptions, which include other legal and policy areas of  the EU. 
-87-We have seen how sub-national governments have become quite active also in science policy over 
the last two decades.  This is  not only  due to the trend towards political  decentralisation in many 
European countries over the same period, but also to the fact that locality has a crucial role to play in 
the  learning  economy.  Chapter  2  showed  the  importance  of tacit  knowledge  in  the  present 
accelerated innovation process, and how geography is important in the creation and development of 
this sort of  knowledge through proximity. Regional governments have been aware of the economies 
-88-of  localisation and have launched more or less explicit initiatives to enhance the innovative potential 
of their  territory.  Regional  governments  have  good  access  to the  local  S:MEs,  universities  and 
research institutions operating in the region, and are in better positions to effectively enhance social 
and  economic conditions for the production of tacit knowledge.  In close relation to this, the sub-
national level is particularly well placed to reinforce the 'learning capabilities' of  local institutions and 
the human resources. We shall look at this in Chapter 7 in the context of  industrial networks. 
-89--90-Chapter 6: Innovation policy and new ways of organising the firm 
Introduction 
The  most  ambitious  attempts  so  far  to  map  the  European  situation  in  terms  of science  and 
technology (CEC,  1994b) and to compare its performance with developments in Japan and the US 
indicate that the substantial European investments in R&D and the excellent scientific results are not 
reflected in innovation and economic performance as measured by productivity growth rates (  op. cit. 
p.  57-58). Why are European firms lagging behind in terms of  innovation and productivity in spite of 
investing heavily in R&D? One possible explanation is  slow adaptation by European firms  to new 
organisational principles.  The last decade has witnessed a dramatic change in what constitutes best 
practice in terms of organisational forms.  Against this background it has been argued that the true 
Achilles'  heel of  Europe is that firms  stick to old patterns of organisation (Andreassen et al,  1995, 
and Weinstein, 1997). 
Results from TSER research,  analysing patterns of production and  trade specialisation and  linking 
them  to  economic  performance,  indirectly  support  this  view.  Recent  analysis  of patterns  of 
production and trade specialisation identifies weak European specialisation in high-technology (and 
high-growth)  products  (Verspagen,  1997).  This  brings  organisational  change  into  focus  for  two 
.different reasons. On the one hand, the need for efficient modes of organisation promoting flexibility 
and innovation may be especially strong in economies specialising in products with a limited growth 
potential  in  world  markets.  On  the  other  hand,  weak  performance,  especially  in  information 
technology  products,  may  reflect  weaknesses  in  the  organisational  set-up  of European  firms 
(Weinstein, 1997, p.8), which means that one element in changing the pattern of specialisation could 
be to establish new forms of  organisation. 
This  raises  fundamental  issues.  Is  there  one best way  to  organise  the  firm  in  order to promote 
innovation  and  the  intelligent  use  of technology?  What  should  governments  do  to  bring  about 
organisational  change?  How can  the  diversity  of organisational  traditions  in  Europe be  used  to 
propagate forms of  organisation conducive to learning and innovation? In this chapter we will reflect 
upon  these  questions  from  the  point  of view  of the  globalising  learning  economy,  with  special 
emphasis  on  the  internal  organisation  of firm.  In  Chapter  7  the  focus  will  be  on the  external 
relationships of  the firms and the increasing importance of  the formation of  industrial networks. 
We shall argue that one of  the major consequences of  intensified global competition and acceleration 
of change is that it challenges traditional modes of organisation and human resource development. 
The changes taking place in these respects are central to the very concept of 'the learning economy'. 
They indicate a great potential for promoting competitiveness,  as well  as  negative elements in the 
form of  social polarisation. Both must be taken into account in an updated policy agenda. 
Intensified competition forces firms to find new ways of  doing things 
Many firms have experienced more intense competition in their product markets. For some it reflects 
a process of internationalisation and globalisation (automobiles, electronics and transport systems). 
For others it has been the result mainly  of the break-down of barriers between sectors (banking, 
insurance  and  real  estate).  Sometimes  the  driving  force  has  been  a  consciously  engineered 
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technological development (such as new telecommunications and transport systems). 
When facing  more intense competition the pressure on firms  to do new things and to change old 
ways of doing things is  increased,  although firms  react differently to such pressure.  Some will  not 
make any changes and most of  those will be wiped out by competition. Others will focus even more 
intensely  on  reducing  production  costs  by  intensifying  the  division  of labour  and  reinforcing 
discipline in the factory. Others will try to find more intelligent ways of organising production with 
the  emphasis  on  exploiting  the  new  opportunities  offered  by  information  technology,  thereby 
reducing costs and the time it takes to transform inputs into attractive outputs while at the same time 
obtaining higher quality products. Finally, some will try to find ways to side-step the competition by 
introducing new products and services or tackling completely new markets. 
None of  these strategies can be said to be the 'best practice' under all circumstances. In some sectors 
and  phases  of development,  making  the  production  process  more  effective - for  instance  by 
exploiting economies of scale - may be an adequate strategy, while in others success in the race to 
introduce  new  products is  the  most  important  condition  for  success.  The  same  firm  will  often 
combine  the  different  strategies  in  different  mixes,  and  different  mixes  will  prevail  in  different 
sectors, regions and countries. 
23 
But even if there are several viable strategies many different studies, including some of the TSER 
projects, demonstrate that, at least in the OECD area, there are specific modes and mixes of modes 
which are tending to dominate in more and more sectors and firms. 
24 This reflects both a selection 
process which picks the firms with the most efficient strategy mixes and  a learning process where 
front-runners inspire laggards. We can see a broad movement toward new organisational principles 
that constitute a new best practice, especially in sectors characterised by rapid innovation and intense 
competition. It is in the most protected areas of the economy that the old organisational fonns still 
thrive. 
This implies that government policy has an important role to play in this area. One major opportunity 
for promoting competitiveness is to support organisational learning and to help individuals and finns 
to overcome barriers to change and to cope with the negative consequences of the organisational 
transformation taking place.  This role will  become even more important in  the future,  since  some 
23 Actually, we would argue that in the current period the most important factor determining the 
macro-economic performance of  national economies may be the ability of  the national system of 
firms to adapt to the new context of  accelerating change and intensified global competition. 
24 This chapter draws on contributions prepared specially for this project by Phil Cooke and Gerd 
Schienstock, and on recent Danish research in the context of the DISKO project (Gjerding, 1996, 
and Lund and Gjerding, 1996) co-ordinated by one of  the authors. 
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intensification of  competition, will become more exposed. 
25 
The negative side of this process of organisational  adaptation and  innovation is  that it  intensifies 
selection  mechanisms  in  the  labour  market,  thus  weakening  the  position  of the  comparatively 
unskilled and the slow learners (Lundvall,  1996). Without counteracting measures the very success 
of  the adaptation process may be jeopardised by polarisation, which creates bottlenecks in the short 
term  and  undermines  social  cohesion  and  learning  in  the  long  term.  This  implies  that  policies 
promoting the introduction of  new forms of  organisation must give priority to enhancing the learning 
abilities of  the low-skilled. 
Main trends in modes of  organisation and in skill requirements 
The most successful strategies are obviously those which succeed in creating organisations able to 
cope with rapid change and able to impose change on their environment.  Such strategies are at the 
core of  the learning economy; they focus on the development of  new skills, on competencies to cope 
with new problems and on developing new products when the demand for old ones is faltering. 
It would seem that the basic distinction between firms that are most successful in these respects and 
· those that are not is that the successful ones emphasise horizontal communication within the firm and 
build network relationships with external organisations. Both of  these characteristics help give firms 
access to a diverse and rich knowledge base as well as the ability to change and expand it when faced 
with new challenges. Inside the firm  it involves reducing the number of levels in the hierarchy and 
delegating responsibility to lower levels. It takes too long to move information and decisions to the 
top, and back again to the operational level, in a rapidly moving world. 
Of course, this has consequences for the skills required by management and employees. One major 
task of  management now is to select and motivate employees in such a way that they can and want to 
take responsibility and that they have the necessary social skills as regards communication and co-
operation.  Another  major  task  is  to  support  the  creation  of,  and  manage  and  renew,  network 
25 In the social sciences, there is sometimes a big gap between how different approaches treat the 
same phenomenon. One of  the most obvious examples is the difference between how mainstream 
microeconomics and organisation theory view 'the firm'. In microeconomics the firms are seen as a 
'representative' unit and differences between firms are neglected. In organisation theory the focus is 
on such differences and it is assumed that there are more or less efficient ways to organise 
production and distribution. In a period when there is radical change in best practice, the 
microeconomic approach is especially problematic because it neglects a substantial potential for 
economic growth. Organisation theory is often too casuistic to be theoretically useful and operates 
with too many competing taxonomies and conceptual schemes to be helpful for practitioners in the 
field. Evolutionary economics may be seen as one way of  building a bridge between the need for 
general theory and differentiation in the organisation of  economic activities. Dosi (1997) establishes 
a link between organisation theory and evolutionary economics. 
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with  change  in  an  interaction  with  others.  This  implies  a  combination  of  analytical  tools, 
problem-solving based on practical experience, and social skills. 
Where do the new organisational principles come from? 
The new principles of  organisation may be regarded from different perspectives, each with a different 
interpretation of why the new principles appear.  The first  contributions to the debate on the new 
organisational principles focused on organisation of the production and labour process (Piore and 
Sabel, 1984, and Boyer, 1991). New flexible production systems were identified where the emphasis 
was on the ability to respond to new market signals and exploit the flexibility offered by IT  -based 
production systems. In the management literature, this debate was reflected in a growing interest for 
Japanese-based organisational techniques in the form of "just-in-time"  /Kanban and quality circles. 
The overriding concern for the firm was to save resources and time and to obtain quality in a context 
of  rapid change. 
Another approach has a much more specific starting point,  and refers to the formation of a  new 
techno-economic paradigm rooted in information technology. It has been shown that,  especially in 
connection with the successful production and use of  information technology, there is a tendency to 
establish horizontal communication and functional flexibility within firms (Freeman and Perez, 1988). 
However,  it  was  also  shown  that firms  which  introduced  IT  -based  process  equipment  without 
introducing organisational change and human resource development achieved poor performance in 
terms of  productivity (Lauritzen et al,  1996}. This has been proposed as one major explanation of  the 
so-called Solow-paradox: 'We see computers everywhere but in the productivity statistics'. 
A third approach is based on the formal and informal participation of  workers in decision-making and 
on the delegation of  responsibility to individuals or to groups of  workers. This approach emerged in 
particular from the Scandinavian debate on economic democracy and  the quality of working life 
(Gustavsen, 1986). As unemployment has grown and labour has become less scarce, there has been a 
tendency to give it less priority in the debate. However, as we shall see below, it tends to reappear in 
a new form in the learning economy context. 
The approach emphasised  in  the following  presentation differs  somewhat from  those mentioned 
above. We are going to analyse organisational principles mainly from the point of  view of  innovation 
and  learning.  But,  as we shall  see,  there is  an  overlap  since  information  technology  affects  the 
process of innovation and learning and since specific forms of worker participation and production 
flexibility are important characteristics of  the new organisational modes that promote innovation. 
The new organisational mode as a framework for product innovation 
One major reason why the new organisational principles become more widespread has to do with the 
need for firms to pursue product innovations. In spite of its absence in economic models,  product 
innovation is  not a  marginal  activity  in  the economy. It is  fundamental  for  sustaining  economic 
growth (Pasinetti,  1981) and in most sectors firms  must introduce new products continuously in 
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manufacturing and service sectors will have developed at least one new product or service. 
The  realisation  that  product  innovations  are  most  successful  when  there  is  close  and  efficient 
collaboration and interaction between different departments within a firm goes back many years and 
was one of the major outcomes of the  Sappho-project (Rothwell et al.,  1974 and Freeman,  1982). 
This study demonstrated that firms  successful in product innovation were those with close internal 
co-operation between the  production,  R&D  and  marketing  department.  This  is  even truer today 
because of  the accelerating innovation process. In order to reduce the time it takes to move from the 
general idea of  a new product to launching it on the market, the efficiency of  this kind of  interaction 
has become of  critical importance. 
There are different ways to reduce barriers between business departments.  One is to stimulate job-
rotation  between  departments  and  another  is  cross-departmental  co-operation  in  project-specific 
teams, which often will not respect old orders of seniority and the formal hierarchy. They will be free 
to communicate directly with other units, both inside and outside the firm,  without referring back to 
the  higher  echelons.  This  form  of network  organisation  is  becoming  more  and  more  attractive, 
especially in fields  with frequent product innovations (Sako,  1992, and Freeman,  1991 ).  This does 
not apply only to high-tech producers, however. Producers of clothing, furniture and food-products 
also  have  to  renew their products and  to respond  swiftly  to new  user  needs,  and  indeed  some 
business service firms have led the field in developing this kind of  organisation. 
New trends in skill requirements 
The firms that have gone furthest toward the new mode of  organisation are more demanding in terms 
of social skills and  work virtues.  When recruiting new employees strong emphasis is  given to the 
ability  to  co-operate  and  communicate  inside  and  outside  the  organisation.  The  importance  of 
workers being prepared to take on responsibility and being trustworthy is also emphasised. 
In  a complex  and  rapidly  changing  context  there  will  be  more  demand  for  knowledge  aimed  at 
solving  a wider range  of problems  than  for  narrowly  defined  substantive  knowledge.  This  gives 
academic training a more important role to play in forming the qualifications of  the workforce. Other 
changes  in  qualification  requirements  are  less  clear-cut.  Most  of the  firms  introducing  new 
organisational  forms  report  a  need  for  less  specialisation,  while  a  minority  asks  for  more.  It is 
probably the case that there is different demand for different kinds of knowledge.  Technically there 
might be, at the same time, demand for highly specialised, multi-skilled and general workers. For all 
of  these categories it is a requirement that they can communicate with people with a different kind of 
expertise. 
There  is  growing  demand  for  two  specific  sets  of competencies  and  skills.  Being  able  to  use 
information technology and especially being able to learn as the technology develops has become a 
crucial  condition in  most parts of the labour market.  More and  more employees  are expected to 
interact directly with foreigners, so linguistic skills and openness to other cultures is becoming more 
important. 
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One  important  characteristic  of the  present  phase  of development  is  the  extremely  high  rate  of 
change in skill requirements. In the Green Paper on Partnership for a new Organisation of  Work, it is 
pointed out that 80% of  the process technologies used today will become obsolete within a decade 
(  op.cit. p. 7). This implies that all categories of  employees and management need to renew their skills 
and  capabilities from  time to time  and  that organisations will  continuously have to develop  new 
competencies. 
Hence a fundamental requirement is that employees have the background necessary to absorb new 
knowledge and to be creative in combining old pieces of knowledge in  new ways.  This puts new 
demands on education and training institutions. They should become much more focused on making 
students capable of  confronting and solving new problems as they appear. 
But it also demonstrates that much of  the training and learning has to take place at the work-place or 
in  close connection with firms.  Some of the new organisational characteristics presented above are 
actually designed to promote the absorption, production and intelligent use of  knowledge. But there 
is a specific problem of under-investment in this area, especially in areas where firms are many and 
small. The fact that the labour force is mobile means that firms will tend to invest less in people than 
what would correspond to a socially desirable level. This will be especially true for isolated small and 
medium-sized firms, while the situation might be different in industrial districts where the firms draw 
upon a common stock of  skills in the region. 
Japanese versus US principles of  organisation 
Much of the theoretical debate and  management  literature on the new forms  of organisation has 
given  the  Japanese  firm  as  a  model.  The  combination  of life-time  employment,  job  rotation, 
interdepartmental  task  forces  and  horizontal  communication  practised  in  the  big  internationally 
oriented Japanese firms has been used as a prototype for the learning organisation in the new techno-
economic paradigm (Freeman, 1987). 
Recent  analytical  contributions  give  a  new  picture  of the  Japanese  firm  as  a  role  model.  The 
contributions  by  Nonaka  (1991)  and  Nonaka  and  Takeuchi  (1996)  look  behind  the  specific 
organisational  forms  and  identify  even  more  fundamental  differences  between  the  approach  to 
organisational learning in  Japan  and  the  Anglo-Saxon  tradition.  According  to Nonaka,  the  most 
fundamental difference is that the Anglo-Saxon model puts a much stronger emphasis on codified (as 
opposed  to  tacit)  knowledge  and  that  codification  has  become  a  goal  in  itself in  the  Western 
tradition. Japanese firms,  on the other hand, tend to give the formation and use of tacit knowledge 
much more emphasis in  the learning  process,  which  is  described  as  an upward  spiral  that moves 
between and combines tacit and codified knowledge. Nonaka (1991) gives a number of illustrations 
of how this takes place in  connection with the development of new  products,  while Lam ( 1998) 
shows the difficulties when the Japanese model comes up against the Anglo-Saxon model in inter-
firm co-operation. 
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of the Western model for product innovation, the revitalisation of US high technology sectors and 
the slow-down in  growth in  Japan over the last  couple of years  have  raised  questions  about the 
efficiency of the Japanese model and whether a different and more efficient model is  developing in 
US firms (Weinstein, 1997). The major weak point in the Japanese model may be that it bars access 
to knowledge  sources  outside  the  firm.  Intra-firm  mobility  of workers  and  experts  may  not be 
sufficient given the new mode of  knowledge production. Inter-firm co-operation and the mobility of 
expertise  between firms  has  become  more  important  because  of the  growing  complexity  of the 
knowledge base and  the acceleration  of innovation.  Intra-firm  cross-functional teams  have  to be 
over-layered by 'integration teams', including experts from universities and from other firms (Iansiti 
and West, 1997). 
These changes are reflected in  changes in  the position of the R&D department,  which has  had to 
show that it can interact with the market-oriented part of the organisation, and increasingly has to 
compete with external  sources of knowledge.  To do  so  it  has  to develop  its  own networks  and 
alliances.  The major challenge has become the timing of its output and the capability to create new 
products and ideas in a rapidly changing and increasingly complex environment. A statement by Bob 
Anderson  from  the  Rank  Xerox Research  Centre  illustrates  this  point  (Anderson,  1997).  After 
arguing that the most important change is not the increasing importance of  the knowledge-base and 
intellectual property rights he goes on: 
Rather what seems to be fundamentally different now is what you might think of  as the second 
order derivative of  innovation (the  rate of  change of  the rate of  change) - its cycle time,  if 
you will... .  .  .  .  In  the  marketplaces within  which  the  outcomes of the  R&D  I  manage  are 
deployed,  both the pace and the acceleration of  innovation are startling; nay terrifying. 
26 
Bob Anderson describes the new context in which R&D laboratories operate as a "bazaar economy" 
where there is a mixture of  formal and informal contracts and contacts and where new alliances are 
formed. A major task of  management is to transform competitors into "co-opetitors". In the chapter 
on competition policy (chapter 1  0) we will return to the broader implications for industrial dynamics 
of  these changes. 
Organisational principles and national systems of  innovation 
It is important to note that international differences in modes of organisation are rooted in  specific 
systemic characteristics and that any attempt just to copy what is going on in another national system 
26 Anderson goes on to argue that the most extreme form of  acceleration is the development of  new 
services on the Internet. This is a perspective further developed by Fransman (1997) who shows that 
the Internet represents a new mode of  innovation, which reinforces some of  the characteristics of  the 
new mode of  organisation presented here by a magnitude. These include acceleration of  the process 
and intensified competition reflecting simultaneous participation of  many globally distributed 
innovators and a weakening of  the distinction between the producer and the user. 
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labour market regulation are fundamental for how specific organisational principles affect economic 
performance. To illustrate this point we could look at the role of  life-long employment in some of  the 
big Japanese firms and compare it with its extreme opposite - the Danish case. 
In Denmark there are almost no restrictions on firing  personnel and there is  high mobility between 
jobs and  employers.  The Danish system,  where most people are employed by  small  and medium-
sized firms,  promotes learning  by  a combination of other institutional characteristics.  There is  an 
extensive publicly financed  system of training and  retraining,  there are possibilities to go on paid 
leave to obtain extra training, and the unemployment benefits are higher than in most other countries, 
so that workers' fear of change is reduced. The regular attacks from OECD labour market experts 
arguing that the high Danish benefits weaken incentives to accept low paid jobs illustrate the risk of 
focusing on one single variable rather than on systemic features.  The fact is that participation rates 
are higher in Denmark than in any other OECD country. {In this context it is interesting to note that 
Paul A.  Samuelson recently pointed not to Japan or the US but to Denmark as the ideal model.) 
The main conclusion at this stage is that there is no  single role model for Europe to copy and that 
any kind  of policy initiative needs to take the existing  systemic features  as  the starting point.  We 
would however point to some features of the Japanese and US models which might be especially 
.interesting when it  comes to implementing  the  new  organisational  principles  in  Europe.  The  US 
model will, if  left to itself, lead to extreme polarisation in terms of  incomes and/or job opportunities, 
whereas  polarisation  has  increased  less  in  Japan than  in  other OECD  countries  (OECD,  1994b, 
p.23).  This  may  reflect  several  distinct  features  where  the  two  systems  differ.  Here  we  would 
emphasise  two  differences  between  the  models:  life-time  employment  and  a  difference  in  the 
appreciation of  tacit knowledge. 
In the new context it may be counter-productive to implement life-time employment- especially in 
economies with a strong presence of small and medium-sized enterprises, and here a Danish model 
(combining  flexible  employment  contracts  with  generous  unemployment  benefits  and  attractive 
training opportunities) may be more adequate.  On the other hand,  it is  worth considering that the 
one-sided focus on formal and codified knowledge may be a major factor in reinforcing polarisation 
in  the  European  labour  market.  If so,  more  emphasis  on  the  formation  and  utilisation  of tacit 
knowledge in connection with training, production and innovation systems would help to give those 
with little formal training a better chance. 
European diversity 
There  is  no  systematic  mapping  of differences  across  European  countries  as  to  how firms  use 
different organisational forms. Most studies have been based on case material and it is only recently 
that  attempts  have  been  made  to  analyse  international  differences  in  these  respects  in  a  more 
systematic way (Foray and Lundvall,  1996b, p.135-189 and Berger and Dore, 1996). However, the 
scattered evidence that there is indicates substantial differences between the European countries. 
One  area where  some  documentation  of international  differences  exists  is  in  relation  to worker 
participation. Survey data show that there are substantial differences in how, and how far,  workers 
participate in the process of organisational change (EPOC,  1997). For instance, direct participation 
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Portugal, Italy and Netherlands (op cit., p. 32). 
1-fthe focus is  shifted to government initiatives to stimulate worker participation, we see a similar 
picture where  countries with  relatively  strong  traditions  of participation  (Denmark,  Sweden  and 
Germany) initiate public programmes to develop participation further while those with low degrees 
of participation (Netherlands,  Italy and  Spain) have no  public initiatives in  this direction (Latniak, 
1995). 
This example illustrates a major problem for community-wide programmes to promote new forms of 
organisation (see the Green Paper on partnership for a new organisation of work - CEC,  1997  a). 
The very uneven development  implies  that  such initiatives  must  take  different  forms  in  different 
countries. The most advanced countries in this respect may be prepared to initiate programmes that 
move organisation of  firms toward quite sophisticated forms of  interaction and learning, while those 
lagging behind need to try out co-operation in small-scale experimental forms. 
But diversity is  also  a potential source of innovation.  There are unique opportunities in  Europe to 
exchange experiences in this field  and to learn from the experience of others.  The potential can be 
fully  developed  only  if the following  three prerequisites  are  fulfilled:  mapping  of organisational 
forms across Europe, evaluation of  the systemic context for each country and a better understanding 
of  the linkage between organisational forms and economic performance. 
Public  policies  to  support  the  introduction  of new  modes  of organisation  and 
human resource development 
It might be tempting to argue that the organisational set-up of firms  should be left to the market-
place and the managers to decide.  How can public policy-makers 'know better' than the insiders? 
The answer to this  question is,  of course,  that they  don't.  But this  does  not  exclude  a role  for 
governments. 
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The LOK project 
In  1998  and  1999,  the  Danish  government  will  implement  10  initiatives 
aiming  at  promoting  organisational  and  managerial  change  in  Danish 
businesses.  The initiatives  are the outcome of a two-year dialogue process 
including businesses, social partners and academic bodies. 
The central idea is  that although  a flexible  work organisation can  only  be 
achieved by firms themselves, organisational change is intimately related to a 
firm's  wider  social  environment,  which  defines  access  to  knowledge, 
information, skills and exchange of  experiences. 
The initiatives focus on the development of  new competencies and services in 
public and semi-public institutions (i.e. universities, business schools, training 
institutes  and  technical  institutes)  interacting  with  businesses  in  matters 
relating directly or indirectly to innovation. 
•  Further education for consultants. The point of  departure is a recognised 
need  for  competence-building  among  consultants,  in  areas  such  as 
communication,  interactive  skills,  and  understanding  of links  between 
functions  within  enterprises.  Moreover,  a  new  information  service  on 
consultancy  services  will  be  established  in  order  to  increase  market 
transparency. 
•  Local advisory units on vocational training will be established in order to 
deal  with business  needs for  individual  training  programmes.  The units 
represent local training institutes and make possible a closer link between 
organisational change, skill development and training. 
•  A  research  centre  on management and organisational change  will  be 
established.  The  centre  will  facilitate  co-operative  research  projects 
focusing  on the flexible  organisations  of tomorrow.  Businesses will  be 
invited  to  participate  in  a  number  of activities,  including  co-operative 
research,  training  modules  and  development  of tools  and  methods  to 
change management in S:MEs. 
•  A  research project on  "knowledge  accounting"  will  be  initiated.  The 
projects  brings  together  scientists,  businesses,  investors  and  trade 
associations.  It aims  to integrate human  resources  and  other intangible 
assets  into  accounting  principles  in  order  to  make  possible  proper 
valuation of  knowledge-based enterprises. Furthermore, the principles are 
to  be  used  as  internal  guidelines  and  steering  methods  in  flexible 
organisations. 
In order to facilitate  co-operation between regional  institutions and  private 
enterprises,  a  "Change  Contract  Scheme"  will  be  designed  to  allow  the 
co-financing of  regional projects, including at least two public institutions and 
a  number  of enterprises.  The  projects  will  focus  on  issues  relating  to 
organisational change, i.e.  competence building in work teams,  how to build 
a learning organisation, networks and standards for interactive training. (Jens 
Nyholm, 1997) 
Governments  may  help  in  different  ways.  The  recently  established  Danish  LOK  (Management, 
organisation,  competence) programme,  bringing together four  different  ministries,  makes  a major 
effort  to create  new  framework  conditions  to  stimulate  organisational  change  in  firms.  In  other 
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preliminary nature, less ambitious initiatives aimed at analysing the actual situation and the potential 
for different types of  policy initiatives may be called for. 
The most powerful tools to influence organisational  change are policies affecting the pressure for 
change, including competition policy. But in a sense, these tools might be too powerful. If  the ,system 
of  firms exposed to intensified competition is not at all prepared for reconstruction, the outcome may 
not be creative destruction but just plain destruction.  Competition pressure must match the ability to 
absorb change, which has to do with human resource development. 
Public policy in relation to human resource development 
The new organisational context points to new tasks for the formal  education and training  system. 
First, it is obvious that there is a need to increase the effort in certain fields,  such as providing skills 
in using information technology and in communicating and co-operating across national borders. 
It might be difficult, and even of dubious value, to train students directly in social skills such as co-
operation, and  in  work assets such as  creativity.  But there is  ample  room to introduce work and 
study methods and evaluation schemes that reinforce and  develop  such skills.  For instance, basing 
training  on  problem-oriented  and  interdisciplinary  projects  pursued  in  groups  with  common 
evaluation for the group is a way of simulating how things are done in the real working life in the 
learning economy. 
The need to engage in  life-long training will  require other institutional changes.  A crucial element 
will be to involve private firms  in more direct co-operation with the public  sector. Public schemes 
could support training in firms in order to avoid under-investment, and could give support to groups 
of  firms joining with each other and with regional training institutes to develop new programmes for 
building the skills needed. And most importantly, public programmes could be introduced to explain 
to firms in general how to organise learning. 
The need for a New New Deal 
The  learning  economy  is  one  where  broad  parttctpation  in  economic  actlvttles  and  trust  is 
fundamentally important for economic performance. When the workforce is required to master more 
skills  than  they  are  capable  of learning,  the  result  is  the  exclusion  of citizens  from  active 
participation.  Trying  to  bring  unemployment  rates  down  in  such  a  situation  will  give  rise  to 
inflationary  bottle-neck  problems  in  the  labour  market.  Safeguarding  a  high  level  of trust  in  a 
strongly and permanently polarised economy may also be difficult. 
For these reasons,  as well  as  for  social reasons,  a whole  set of specific  measures to support the 
low-skilled and slow learners is needed. A New New Deal must focus on the distribution of  learning 
capabilities,  involving  both ordinary  education,  and  training  institutes  and  firms.  Giving  special 
incentives to low-skilled workers to go on leave in order to develop general and specific skills,  and 
to bring in unemployed of  the same category in their place could be part of such a programme. It is 
also important to review the existing training methods and try to find new ones which are especially 
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practical skills and on tacit knowledge. It is especially difficult to motivate older workers to engage 
in training and here,  exceptionally,  the solution may  be to create sheltered jobs less  demanding in 
terms of learning. However, the main strategy should be to create a cohesive labour market and, as 
far as possible, to avoid exclusion and polarisation. 
Dividing policy responsibilities between regions, nations and the European Union 
Organisational innovations differ from technical innovations in that they are more 'fuzzy'. There is 
no  legal  protection - such as  patents or licences - for  new forms  of organisation  so  incentives  to 
document and specify them are weak. This may be one reason why firms tend to underestimate the 
importance of organisational as opposed to technical change. It is also reflected in a general lack of 
understanding  of  society  as  a  whole  of the  organisational  systems  used.  The  division  of 
responsibilities  between  the  three  levels  of  decision-making  must  take  into  account  these 
characteristics of organisational innovation.  It must  also  reflect the very uneven development and 
diversity on the European scene. 
All these factors imply a major role for the European Commission in organising the knowledge base 
in this field.  The situation is similar to that of science and technology some decades ago. Thtre is a 
need to establish common principles to gather and present data (  cf the roles played by the Frascati 
manual  and  the  Oslo  manual  in  relation  to  R&D  and  innovation  statistics).  The  very  uneven 
development in  the field  in  Europe presents analysts with a diversity that may  be helpful when it 
comes to developing  taxonomies  and  related  policy  strategies.  This  is  an  area where the TSER 
programme could help  by  promoting basic  research.  The recent launch of the  'Made in  Europe' 
project (Coriat, 1997) is an important step in this direction. 
This analytical effort must take into account that organisational features even more than the use of 
technology are rooted in  systemic features  specific to regions and  nations.  Industrial relations,  the 
education  and  training  system,  the  financial  system  and  other  institutional  characteristics  of the 
national  innovation  system  have  to  be  taken  into  account  when  designing  policies  aimed  at 
introducing  new  principles  of organisation  and  human  resource  development.  In  this  field  the 
comparative approach is  extremely useful,  since it  creates an awareness among policy-makers and 
agents for change of  the characteristics of national and  local systems.  Such awareness is crucial for 
designing policy. 
This implies, on the other hand, that the policies must be designed and executed mainly at national or 
regional level. This is an area where the starting point is different for each country and region so the 
challenges presented by globalisation and the learning economy will differ.  An economy dominated 
by small and medium-sized firms in low-technology sectors will need a completely different approach 
to  one  where  big  highly  internationalised  companies  dominate.  Some  regions  - like  industrial 
districts  or local  industrial  clusters  - will  have  there  own  specific  organisational  traditions  and 
therefore the policy should also allow some scope for regional initiatives. 
The  fact  that  organisational  forms  and  human  resource  development  strategies  are  embedded  in 
national innovation systems has another important implication.  To implement the new principles of 
organisation some of  the existing policy frameworks and institutions may have to be changed. This is 
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But again the critical framework conditions and  institutional barriers will  differ between countries 
and therefore policy strategies will have to be rooted at national or regional level. 
A specific  effort  is  needed  in  the  field  of human  resource  development  in  order to counter the 
tendencies toward social polarisation. Since this trend is general in all countries there is an argument 
for the European Commission to take a lead here.  A European forum for  exchanging experiences 
between countries and  regions regarding the experimental design of human resource development 
systems to support weak learners is  a possibility.  Education and training systems are conservative 
and real incentives to try out bold experiments in this field  should be provided. Different models of 
production-based training where learning is integrated into the everyday life of  private firms could be 
developed and tested within such a forum. 
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Introduction 
In the last chapter we pointed to organisational  change as  a new focus  for European innovation 
policy.  Another way of more effectively transforming the European knowledge base into economic 
growth and job creation is to stimulate the formation of networks. This is an area where European 
innovation  policy  has  already  played  a  role  through  the  ESPRIT  Programme,  the  Framework 
Programmes and,  indirectly, through the EUREKA Programme. But networking is  a phenomenon 
that can be stimulated at different levels - from the local and regional level to the global level - and it 
is an area where policy options are complex. 
A number of questions arise in relation to policies aimed  at  stimulating the formation of networks, 
namely, what is the nature and dynamics of innovation networks? What is their relevance within the 
new industrial  dynamics  at European and  regional  level?  What  are  the most significant  risks  and 
costs of  networking for the individual firm and for the system? How can policy action tackle those? 
Co-operation and competition between firms and other innovative units coexist. Horizontal forms of 
·co-operation, between competing firms or between firms and research centres, have expanded in the 
last couple of decades.  They are generally based on contractual agreements to undertake common 
R&D activities, where the commercial exploitation of results is  carried out independently by  each 
partner.  Thus there is  co-operation in the research (and in  some  cases the  developmental)  phase, 
while there is competition on the final  product market. Vertical arrangements are where users and 
producers co-operate in  defining and  improving products or production processes through buyer-
supplier relationships. 
This chapter considers the global and  regional dimension of networks. It will  address some of the 
previous  questions,  by  focusing  on two  central  points,  namely,  the  role  of innovation  networks 
dynamics in the learning economy,  and  the policy implications emerging from this and from  some 
interesting policy experiences.  Chapter 8 will  consider certain aspects of creating vertical linkages 
and inter-firm co-operation from the perspective of  (government) technology procurement policies. 
Networks and inter-firm co-operation
27 
One salient feature of  the new mode of  knowledge creation is that more and more of  the innovation 
process takes place through networking rather than through hierarchies and markets. Data based on 
the European Community Innovation  Survey,  CIS,  show that  only  a small  minority  of firms  and 
27 This section is based on the contribution of  Prof. Philip Cooke. See also publications by the Cooke 
TSER project on regional innovation systems (Cooke, 1997, Cooke, Etxebarria and Uranga, 1998 
and Todtling and Sedlacek, 1997). 
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(DeBresson, et al,  1997). 
Networks and network relationships are heterarchical rather than hierarchical. They are based not on 
bureaucratic or administrative  authority,  nor on arm's length  market exchange,  but on  exchange 
between partners of  consequence. The importance of  horizontal inter-firm co-operation in promoting 
innovations  highlights the qualitative  aspects  of networking.  Grabber argues that "loose coupling 
within  networks affords  favourable  conditions  for  interactive  learning  and  innovation.  Networks 
open  access  to various  sources  of information  and  thus  offer  a  considerably  broader  learning 
interface than is the case with hierarchical firms" (Grabber 1993). 
Networks lower transaction costs by substituting exchange through reciprocity for exchange through 
markets. They may suffer from "lock-in" where insufficient "loose-coupling" or network exchange, 
openness  and  interaction  are  available.  They  may  be  set  up  temporarily  to  solve  a  problem 
experienced in  an industrial community.  They need not be permanent and  from time  to time  they 
divide in order to coalesce with new partners. At their most functionally efficient they are capable of 
allowing rapid and reflective response to anticipated or actual crises affecting firms,  social groups or 
cultural communities (Freeman, 1991). 
Network relationships are based on a number of  key social and psychological features: 
•  reciprocal exchange relationships among partners 
•  trust in the integrity of  partners 
•  belief in the reputation of  partners as persons of  conscience 
•  understanding of  need for openness and willingness to learn 
•  a personal disposition that is inclusive not exclusive 
•  a political disposition that is empowering not elitist 
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This  list  shows  that  networks  can  thrive  only  if there  is  a  nurumum  of mutual  trust  in  the 
re1ationships.  Without  trust the  costs  of designing  and  supervising  contracts  (transaction  costs) 
would be prohibitive. This implies that networks are always socially embedded. They are discursive 
mechanisms for creating and accessing tacit knowledge. 
Network stability derives from the establishment of trust and  reliability,  reputation and customary 
rules to which members adhere. The reason for maintaining networks is that network members have 
direct  or indirect  access  to  resources  and  influence  in  pursuing  projects  they  consider  to  be 
individually  or collectively  important.  Network actors need  each other because within  their  own 
institutional setting (e.g.  firm,  university,  research laboratory) they cannot create all  the resources 
they  need,  whether financial  or intellectual.  Thus,  networks are  always  distinct from  markets and 
hierarchies. Although they can be based on legal contracts and involve financial transactions, they are 
conditioned  by  notions  of reciprocity,  sharing,  co-operation  and  trust  as  means  of economic 
coordination. 
Networking takes different  forms.  Horizontal co-operation between  competing firms  or between 
firms and research centres has expanded tremendously in the last couple of decades.  It is generally 
based  on  contractual  agreements  to  undertake  common  R&D  activities,  while  the  commercial 
exploitation of results is carried out independently by each partner.  Vertical linkages between users 
and producers for the definition  and  improvement of products or production processes have  also 
become  more  frequent  and  more  comprehensive  over  this  period.  The  growing  importance  of 
selective relationships between customers and sub-contractors, giving them a more direct role in the 
innovation process,  accounts  for  the formation  of regional,  national  and  international  production 
chains. 
The regional and local dimension of  networks 
The local and regional dimension of  networking is crucial. The learning process within an innovation 
network is based upon a constant exchange of knowledge,  as well as the collective production and 
exploitation of new knowledge, founded  on mutual trust.  In this sense,  the territorial dimension of 
networking activities is not a subsidiary factor, but rather a primordial one.  Networks function best 
as innovative social organisms when they exploit the different areas of  tacit knowledge of  regional or 
local  interests  and  associations,  including  firms  and  enterprise  support  agencies.  This  is  partly 
because the exchange of tacit knowledge requires more trust and cultural understanding,  developed 
mostly through geographical proximity. Networks can also be international or even global,  and the 
frequency of these wider networks is growing rapidly, but normally wider networks will tend to be 
more formalised and oriented toward the exchange of  codified knowledge. The Keeble TSER project 
recently concluded that notwithstanding their global  market  orientation and  international research 
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involving other regional firms and knowledge centres. 
28 
Networks exist in specific institutional milieux or settings with shared interests and understandings 
(Castells and Hall,  1994,  and  Saxenian,  1994).  Therefore, the way in  which networks specifically 
contribute to the development  of the  innovation  system will  depend  on the type  of institutional 
setting or milieu, and the interaction between it and the networks. 
Studying  systemic  learning  and  networking  implies  a  broader  understanding  of the  institutional 
setting and its relationship with industrial dynamics. 
Policy and public sector players are important elements of  the milieu in which networks operate. Not 
only does the specific  policy  strategy affect  industrial  dynamics,  but so  does the constellation of 
public  and  private sector players who  participate in  the  decision-making  of such  policy  strategy. 
28 TSER project coordinated by Dr Keeble. Keeble, D and Lawson, C (1997): Networks, Collective 
learning and RTD in regionally clustered high-technology SMEs (unpublished TSER draft report). 
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Therefore, the forms of  this partnership between local policy-makers and private sector players is an 
important element in the regional innovation system. 
In relation to these three broad arguments,  the establishment of innovation networks is  currently 
perceived as an essential policy instrument to enhance the technological capacities of less favoured 
regions. Networks help these weak regional innovation systems in three crucial ways: 
1.  by building up the 'social capital' in the region, exploiting the learning potential of  individuals and 
human resources; 
2.  by expanding the (generally very weak) institutional capacities of  the region; 
3.  by  enhancing partnerships between public and private sector players in the region,  and  devising 
collective strategies. 
29 
The costs and risks of  networking 
The  previous  section  discussed  some  of the  potential  benefits  of networking  for  innovation. 
Assumptions were based on the idea that networks,  as non-market and  non-hierarchical  forms  of 
industrial  organisation,  reduce  costs of communication  and  transaction,  and  facilitate  interactive 
learning. However, even if they do this for a while, they might later become obstacles to necessary 
change.  And  there are other costs and  risks,  both for  individual  partners and  for  the innovation 
system as a whole. 
Four negative aspects of  innovation networks, which may apply to a greater or lesser extent, are the 
following. 
1.  Networks  might  increase,  rather  than  reduce,  transaction  costs  as  it  takes  many  resources 
(economic, human and time) to build the networks and operate them effectively. 
2.  The presence of  free-riding partners reduces the collective benefits for the rest of  partners 
3.  Networks contain an  important element of inclusion,  but also  of exclusion,  which  can  have  a 
negative effect in the territorial or sectorial dimension. 
4.  Power relations  within  the network might  be less  than  ideal  and  may  strongly  influence  the 
network. For example, large companies might dictate the directions of  the network's operations, 
or exploit the knowledge produced locally rather than contribute to local knowledge-creation. 
29 Fallowing these premises, the EU has recently developed 'Regional innovation strategies', a policy 
instrument managed by DG XVI that aims to develop these collective strategies in less favoured 
regions of  the EU. 
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have  important  negative  effects  on  the  overall  innovation  system.  This  is  related  to  what  we 
identified in a previous chapter as the integration/flexibility dilemma. While networks are effective 
mechanisms  for  integrating  individual  firms  and  organisations  into  the  innovative  system  and  in 
pursuing a specific technological trajectory they may,  at a later stage,  become mechanisms which 
prevent those firms from adapting to new conditions. Networks might work as factors introducing 
systemic and technological lock-ins into the process if their capacity for change is limited,  and the 
financial commitment invested in building information channels and trust makes it too expensive to 
end  the  collaboration.  This  can  apply  especially  when  scientific  paradigms  or the  technological 
trajectories of  the innovation process change rapidly and radically. In such situations, radical change 
in  the  environment  may  make  given  network constellations  inefficient  and  block renewal  of the 
economy.  For  instance,  one  reason  why  the  positive  impact  of information  technology  on 
productivity took a long time to appear may  have  been the stubbornness of old  networks linking 
industries to mechanical engineering (Lundvall, 1993). 
This dilemma also has a geographical dimension.  Regional networks and industrial districts may be 
important for  stimulating knowledge-creation locally.  But wider networks may  be  more dynamic, 
and being locked in regionally may hamper the innovative capability of firms.  This may be specially 
true for European-wide industrial networks. The recent rejuvenation of the US high-tech industries 
has  been  closely  linked  to the  formation  of international  production  networks  spanning  several 
continents and especially involving producers in South-East Asia (Ernst,  1997; Borrus and Zysman, 
1996). 
Public action has a role to play in this dilemma, by ensuring that the risks and costs of  networking are 
minimised,  not  only  for  the  individual  organisation,  but  especially  for  the  overall  system  and 
innovation  process.  However,  before  examining  this  point  in  detail,  the  next  section will  briefly 
review some of  the most salient policies adopted in Europe at different levels of  policy-making. 
Policy experiences with networks
30 
The  literature  focusing  on  innovation  networks  sees  innovation  as  an  interactive  process. 
Communication, co-operation and coordination between actors are conceived as  essential elements 
in the innovation process.  This has changed the perspective on innovation policies in  the last two 
decades from  one which stressed infrastructures to one which stresses the fostering  of interaction 
between actors, firms and other organisations. This may be referred to as the network approach to 
innovation policy-making. 
Europe has lately seen the emergence of several inter-firm collaboration and network initiatives.  A 
large variety of  public programmes to support networks have been launched in the last decades with 
the purpose of stimulating interactive learning by  enhancing linkages  between firms  and  between 
30 This section is based on the contributions of  Prof Philip Cooke and Dr. Patries Boekholt 
respectively. 
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target groups differ largely from case to case.  They are the initiative both of national policy-makers 
concerned  about  the  unsatisfactory  exploitation  of R  TD  capabilities  by  industry  and  regional 
pGlicy-makers aiming to exploit fully regional capabilities for economic development. 
The European Commission has also contributed to the spread of  the collaborative network approach 
in  two  major  ways:  through  the  funding  of pre-competitive  R  TD  conducted  by  transnational 
consortia  of firms  and  research  centres  (the  ESPRIT  programme  laid  the  foundation  for  this 
mechanism to become the dominant form  of EU R  TD support),  and through the establishment of 
multiple transnational networks for technology transfer and dissemination (CEC, 1994a). 
Several European countries have developed networking policy instruments at the national level.  A 
common form of  networking policies are schemes that link groups of  firms with research centres and 
universities.  One example is the Dutch BTS (Business-Oriented Technology Collaboration Scheme) 
launched  in  early  1997,  which  funds  collaborative  projects  for  up  to  37.5%  of the  costs.  This 
mechanism  is  very  similar  to  the  pre-competitive  research  funding  in  European  programmes. 
However, the Danish Network Programme launched in 1989 is the best known national co-operation 
programme  in  Europe.  In  its  original  design  the  scheme  consisted  of  awareness-building, 
brokerage-training and grants for establishing networks. The active marketing of  this programme by 
the Danish Technological Institute has led  to the wide application of the model in  other countries 
such as Portugal, Spain, the UK and Ireland, which have adapted it to their own requirements. 
Similarly,  a large set of networking initiatives have been launched at the regional/eve/ in the past 
decade. Given their limited scale and public budgets it is not appropriate to include all the elements 
that are available on the national scale.  So for regional innovation policy there is greater pressure to 
target specific  economic and  technological  strengths.  This  is  the reason why  regional  innovation 
policy  is  increasingly  focused  on building  network  infrastructures  between  existing  parts  of the 
regional  system:  technological  support  systems,  support  for  interfirm  collaboration,  promoting 
research and development in endogenous firms,  and linking local firms with internationally operating 
firms.  Cooke (1995) refers to this new approach to regional development as the idea of networked 
regional innovation architecture. 
These  regional  initiatives,  more than the national  networking  programmes,  aim  at  improving  the 
innovation  capabilities  of S?\ffis,  and  not  solely  at  creating  industry-RID  linkages.  Small  and 
medium-sized enterprises, even when operating on a regional market, feel  the challenges of global 
competition in the same way as large companies operating internationally. One obvious effect is for 
instance the change in subcontractor relationships: contractors require higher quality, more flexibility 
and more complex products from their suppliers. The S:MEs find it increasingly difficult to face these 
challenges by themselves. Therefore, the rationale of  regional policy initiatives has been based on the 
idea that inter-firm co-operation can offer: 
•  Better channels  for  learning and creating expertise  in  the  region:  It is  widely  accepted  in 
innovation research that companies rely heavily on other firms  - their competitors, suppliers and 
customers - for innovative ideas. 
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•  Economies of  scale in the region: Networks aimed at joint purchasing, distribution, or sharing of 
facilities can reduce costs for individual firms; 
• · Economies of  scope in the region: Combined expertise can open new market niches for high-end, 
value-added products. A network of  firms with complementary expertise could be better equipped 
to deal with demand for high-quality products and services if  they combine their skills; 
•  Heightened flexibility and shared risk in the  region:  Creating a pool of expertise in  a flexible 
network increases the ability of  the regional economy to respond to the demands of  the market. 
Types of  support mechanism
31 
Schemes for  enhancing innovation networks have  assigned  a  number of different  roles  to public 
action in this area: 
•  promoting awareness; 
•  facilitating of  informal contacts and thematic working groups; 
•  helping to bring firms together by supporting brokerage; 
•  supporting collaborative facilities and technical services; 
•  providing financial support for networks and interfirm co-operation. 
Following these goals, there are different types of policy instruments and programmes for enhancing 
collaborative networks. In 1993 a review of  European policies for networks was conducted on behalf 
of the European Commission's DG XIII,
32  identifying  a  range  of networking  policy  approaches 
(Boekholt and Fahrenkrog, 1993). A basic distinction was made between policies aimed at sustaining 
existing networks and those aimed at creating new linkages. In the first case the main challenges are 
to revitalise existing modes of  operation and facilitate innovative approaches in mature industries. In 
the second case,  promoting awareness, finding  and  bringing together the appropriate partners and 
building a relationship between them are key issues.  The review identified  23  policy initiatives in 
Europe, most of them oriented towards S:rvffis,  while others involve a deliberate mix of small  and 
31 This section is based on a contribution by Dr Patries Boekholt. 
32 This review was conducted under the framework of  the European Innovation Monitoring System 
(ElMS). It served to prepare one in a series ofPolicy Exchange workshops where policy-makers 
from each EU country could learn from experiences in other countries. 
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Centres) and other types ofintermediary.
33 The schemes can be classified under three headings: 
1.. Formal co-operation versus informal co-operation 
The type  of networking  schemes  identified  in  the ElMS  review  varied  from  linking  firms  in  an 
informal matter (i.e. business clubs, mentorships, joint seminars) to very formal co-operations backed 
by contracts and joint ventures.  The philosophy behind the informal approach is that building trust 
takes time and should start with 'easy' forms of collaboration before companies start sharing more 
sensitive information and skills. 
Examples of  this informal approach are the Plato Scheme in Belgium, and the Medical Technology 
Forum in Wales. The first has been run by the Kempen Regional Development Agency in Flanders 
since 1988, and aims at knowledge transfer between SMEs and large companies through mentorship 
groups.  The final  objective is  to develop  more formal  networks between 'allied  enterprises'.  The 
Welsh Medical Technology Forum was founded  as  a collaborative venture between industry,  the 
Welsh  Office,  the  Welsh  Development  Agency,  the  National  Health  Service  and  academia.  Its 
mission  is  to  improve  the  competitiveness  of the  medical  sector  in  Wales.  The  Forum  has  an 
industrial chairman and  representatives from industry on its steering group. More than 90% of all 
health care companies in Wales have participated in seminars and workshops since its launch in 1992. 
The rationale for the formal approach is that co-operation between companies should not be free of 
obligations and  should aim  at establishing  clear objectives  and  milestones.  The philosophy is  that 
firms  will  only invest time and  effort in  networking in  return for  clear business benefits.  A recent 
example  of such  an  approach  is  a  Dutch  initiative  in  the  region  of Twente,  where  around  60 
specialised suppliers and  contracting engineers from all  disciplines have set up the Systems Supply 
Group  Twente  Ltd  (TMG).  The  group  has  formalised  this  network  by  forming  a  new  joint 
shareholding company, which acts as systems supplier contractor on behalf of  the shareholders. The 
public role  in  this  initiative  consisted  of financial  support for the brokerage efforts  and  an  initial 
payment in shareholder funds.  Joint research and product development between the firms is expected 
in the longer term. 
Whether formal or informal co-operation works best depends on the degree of previous networking 
experience of the target group.  In  cases  where the  companies  already  know each  other or have 
experience in  establishing interactions with external  knowledge suppliers,  the slow  awareness and 
trust building phases can be shortened. This was the experience in the Danish Network Programme 
where some of  the networks were consolidated into formal joint ventures. In regions and  industries 
33 We should explain that, given the relatively short time for the ElMS review, it concentrated on the 
national policy level, and included only a selection of  interesting regional  initiatives.  The focus on 
SMEs resulted in under-representation of  R&D-oriented collaborative networks. In several countries 
programmes are designed to foster industry research relations and increase user orientation ofR&D. 
These were not taken into account in cases where the target group was mainly medium to large 
companies with R&D capabilities. 
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where collaboration is not so well developed, the informal route may be more effective in prompting 
firms to establish interactive links. 
2. Vertical versus horizontal inter-firm links 
Those who practice and  study networking often claim  that networks of competing firms  are  not 
viable. Trust between companies cannot exist if  the network members are direct competitors. Indeed, 
the  ElMS  review  identified  mainly  vertical,  supply-chain-oriented  initiatives.  Here the  aim  is  to 
increase the performance of the suppliers, to raise their quality standards, to increase co-designing 
capabilities or even to become joint system suppliers.  More informal networks can bring together 
groups  of firms  from  completely  different  sectors  sharing  similar  technological  or  innovation 
management issues. However, there are also network approaches that associate competitors from the 
same sector, for instance in industrial districts where many small and medium-sized firms operate in 
the  same  sector.  The Italian CITER Programme initiates network projects among textile firms  to 
provide the firms  with  strategic information about fashion,  market  and  technology developments. 
The  Germany  Technology  Working  Groups  (Technologie  Arbeitskreise)  is  joint  technological 
problem-solving for firms  in the same sector.  In  areas where there is  no  historical tradition of co-
operation, severe pressure from global competition is often one of the incentives for competitors to 
co-operate. 
3. Brokerage activities versus building a collaborative infrastructure 
In the brokerage approach the public role consists in identifying potential partners and bringing them 
together for  more  formal  co-operation.  Experiences  with  the Danish Network Programme  have 
shown that this facilitator role is difficult and requires specific expertise and good knowledge of  the 
business community.  This  is  why training  of brokers plays  a key  role  in  the programme.  Recent 
initiatives  in  the  Netherlands  where  Innovation  Centres  have  played  a  similar  role  in  bringing 
together firms for 'cluster projects' on joint product development, also showed that th!s takes a long 
time and  is  very time consuming.  Thus public investment in  these type of activities is likely to be 
substantial. 
Instead  of  proactively  bringing  together  firms,  network  initiatives  can  consist  in  building 
collaborative service infrastructure with specific expertise.  These centres can act as problem-solving 
and  technology-watch  facilities.  The  firms  themselves  are  left  to take  the  initiative  to  use  this 
infrastructure in collaboration with other firms.  The Italian CITER programme is a good example of 
such a joint service infrastructure. One of  the important policy issues here is the degree to which the 
users are in control of  the services provided. Many public initiatives seeking to provide these services 
which  have  been  started  from  research  centres  or universities  have  shown  limited  dissemination 
potential. 
Public schemes - rationale and lessons 
Even a limited review of  networking policies shows the wide variety of support mechanisms, target 
groups, and objectives involved. The fact that a majority of  these initiatives are developed at regional 
or even local level is due to the need to fine-tune the business sector, the support infrastructure and 
the people involved in the process.  This implies that there is  no  'best practice' recipe for  network 
policies or instruments. However, some genera/lessons can be  learnt from the types and examples 
of  networking described above. 
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business community who are widely accepted as intermediaries. 
2·: Creating networks relies on raising awareness and building trust,  and it  is  a process that takes 
time. Public schemes that need to show short-term results may be difficult to legitimise. 
3.  From the firms'  standpoint,  clear business benefits should be expected before they will  commit 
time and effort to networking, particularly in more formal modes of  networking. 
4.  Science-led  initiatives  to foster  clusters  with  economic  potential  have  resulted  in  only  a  few 
success stories. 
The  issues  of how to identify  potential  successful  clusters  and  how to manage  the  creation  and 
growth  of these  'centres  of competence'  are  on  the  agenda  of many  national  and  regional 
policy-makers  at  the  moment.  The  costs  and  risks  for  individual  organisations  of engaging  in 
networking activities are among the main reasons for the establishment of  these public programmes. 
Firms run the risk of losing important know-how in  networks,  while  exposing themselves to the 
competitors.  Thus there is  not much incentive for  individual  firms,  specially  SMEs,  to engage in 
collaborative  arrangements.  As  shown  in  different  examples,  public  action  can  help  create  the 
conditions for  trust and  confidence between partners needed  in  such  situations.  Similarly,  public 
· action can help to reduce the time and resource-consuming activity of setting up a network through 
schemes that aim to improve the efficiency of this initial  stage.  And  finally,  by  acting as  a direct 
broker or information provider, public action can help individual firms find a suitable partner, or help 
a group of  firms identify common problems and challenges. 
Similarly, the purpose of public action should not only be to encourage individual firms to join and 
set up innovation networks, but should also be to identify potential negative effects of networking in 
a given system and/or technological trajectory. In cases where the integrative impact of  the networks 
has  a  negative  side  by  producing  technological  bottlenecks  and  hindering  the  adaptability  of 
individual  firms,  public  action  should  be  able  to  detect  such  problems  and  to  promote  the 
development of alternative networks in areas and in forms which are more flexible.  In other words, 
public  action  should  focus  on disintegrating  and  reintegrating  networks in  the territory,  to some 
extent producing discontinuity in  negative networking trends.  This requires that policy-makers are 
prepared  to introduce  policy  alternatives  which  give  new  direction  to  traditional  industrial  and 
technological orientations. This is one reason why it is becoming increasingly crucial at the regional 
and national level to encourage firms to participate in international and global networks. 
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As pointed out in the introduction to this report, studies of  innovation processes and public action on 
technological development have tended to focus  mainly  on manufacturing activities.  Services have 
generally been given only  marginal consideration.  Aware of this unbalanced view  of the learning 
economy,  several  of the  TSER projects  are  currently  examining  the role  of services,  especially 
knowledge-intensive services, in the innovation process. The analysis has important implications for 
the  European  project  which  have  been  overlooked.  As  we  shall  see  below,  firms  involved  in 
producing  knowledge-intensive  business  services  play  a  major  role  in  international  integration 
processes because they transfer experience, institutions and technologies between localities that are 
geographically far apart. In this sense, they are at the very core of  the globalising learning economy. 
The  economic  and  organisational  activities  that  come under the generic term  'services'  are  very 
diverse and heterogeneous. This has traditionally posed a problem in analytical and statistical terms, 
and has so far prevented an analysis of  the role played by this sector in the recent transformation of 
the economy. Extensive conceptual and comparative tools need further development.  Most of this 
chapter is  based  on the  provisional  results  from  TSER projects,  and  will  address  some  of the 
questions relating to their line of inquiry. How do knowledge-intensive sectors affect organisational 
change,  and  the  dissemination  of tacit  knowledge  in  the  innovation  system?  How  are  those 
knowledge-intensive  sectors  defined  and  in  relation  to  which  industrial  sectors  are  they  most 
relevant? What are the policy implications of the role played by knowledge-intensive services in the 
learning economy? 
The interaction between services and manufacturing 
It has been generally claimed that the literature on economic growth and technological change has 
traditionally been biased in  favour of manufacturing and  against the service sector.  However,  this 
charge of  a 'manufacturing bias' is not totally correct. There is some literature, marginal at least from 
the point of view of economic growth, covering many  aspects of the process of service growth. 
35 
This literature tends to be based on a stage-by-stage interpretation of economic history, the 'service 
economy'  representing  the  tertiary  stage  in  the  development  of modem  societies.  Moreover,  it 
assumes that the proliferating production and consumption of services is highly dependent on 'social 
innovations',  a  term  that  refers  both  to  restructuring  of production,  and  to  the  wider  social 
framework (Gershuny and Miles, 1983). 
34 This chapter draws heavily on two contributions by Dr. Hauknes and Dr. Wood on the role of 
knowledge-intensive services in the learning economy. Both were written specifically for this project. 
35 Part of  this literature can be traced back to prominent writers like Fisher (1935), Clark (1957) and 
Fuchs (1968). 
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regeneration,  particularly  'advanced'  or  'high  quality'  business  services  as  important  economic 
activities for  regional  growth (Illeris,  1996 and  Holmen and  Jacobson,  1997).  Last but not least, 
other literature has described the role of  key services in industrial organisation, in terms of  the role of 
strategic  services  in  shaping  competition  and  comparative  advantages,  as  in  the  strategic 
management literature (Quinn,  1992),  and the role of 'technological'  services and  competencies in 
shaping new industrial structures and organisational patterns (Reich, 1991 ). 
To  a certain  extent  all  these approaches take the  view that there  is  a  complementarity between 
services and manufacturing, which raises the problem of establishing a clear border line between the 
two, given that  uevery high-value enterprise is in the  business of  providing services [specialised 
research,  engineering  and  design,  sales  marketing  and  consulting,  strategic,  financial  and 
management)  ... (Fherefore)  the [distinction} ignores the web/ike relationships that are shaping the 
new economy" (Reich, 1991 ). 
Hence,  there  is  a  general  shift  of emphasis  from  the  perception  of services  as  production  and 
consumption sectors towards services as functions.  This interest reflects the new insights about the 
role of knowledge production and distribution in the economy, and more specifically, the provision 
of new knowledge-based  services  and  the reshaping  of old  ones.  Therefore,  knowledge intensive 
. services acquire a special relevance within the overall  service  sector as  crucial  instruments in  the 
learning economy and in the innovation process. 
What are knowledge-intensive services? 
Services are a heterogeneous set of  activities. Some service firms are small, labour-intensive and use 
only primitive technologies, while others are capital-intensive, knowledge-intensive and major users 
of  information and communication technologies.  Some operate in local environments where there is 
little  competition,  while  others,  such  as  telecommunication  and  financial  services,  have  become 
international  and  have  experienced  a radical increase  in  the intensity  of competition.  The  role  of 
innovation in these different sectors is very different and we need to map more closely what is going 
on in terms of process and product innovation in the different kinds of services,  including publicly 
procured services, and establish indicators. 
As mentioned, knowledge-intensity, in some senses of  the word, clearly plays a role in some of  these 
services. But knowledge-intensity is  hard to define  and  still  harder to measure.  To the extent that 
knowledge-intensity  reflects  the  integration  of output  with  a  generic  or  specific  science  and 
technology  base,  it  can  be  seen  as  a  combination  of knowledge  embedded  in  new  equipment, 
personnel and R&D-intensity. 
The difficulty of defining knowledge-intensive services precisely is evident not only at a theoretical 
and conceptual level, but is also reflected in empirical data recording. In this sense, it is important to 
mention the lack of a homogeneous and  standard classification of this specific sector in European 
national  statistical  departments  and  Eurostat.  This  situation  hinders  reliable  cross-country 
comparisons  and  European-wide  studies  of the  structural  dynamics  and  transformations  oJ 
knowledge-intensive  services.  In  spite of the  increasing  importance  of the  sector in  the learninB 
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stagnating sectors like steel and agriculture. 
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Until there are more developed instruments for identifying knowledge-intensive services, we have to 
resort  to  the  kind  of approach  used  as  a  basis  for  the  OECD's  high-,  medium- and  low-tech 
classification of  manufacturing industries, namely simple R&D intensities. Tables 1 and 2 outline the 
sectoral content of a survey of  technology-based knowledge-intensive services (knowledge-intensive 
services) carried out under the TSER Project SI4S. 
Table 1: Technology-based (T) knowledge-intensive services (knowledge-intensive services) 
T knowledge-intensive services categories  NACE 
Hardware consultancy services  7210 
Software consultancy and supply services  7220 
Data processing services  723 0 
Database activities  7240 
Maintenance and repair of  office  7250 
Other computer related activities  7260 
R&D on natural sciences and engineering  7310 
Rand experimental Don social sciences and humanities  7320 
Architectural  and  eng1neenng  activities  and  related  742 
technical consultancy 
Technical testing and analysis  743 
Table  2:  Potential  technology-based  knowledge-intensive  services  (knowledge-intensive 
services) 
36 One of  the first attempts to provide a comparative statistical basis of  knowledge-intensive services 
in Europe was developed in a three-country report about employment trends in the sector (Gaebe 
and Strambach, 1993). 
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Potential T knowledge-intensive services categories 
Technology-related publishing 
Wholesale in machinery, equipment etc. 
Logistics services and related transport services 
T  -KIBS in telecommunications 
Patent bureaux 
Technology-related market research 
NACE 
part of221 
516 
632 
part of6420 
part of7413 
Technology-related  econonuc  and  management  7414 
consultancy services 
Labour  recruitment  and  prov1s1on  of  technical  part of745 
personnel 
Technology-related training  parts  of 8042  I  8022  I 
8030 
These  two  tables  provide  an  approximative  listing  of  service  firms  demonstrating 
knowledge-intensity in various forms. 
The innovation process and the role of  knowledge intensive services 
The  service  sector  plays  an  important,  but  diffuse,  role  in  the  innovation  process. 
Knowledge-intensive services may not be dominant forces in the overall process of innovation, but 
they influence  and  are  significant  catalysts for  wider  organisational and  technological  change,  as 
knowledge-intensive  services,  and  more  specially  knowledge-intensive  business  services  {KIBS), 
affect the learning capacity of  the system. The search for learning-based resources to respond to the 
challenges of globalisation appears already to have favoured  the  recent  expansion  of commercial 
knowledge-intensive  services.  This  experience  serves  to  illustrate  the  important  issues  raised  by 
innovation-oriented  change  more  generally.  Through  their  function  as  intermediaries  between 
companies'  idiosyncratic,  and  often  tacit,  knowledge  bases,  these  services  play  an  increasingly 
complementary  role  to  more  traditional  public  'technology  transfer'  instruments.  Similarly, 
knowledge-intensive  services,  and  more  specifically  KIBS,  are  crucial  instruments  for  inducing 
organisational change in different institutions (not only firms). 
But what are the sources of  the internal innovativeness of  knowledge-intensive services? Research in 
the TSER projects indicates that these are similar to the ones identified in manufacturing firms and in 
the industrial sector in general. Those sources include: 
•  Personnel and human resource management- Their ability to recruit specialist ICT, sector-
specific and management personnel and  employ them across a range of client  applications. 
Their own adaptive learning  processes  are  augmented  by  a variety of project experience. 
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specialist sources of  information and intelligence. 
• ·  Proficiency in IT systems - Global knowledge-intensive services are developing advanced IT 
systems  to  support  their  own  activities.  They  also  play  a  significant  role  in  adapting 
computer-based management systems to individual client circumstances. 
•  Flexible,  decentralised organisation  - It has  been widely  noted that  knowledge-intensive 
services firms are organised in innovative, flexible ways, cutting across the rigidities of  formal 
organisations,  employing  project-based teams,  and  incorporating  close working links  with 
clients. They depend for success largely on reputation. 
•  International  and  cross-sectorial  expertise-bui /ding  - One  of the  most  significantly 
innovative features of modem knowledge-intensive services is  the increasingly international 
scale  of their  experience  and  intelligence-gathering.  Global  and  international  knowledge-
intensive services are thus becoming a distinctive source of  new ideas and expertise for many 
clients, especially those operating at national or regional level. 
However, the essential difference between manufacturing and knowledge-intensive services firms  is 
the type of  product they offer; and through that, their role in the innovation process. 
The role of  know/edge-intensive services in national and regional innovation systems is closely tied 
to  the  'products ' these services supply to  the  market.  Specialised expert knowledge,  research and 
development ability,  and problem-solving know-how are  the  real products of  knowledge-intensive 
services.  Given  increasing  differentiation  and  the  accelerating  growth  of knowledge  and 
information,  indirect effects,  like the  early recognition of  problems and more rapid adjustment to 
current  economic  and structural change,  can  be  expected when firms  succeed in  utilising this 
external knowledge (Strambach, 1997, p. 35). 
Not only  does  the  content  of the  product  have  an  indirect  effect  on  the  innovation  system  by 
increasing the adaptability of  knowledge-intensive services client firms,  but so does the nature of  the 
product itself The 'intangible' nature of knowledge-intensive services products means that they are 
used  differently  from  simply  purchased  external  services.  The  interaction  between  supplier  and 
customer is far more intense, involving both partners in a process of mutual and cumulative learning 
where the transfer of knowledge  and  problem-solving  takes  place.  This  is  the  reason  why  uthe 
results  of the  interaction process  depend  on  the  competence  of both  the  knowledge-intensive 
services supplier and the  client" (Strambach,  1997,  p.  35).  The  role  of the  demand  side  then 
becomes  strategic  in  achieving  successful  and  valuable  client-supplier  interaction  regarding  the 
delivery  of knowledge-intensive  services  products.  This  relates  back to earlier  points  about  the 
importance of  the advanced demand side in innovation systems.  Thus knowledge-intensive services 
play a crucial role by stimulating the positive feedback that in the long run can increase the capacity 
of  the demand side to adjust more rapidly and effectively to new innovative and learning contexts. 
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The  knowledge-intensive  service  sector  has  been  through  important  changes  over  the  last  two 
decades with the globalisation of the economy, the growing importance of information technology 
and tacit knowledge, and the process of deregulation and privatisation. The last of these trends has 
been of special importance in Europe. The macro-economic shifts since the 1970s towards stricter 
control of public finances  and inflation,  the  deregulation  of many services and utilities,  and the 
privatisation and outsourcing of publicly-operated functions,  have drawn heavily on the expertise of 
knowledge-intensive  services  firms.  The  innovations  required  by  these  changes  are  mainly 
organisational, often moving from bureaucratic, hierarchical cultures to more devolved and market-
oriented  methods  of operation,  supported  by  new  information  and  computer  technology.  Such 
expertise is now an important basis for international knowledge-intensive services activity. Strategies 
of cost-cutting  and,  more  recently,  of efficient  service  delivery  require  processes  promoted  by 
knowledge-intensive services including financial  monitoring, business process reengineering, market 
targeting and risk assessment. 
Given  their  instrumental  role,  the  impact  of globalisation  in  knowledge-intensive  services 
enterprises  is  an  important  issue  for  innovation-oriented  change.  The  evidence  from  the  TSER 
projects  shows  that  the  supply  of knowledge-intensive  services  is  highly  segmented  between 
relatively  dominant  multinational  agencies  and  many  national  and  local  SMEs.  Traditionally 
knowledge-intensive  services  have  operated mainly  at regional  or at national  scales  of exchange, 
because  of the  need  for  close  user-producer interactions  in  information- and  expertise-intensive 
functions. Two developments have transformed these geographically confined patterns over the past 
twenty years, namely, increasing demand from multinational clients (MNC), and a growing ability to 
deliver expertise over long distances.  The first of these encouraged the international expansion of 
US- and European-based consultancies offering MNCs consistent standards of  service, often through 
networks of semi-independent partnerships.  Subsequently, the growing 'tradability'  of knowledge-
intensive services has supported the closer integration of  their global operations. Some sectors, such 
as  engineering  and  architectural  service  firms,  were  internationally-oriented  earlier  than  others. 
Recently the most rapid internationalisation has affected management and  computer-based service 
firms. 
Many nationally-based specialist service firms are today expanding into foreign markets, especially as 
these become more  integrated,  for  example  in  the  EU.  Often this  is  achieved  by  following  the 
international activities and contacts of  home-based clients, including :MNCs. Like global knowledge-
intensive  services  firms,  exchange  may  be  supported  through  any  combination  of IT  -based 
information  export,  short- or  long-term  mobility  of key  personnel,  or  investment  in  foreign 
partnerships or branch offices. 
An important contribution of knowledge-intensive services to the learning required to respond tc 
globalisation is their role in the creation and distribution of  both tacit and codified knowledge.  Thi~ 
is a much wider process than that associated simply with new information technology. The primaJl 
role of  knowledge-intensive services firms' is to review the wide range of technical, managerial an< 
marketing knowledge, through their own research and experience of  collaborating with many clients 
and to adapt and codify it for other clients. It is axiomatic that the innovative methods they promot, 
now will become standard practice in the future, so this codification role is itself broadly innovativ€ 
The same principle applies to the new information and computer technologies, engineering and oth€ 
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services depend on the active transmission of specialist knowledge and  applications experience to 
clients,  and  between  sectors,  regions  and  nations,  so  their  role  in  the  innovation  system  is  very 
important in this respect, helping to overcome the limitations of local networks and to diffuse local 
knowledge world-wide. 
Restrictions on intellectual property rights do  not significantly affect knowledge-intensive services 
activities,  at least not in  their main  relationship with clients.  This is  because knowledge-intensive 
services  are  generally  not  engaged  in  strictly  technical  innovations,  which  require  patent  law 
protection,  except  in  those  cases  where  technical  service  firms  support  client  investment  in 
development.  Knowledge  is  mainly  embodied  in  staff  skills  and  organisational  adaptability. 
Innovative investment is  seldom critical and staff mobility to competitors is not a long-term threat. 
As examined earlier, the uniqueness of  the 'product' of  each knowledge-intensive services firm arises 
primarily from the circumstances of each client,  and  from  their capacity to build  strong supplier-
client partnerships in the search for specific solutions. 
Policy implications 
The introduction of  this report suggested that new and flexible institutions are required to support 
learning processes in  an  increasingly globalised  economy.  Knowledge-intensive  services  provide a 
diversity of  specialist expertise by a variety of  means adapted to the needs of  a wide range of  private 
and  public  sector  clients.  Therefore,  the  growth  of knowledge-intensive  services  illustrates  this 
increasing demand for new learning and change within firms  and organisations.  This is  why public 
action  should  be more  aware  of the  role  played  by  knowledge-intensive  services  in  the  learning 
economy, and why it should proactively encourage the use of these services as a way of enhancing 
the organisational and technological transformations of  firms. 
The  growth of knowledge-intensive  services  raises  many  important  questions  about  appropriate 
policy instruments in a context where the private sector can now itself offer commercially informed 
support.  The  intemationalisation of knowledge-intensive  services  has  strengthened their  potential 
influence even more. Innovation policy must be sensitive to the intensity of  competition, the rates of 
possible innovation arising from research and dissemination processes, and the capacity of firms  to 
absorb  and utilise new knowledge through human  resource development.  All  these tasks are now 
widely supported by knowledge-intensive services firms, sharing mutual learning capabilities between 
European,  national  and  regional  levels  of innovation  experience.  Policy  support  for  the  use  of 
knowledge-intensive  services  requires  a  process-oriented  perspective  which  fosters  interaction 
between  clients  and  those  services.  In  this  sense,  this  chapter  has  examined  the  importance  of 
advanced demand in the innovation system, and the need to encourage the use of  these services. 
However, there are two major points which should be emphasised. The first concerns the difficulties 
posed by the 'intangible'  nature of the products knowledge-intensive services offer.  If the use of 
these  services is  to be encouraged  an  important  element  is  to build  trust among  potential users. 
Quality control is a crucial mechanism for achieving this. Therefore, public policy could consider the 
benefits  of helping  to  establish,  at  national  and  European  levels,  collective  instruments  and 
institutions for controlling quality within the sector, while respecting fully the strong self-organising 
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products or profile, and taking into account the intrinsic 'intangibility' of  the product. 
ft;.  second  point  concerns  accessibility  of these  services.  Typically  knowledge-intensive  services 
activities are highly concentrated in the most developed regions and the main users are large firms 
rather than SMEs.  Therefore,  a major role for  governmental action is  to support the  use of  such 
services in the less-favoured regions of  the EU,  and in small and medium-sized enterprises. Public 
actions could be taken at different levels, and not only at European and national level.  Some limited 
but  highly  positive  results  have  already  been  achieved  by  pilot  projects  of the  EU programme 
'Regional Innovation Strategies' under the Structural Funds,  which have  promoted networks and 
partnerships among  regional  actors for the definition  of strategic innovative  actions,  and  actively 
involving SMEs and specific knowledge-intensive services (Landabaso and Reid, 1997). 
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Introduction 
One of the areas where European integration has  changed the innovation policy framework most 
directly is  public  procurement.  Before the  single  market was established  public  procurement was 
mainly a national instrument designed to support the capabilities of domestic firms  and used most 
conspicuously  in  big  science  projects  and  infrastructure  building.  Today  it  involves  much  more 
European interaction, even if  there are still some barriers for foreign firms wishing to participate in 
national projects. 
Procurement is important because it directly and effectively creates demand. R&D support schemes, 
improvements to technological infrastructure, or encouragement of innovation networks give firms 
easier access to technology and  help  increase the knowledge base of the economy.  However,  the 
effects of  these instruments are uncertain in that their success depends on the ability and readiness of 
the  actors  operating  in  the  system  to  absorb  and  maximise  the  potential  of these  incentives. 
Developing demand-side policy instruments is of  equal relevance for European and national systems, 
and  relate to policy actions designed to enhance the technological  competencies of the system by 
emphasising  the  role  of the  user.  Examples  of such  instruments  include  government  technology 
procurement  as  well  as  laws,  regulations,  standards  and  related  institutions,  which  help  shape 
demand  for  technological  products.  Demand  policies  might  be  more  effective,  as  they  directly 
stimulate the innovator's activities. When government operates as a customer in a market or when it 
organises private demand (by supporting users) it  directly affects the supply of technological  and 
innovative products. 
This chapter will be devoted to two interrelated topics. Firstly, it will  address questions relating to 
the rationale, types and models of  government technology procurement. What are the main political 
and economic arguments for developing such demand-side oriented policy instrument? What is the 
rationale for state agency involvement in such a task? Should technology procurement be seen as a 
special element in the overall governmental procurement policy, or as a separate issue? Secondly, the 
chapter will  discuss  some important aspects of user-producer relations.  In the case of innovation, 
these  interactions  generally  take  the  form  of vertical  interaction  between  firms,  through  which 
products or production processes are  (re-)designed.  This is  what has  been  defined  as  technology 
procurement without (direct) government intervention, and which also works on the demand-side of 
the innovation process by aggregating and identifying more explicitly new needs on the user side. 
37 This chapter is based on the contribution of  Prof Charles Edquist and Prof. LeifHommen (1997): 
"Government Technology Procurement and Innovation Theory" (TSER Programme paper for 
discussion at ISE project meeting). 
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Government Technology Procurement (  GTP) is one of  the possible forms of technological-oriented 
interaction between users and producers, where the user is a government agency.  Such interactions 
are  essentially  complex,  involving  the  exchange  of knowledge  and  information  in  a  process  of 
collective learning. Therefore, this type of interaction goes beyond the assumptions of neo-classical 
economists, whereby user-producer relations in the market place occur only in the form of price and 
quantity signals. Furthermore, GTP is  normally conceived not only in terms of the 'market failure' 
rationale for policy intervention, but also with some defined social and political objectives. In other 
words,  the  role  of Government  Technology  Procurement  is  to  articulate  demand  for  specific 
technological and social purposes. 
The rationale for and against government intervention 
Government  Technology Procurement  has  explicitly  or implicitly  been used  extensively  by  most 
advanced  industrialised countries since the war.  These policy instruments have been developed in 
relation  to  a  set  of theoretical  arguments  for  and  against  the  economic  effects  of technology 
procurement. 
Opponents have emphasised the nature of political decisions relating to procurement. Much of the 
recent public debate on procurement, including - but certainly not limited to - discussion of  failures in 
GTP,  has  drawn attention to the distorting effects  on rational  economic  decision-making of what 
may be broadly termed 'political considerations' (Edquist and Hommen,  1997, p.  8).  Three of  these 
effects seem to be the most salient political obstacles for efficient economic decisions in this area: 
firstly, the in-built 'risk avoidance' tendency of  decision-makers; secondly, their preference for short-
term projects with rapid political pay-offs; and  finally,  their preference for decisions without major 
distributional impact (no clear 'net payers' ofthe actions). These three features of political decision-
making are perceived as important barriers to rational economic decisions,  especially in the area o1 
governmental procurement. 
A second set of arguments against technology procurement policy concerns the way in which statj 
intervention affects the nature of  the market. Government buyers, it is  argued, tend to maintain tb 
same  suppliers for  long periods of time,  thus creating too close relationships.  In such a conteX1 
- 126-innovation and technology may be blocked for reasons of risk-avoidance because of a comfortable 
relationship between the government agency and the producer. 
There have also been abundant arguments in favour of government technology procurement in the 
past  decades,  both the  classic  market-failure  arguments  and,  more  recently,  arguments  based  on 
system failure. The former include: 
•  under-investment in socially desirable technologies; 
•  high risks of  early buyers or users of  a new technology, preventing the emergence of  a market for 
innovative products; 
•  under-investment  in  long-term  and/or  high-risk  R&D;  this  might  be  for  several  reasons,  for 
example, insufficient capacity for undertaking R&D in some industries (fragmentation, small firm 
size, the large-scale nature of  some projects); 
•  military  requirements  and/or  economic  security  needs  for  domestic  capability  in  strategically 
important technologies or supplies. 
Other types of  non-market or system failure,  such as the ones explored in Chapter 3,  are important 
arguments for this  demand-side  instrument  of innovation  policy.  We  could  mention  for  example, 
learning failures,  where firms  are unable to learn effectively or rapidly enough; technological lock-
ins,  where firms  are for  different reasons locked into defined  technologies of a post-paradigmatic 
nature;  or  transition  failures,  where  firms  have  strong  competences  only  within  a  specific 
technological area but have difficulties moving into a related area. 
The US and European models 
In practice, these arguments are reflected in different forms of  government technology procurement. 
Policies  differ  according  to  the  national  institutional  and  economic  context,  and  in  relation  to 
different policy traditions and approaches to public intervention in general,  and innovation policy in 
particular. 
The US has one of  the best-known models of  government technology procurement policy, developed 
since the war. Based on the central role played by US defence programmes, Federal Government has 
awarded  important  contracts  to  large  and  small  organisations  (mainly  firms  and  university 
departments) for the development of specific technologically advanced defense items. 
38  The model 
has  two  particular  features.  Firstly,  contracts  have  been  awarded  not  only  to  well-established 
institutions, but also to new ones (like new high-tech oriented SMEs  ),  and in  many  cases to firms 
38 For the impact ofUS procurement on soft-ware see Mowery and Langlois (1996). This is a case 
we shall make use of  in the concluding chapter on policy implications. 
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agencies have played  an  important role in  promoting dissemination of the new knowledge to the 
industrial community.  The explicit spin-off aim and the path for commercial exploitation of results 
have been an unparalleled feature of the US model.  Western European policies either do not refer 
explicitly to technological elements in their procurement policies, or if  they do, they develop models 
under different premises. 
This is the case of  Sweden and other European countries, where this policy instrument has been used 
to develop mutually dependent relationships between government agencies and large technologically-
oriented firms  in  strategic  sectors.  Defence procurement has  played  a  role,  but not to the  same 
degree as in the US, given that other government agencies specifically devoted to civilian technology 
have acted as procurers. A basic difference between the 'European model' and the US one is that the  I 
former makes less explicit efforts to force contractors to disseminate research results. 
An interesting issue is whether or not government technology procurement is  a policy instrument 
that can be designed in such a way that it effectively promotes exploration rather than exploitation 
in the innovation system. The US experience in the post-war period is an interesting example in this 
respect.  As  a  result  of significant  support to  military-related  research  through  procurement  and 
through building new knowledge infrastructures,  the US played  a key  role in  the promotion and 
development of a  new techno-economic  paradigm based  on  information technology - promoting 
infrastructure and hardware as well as software. This owed a lot not so much to the demand for very 
specific products and services by the military, but rather to the investments in university training and 
research promoted by the military sector. Comparatively, the European national models did  not use 
these broader policy instruments to the same degree,  and  consequently were not in  a position to 
foster  the  emergence  of new technological  paradigms,  nor  to benefit  from  the  tacit  knowledge 
created in the exploration efforts. What this teaches us is that demand which does not emanate from 
the market but which relates to wider social needs may be a factor that stimulates the opening up of 
new technological trajectories at a time when the main tendency is to exploit the existing knowledge 
base. 
The historical differences between the US and European models provide interesting lessons for  the 
present  and  the future.  They  indicate that government technology procurement  is  an  interesting 
instrument because it may be part of  a strategy to open up new technological paradigms. it  should be 
more extensively used as a means of enhancing the exploratory side of  the innovation proceu. \\1th 
specific social goals, like low energy consumption assets and environmental objectives. 
Towards a second  generation of  policy instruments? 
Over the last decade there has been a growing awareness among European national policy-maken 
that procurement is  an  important  instrument  for  enhancing  the technological  capabilities  of th( 
system.  However,  there  are  different  national  models  for  defining  these  policy  instruments  anc 
different types of government technology procurement. Edquist and Hammen distinguish two m<: .. ; 
categories: 
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The classic government procurement policy, including technology-oriented actions, is  based on the 
role of government as  main  user.  In areas  such  as  defense,  or transport and telecommunications 
infrastructure, the government agency is the buyer and end-user of  the product procured. 
An alternative role for the procurement agency is to work as intermediary for the end user of  the new 
technological product. In other words, the agency is not the final destination of  the procured product 
(PTT  or railway  companies),  but  an  agency  specifically  designed  for  promoting technologically 
advanced products for specific technological and social purposes. 
One example is the Swedish agency NUTEK, established with the purpose of  fostering the creation 
of  more energy-efficient products through the use of  new technological knowledge. 
"An example of  NUTEK activity in energy-saving is the procurement of  new refrigerators in the 
early 1  990s.  The  requirement was that much less freon - which damages the atmosphere 's  ozone 
layer - should be used in production and that the refrigerator 's energy use should be considerably 
lower than with earlier designs.  A bidding contest was announced where the prize - which was an 
order of  at least 500 refrigerators - went to the  company which could best satisfy the demands.  A 
design which could meet the demands was presented by Electrolux within a relatively short time. 
This  example  illustrates that innovation policy through  technology procurement can have  other 
objectives besides economic ones." (Edquist and Hommen, 1997, p.  17). 
Other examples of  successful action by NUTEK are shown in the following table: 
Project area  Energy  reduction 
of final product 
Refrigerator/freezer  by33% 
Washers and dryers for communal laundry rooms  by 50% 
Ventilation: replacement of  fans in a residential area  by 50% 
High-frequency ballasts for lighting  by20% 
Windows  by44% 
Heat pumps  by30% 
Source: Westling (1997) 
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The cases examined so far refer mainly to examples of 'creation-oriented' technology procurement 
pelicy, with certain specific technological and social objectives. This means that results from bidding 
contracts have been innovative on a global  scale,  producing results that enhance the knowledge-
creation process through new findings. 
Another type of technology procurement focuses  on dissemination,  seeking to introduce into the 
country a product or production process which  already exists.  It is  thus designed  specifically to 
foster  the  adoption  of,  and  conversion  of the  national  industrial  base  to,  new  technological 
developments taking place elsewhere. 'Dissemination-oriented' procurement includes R&D activities 
by  the  producer,  focusing  on  the  adaptation  of these  new  products,  production  processes  or 
knowledge-bases into  products designed  specifically for  the  national  market.  An  example of this 
might be the adaptation of  software products for the education system or the health system. 
User-producer co-operation: Technology procurement without government 
In the private sector, similar cases of technology procurement are a regular phenomenon.  In these 
cases technology procurement takes the form of user-producer co-operation, or vertical networks, 
resulting in new products or more efficient production processes. 
A successful example of this type of relationship was the three-year co-operation venture between 
Toyota (as customer) and Nippon Steel (as supplier) at the beginning of the 1980s. Both partners 
identified  common  interests  in  developing  a  new  type  of corrosion-resistant  steel  sheet  to  be 
manufactured by the latter (Hellman, 1993). Both firms pooled resources in an R&D project for that 
purpose.  Nippon Steel faced  major problems  at  that time  and  needed to diversify  its  production 
through more customisation. Similarly, the interest of  Toyota in the project was based on its capacity 
to influence, through its strong technological capabilities in this area, the characteristics of a product 
of  key importance in the car-making industry. 
User-producer co-operation schemes are forms of vertical innovation networks, where partners are 
firms  within  the  same  value-chain  production  process.  In  the  case  of the  Toyota-Nippon  Steel 
venture,  the agreement  established that Nippon Steel would  license  the patent to other Japanese 
steel-makers (so Toyota could continue its policy of  multiple suppliers). In tum, Toyota accepted 18 
months exclusive supply from Nippon Steel. This trade-off was possible in a context of  fast-changing 
technological  developments,  where  Nippon  Steel  expected  to  benefit  largely  from  the  tacit 
knowledge acquired during the project, despite the rapid licensing of  the patent. The collective effect 
of this co-operation agreement was the generation of new knowledge and the dissemination of its 
codified elements through the system. 
What are the conditions for the emergence of  such successful forms of  co-operation between private 
users and producers? And what should be the role of government technology procurement in  this 
respect? 
As  mentioned  earlier,  government technology  procurement takes  account of the demand-side  o; 
innovation policy. This means that the structure of  the market, and more precisely, the configuratiot 
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of demand,  is  also  a crucial element in  technology procurement in the form of user-producer co-
operations. There are three ideal types of market structure: monopsony, polypsony and oligopsony. 
In each of  them user-producer co-operation or technological procurement takes different forms. 
Where there is monopsony, there is bound to be strong demand-pull and incentives for user-producer 
co-operation. Yet, monopsony rarely occurs in the strict economic sense, and when it does the buyer 
tends to be a public agency. This situation tends to encourage rigid supplier-buyer relationships, with 
substantial  risks  for  discouraging  innovative  practices.  This  has  been  one  of the  most  important 
arguments behind the deregulation trends in mature industrial sectors in Europe since the mid  1980s 
(such as telecommunications).  However, monopsony in  public demand for new technology is  still 
common  in  large  scale  projects.  The  role  of government  technology  procurement  under  these 
conditions can be justified in the following circumstances: when a new industry is in the early stages 
of development  and  has  a  high  potential  for  innovation,  but a  high  level  of technical  risk.  This 
applies, for example, to UK and Norwegian experiences with North Sea oil development. 
Alternatively,  oligopsony,  with  a  small  number  of large  buyers  in  the  market,  is  ideal  for  user-
producer co-operation. Each government agency is often just another large buyer on the market, and 
in  this  respect  government technology  procurement  might  focus  on the  development  of socially 
desirable technological products.  In other words,  GTP might  concentrate more specifically on the 
social and/or environmental side of  new (less exploited) technologies. 
Finally, in cases of  polypsony, where demand is atomised, there is  little incentive for user-producer 
co-operation. GTP then has an important role to play as a catalyst (rather than as end-user) for the 
promotion of specific lines of  technological development.  Government intervention can do much to 
encourage the  aggregation  and  articulation  of demand  by  helping  to  specify  parameters  in  new 
technological areas according to socially desirable objectives. The example ofNUTEK in efficiently 
'empowering users' is evidence of  successful government intervention of  this kind. 
Type of demand 
Monopsony 
Polypsony 
Oligopsony 
Definition  Effects  on  user-producer 
co-operation 
Very  concentrated  demand  Strong  demand-pull  and 
with one buyer.  strong  incentives  for  user-
producer co-operation. 
Fragmented 
multiple  buyers 
concentration  of 
power. 
demand: 
without 
buying 
Co-operation  between 
buyers and  suppliers is  very 
unlikely  because  producers 
have  greater  control  of the 
market. 
A  number  of large  buyers,  Co-operation  is  a  common 
but  no  one  completely  practice. 
controls the market. 
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procurement. 
The EU and national technology procurement policies. 
The  main  role  of government  technology  procurement  policy  is  to  stimulate  technologically 
sophisticated demand for specific purposes.  A general goal of GTP  policy is  improvement of the 
technological base of  the system. This can have different objectives: 
•  Economic objectives,  namely,  improvement of the technological  base in  an  area of important 
technological and industrial potential for the system~ 
•  Social  objectives,  through  the  definition  of underdeveloped  socially  desirable  technological 
objectives~ or 
•  Environmental objectives,  as  with NUTEK's objective  to reduce  the  energy  consumption of 
electrical items. 
Procurement  policies  may  also  be  an  effective  instrument  in  creating  innovative  networks.  By 
defining tasks that cannot be addressed by existing constellations of  firms new combinations may be 
stimulated to appear. 
Despite wide  use of general  procurement  policies,  many  European governments  do  not have  a 
specific  strategy for technology  procurement.  This  results  in  the  lack  of explicit  instruments  or 
agencies for this purpose. In such countries, the definition of innovation and technology policy tends 
to follow traditional supply-side and linear conceptions of public intervention, where the demand-
side is systematically underestimated. 
A strategy which  aims  to tackle the  complexities  and  adaptive  capacity of the innovation  system 
needs to integrate government technology procurement policy,  as  a valuable demand-side oriented 
instrument, and use it in conjunction with the other available instruments. The exploratory capacity 
of  TP and more precisely GTP opens up interesting prospects for the future in two main directions. 
Firstly, designing procurement policies to cope with new environmental and social problems may be 
a way to open up radically new trajectories in related technological fields (such as biotechnology). 
And secondly, technology procurement instruments specifically targeted at information technoloKJ 
to  encourage adaptable methods of organisation and learning,  might be  a  useful way of betteJ 
meeting the needs of  slow learners and less developed regions. 
Government technology procurement policy requires public  agencies with substantial anticipato11 
strategic and technological competencies,  in  order to identify and  predict the potential benefits c 
specifically designed tenders. These characteristics are also needed in the two dimensions of polic 
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when they are creation- or dissemination-oriented. 
Should the EU play a leading role? How do the new EU procurement regulations affect the role of 
national agencies operating in this area? And in cases of weakly structured national strategies, what 
are the chances of  establishing more clearly defined instruments? 
The current system of EU procurement rules,  and  their enforcement,  was developed  in  the early 
1990s, as a result of  both the establishment of a single European market and the need to rationalise 
and  enforce  effectively  previously  existing  EU procurement  regulations.  The  objectives  were to 
eliminate  artificial  barriers to trade,  and  reduce unnecessary  differences  in  standards.  In practical 
terms,  the  EU  regulation  contemplates  three  possible  procedures  for  tenders,  namely,  open, 
restricted and negotiated procedures. Despite the fact that these regulations are designed in general 
terms for all kinds of  public tenders, the third procedure, namely, the negotiated procurement, seems 
to have been designed for highly innovative development projects. However, this possibility does not 
mean  that  the  EU  has  an  explicit  and  consistent  strategy  or  policy  to  develop  technology 
procurement for innovation purposes. 
The procedures for  implementing  these regulations  follow  the  decentralised  pattern of other EU 
·legislation, where Member State governments are in charge of  enforcement. This means that the role 
of the European Court of Justice is to settle litigation when the national jurisdictional process has 
been exhausted, establishing EU-wide interpretations of  EU legislation. This is supposed to result in 
the gradual adjustment of  national regulations and practices, and in a clearer definition of  open-ended 
European legislation in this field. 
However, despite these general trends at European level, there is still much room for manoeuvre at 
the national level, especially in policies on technological procurement. The framework nature of  EU 
legislation  in  this  area  does  not  prevent  the  definition  of national  strategies  to  encourage 
technologically-oriented procurement in line with the general  objectives of national innovation and 
industrial policies.  As  mentioned  earlier,  the existence of these three different forms  of tendering 
procedures leads to some flexibility in enforcement, and it does not necessarily discourage the use of 
public tenders for the stimulation of sophisticated technological demand with clearly defined socio-
economic objectives. 
More direct EU action in government technology procurement could have two direct objectives. In 
the first place, it could help in coordinating (well- or poorly-conceived) national actions. Decisive 
EU action in this direction would have the benefit of avoiding duplication of effort undertaken at 
national level.
39  Thus the EU could  act as  an  "inter-nation"  agency,  stimulating national  action in 
unexplored  and  potential  areas,  and  exchanging  information  about  specific  national  action  for 
developing  possible  national  co-operation.  A second  role  for EU direct involvement  in  this  area 
39 There are many interesting examples and experiences of  inter-state co-operation in the US with 
government technology procurement instruments for energy-saving objectives (Westling, 1996). 
- 133-could  be  to complement  action  already  undertaken  under EU innovation  policy.  EU innovation 
policy  has  often been  criticised  as  being  too  supply-side  oriented.  The  introduction of EU-wide 
technology  procurement  tenders  with  specific  goals  would  certainly  stimulate  technology 
development in certain specific areas of technology with large potential for European industry as a 
whole. Needless to say, the role of  a hypothetical EU agency for that purpose should be based on the 
idea  of working  as  a  catalyst,  with  a  strategy  combining  creation- and  dissemination-oriented 
tenders, and encouraging trans-European co-operation between firms as a prerequisite for obtaining 
the contract. 
-134-Chapter 10: Innovation and competition policy in a new context 
Introduction 
There is  a potential  contradiction between innovation policy  and  competition policy.  In the main 
competition policy tends to regard intervention by governments as negative while innovation policy 
consists of  public attempts to guide the rate and direction of  innovation. This general contradiction is 
also reflected in European institutions and policies. The European integration project, from its very 
beginning, had competition policy as one of  its major commitments (Articles 85  to 94 of the Rome 
Treaty) while the commitment to science and technology policy was not ratified until 1987 with the 
Single European Act. 
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The major point in this chapter is that the tension and growing interdependence between these two 
policy fields have become of acute importance in the last decade.  The old wisdom that intervention 
can and should take place when,  and  only when, government failure is  less than market failure  no 
longer encompasses what is  really at stake.  Recent developments indicate that the changes in  the 
innovation process are at the very core of  the transformation of  the process of competition, and vice 
versa that new  regimes  of competition  are  crucial  for  the rate  and  direction  of innovation.  This 
indicates a need for major efforts in the field of socio-economic research as well as for a rethinking 
of  the classical limits between the two fields of  policy. 
Competition and competition policy in the globa/ising learning economy 
To clarify the relationship between competition and innovation policy we are going to analyse the 
following questions. What are the implications for innovation and competition policy of  globalisation 
and accelerating change? How should we understand competition in the new context? How should 
we interpret the fact that competition seems to be intensifying while at the same time inter-firm co-
operation is becoming more and more frequent? 
This area is complex and characterised by long-lasting and competing theoretical streams of  thought. 
Competition analysis  and  policy  is  still  strongly  rooted  in  the  old  structure-conduct-performance 
paradigm.  While the mainstream has moved  on toward game theory,  evolutionary economics has 
become a major challenge to the mainstream. It is, of  course, not the intention to cover this complex 
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process that indicate a need to rethink both the analysis of  and the policy framework for competition. 
Especially, we shall  point to the fact  that both the traditional perspectives based in  the structure, 
conduct and performance-paradigm as well as the modem game theory approaches tend to become 
less  relevant.  Radical  technical  change  and  factors  related  to  eruptive  change  in  demand  and 
regulation regimes imply that the borders around what constitutes a market become diffuse and fluid. 
Just  to  define  market  shares  gets  extremely  difficult  in  technologically  turbulent  areas  such  as 
telecommunication services.  The new form of innovation-based competition with regular eruptions 
also implies that both the rules of  the competitive game and the set of  players involved tend to be in a 
permanent  flux  - to  define  useful  game  theory  solutions  that  capture  the  dynamics  becomes 
correspondingly difficult. 
The Schumpeterian trade-off 
A first linkage between competition and  innovation we should consider is  how the first  affects the 
second.  This debate transcends the basic structure-conduct-performance framework as  well  as  the 
traditional  focus  on  the  efficient  allocation  of resources.  In  the  structure-conduct-performance 
paradigm, performance is measured in terms of  production foregone and values not realised, and not 
on outcome in terms of  industrial change and innovation. 
In parallel to this static analysis, there has been an on-going debate on innovation and competition 
that goes back to the late Schumpeter. While in his early work he emphasised the importance of  the 
individual entrepreneur as innovator, Schumpeter points to the big firms and their R&D laboratories 
as the major source of innovation in  his  later contributions (Schumpeter,  1934,  and  Schumpeter, 
1942). The argument was extended by Galbraith (1967) who maintained that the giant corporations 
were the ones playing the key role in the development and implementation of new technologies. The 
debate on how competition affects innovation has  never become the dominating  one in  industrial 
economics; the main focus of  mainstream economics has remained on the static allocation issues. But 
it is fair to say that it has been given increasing attention over the last few  decades (Kamien and 
Schwartz, 1982, Scherer, 1987 and Geroski, 1993). 
There have been quite a number of attempts to test empirically whether there is  some truth in  the 
assumption that industrial concentration promotes innovation although most of these have not been 
able to test directly the connection between the two phenomena. A major problem has, until recently, 
been the lack of  indicators for innovation at the proper level of  analysis. Therefore indirect and rathe1 
unsatisfactory indicators such as R&D-intensity have been used (Scherer,  1965). The results of the 
tests have been ambiguous. Most of  them show that R&D-intensity grows with size, but only as to  ~ 
certain level,  after which R&D grows in  proportion to size.  An analysis based on other indicator 
such  as  patents  and  numbers  of innovations  indicate  that  R&D  is  more  productive  in  terms  o 
innovations in the smaller companies than in the bigger ones (OECD, 1996b  ). 
One  of the  major  contributions  by  evolutionary  economists  has  been  to  demonstrate  that  tt 
causality between competition and innovation goes both ways, and today there is growing consens1 
that  it  is  unsatisfactory  to  assume  a  linear  causality  from,  for  instance,  concentration  ratios  · 
innovation  performance  across  industries.  There  are  important  differences  in  technologic 
-136-opportunities and appropriability regimes between industries that affect simultaneously structure and 
performance in  terms of innovation.  In some  sectors technological  opportunities are rich,  and in 
these innovations will be frequent and there might be room for many small and new firms.  It has also 
been argued that regimes of weak appropriation favour  large-scale producers who  can  distribute 
R&D costs over bigger quantities. According to Cohen (1995) a strong appropriability regime may 
affect innovation activities both negatively and positively. 
One major weakness with the analysis in this field is that the most influential variables now end up as 
exogenous  in  the  analysis.  Appropriability  regimes  will  to  a  certain  degree  be  dependent  on 
institutional  factors  and  the  same  is  true  for  technological  opportunities  (  cf  the  analySis  of 
innovation systems in Nelson (1993) and Lundvall (1992)). It is only by bringing institutional factors 
into the core of the analysis that differences in terms of innovation performance can be explained 
something mainstream industrial economists are reluctant to do because it would reduce the general 
validity of  the theory in models. 
Competition and incremental innovation 
Another even more serious weakness that dates back to the original formulations by  Schumpeter is 
the exclusive focus on R&D and major technical innovations. Incremental technical innovation based 
on learning, diffusion of technology and organisational change are certainly more important for  the 
performance of any  single  national  or regional  economy than major  innovations.  And  we  would 
argue that it is actually less problematic to treat the intensification of competition as an exogenous 
factor when it comes to analysing the impact of competition on this kind  of transformation.  New 
technologies  and  globalisation  have  as  a  major  impact  that firms  in  open  economies  experience 
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transformation pressure (in terms of innovation and organisational learning) is crucial for economic 
performance. 
Some firms will close down while others will be transformed by the pressure for change.  Some will 
intensify their efforts to introduce new products,  processes  and  new forms  of organisation more 
conducive to technical innovation and learning. To analyse this relationship between the intensity of 
competition on the one hand  and  innovation and  organisational  change on the other,  Dahmenian 
concepts  such  as  'transformation  pressure'  and  'development  power'  may  be  extremely  useful 
(Dahmen, 1988). 
One  purpose  of analysing  national  innovation  systems  is  to  better  understand  how  national 
economies  react  to  increased  transformation  pressure.  In  the  ongoing  project  on  the  Danish 
innovation  system,  DISKO,  a  survey  on  organisational  and  technical  change  in  Danish  firms 
(Lundvall, 1997a) concluded that: 
in the large majority of Danish firms,  respondents reported that the firm  had experienced more 
intense competition over the last couple of  years; 
firms which had experienced 'much more intensive competition' differed from the rest in being 
markedly more innovative in  terms of products,  processes and  forms  of organisation (moving 
toward functional flexibility and learning organisations); 
those firms had become much more demanding in terms of  qualifications for their employee~ than 
the rest, and especially insisted on the ability to take responsibility, communicate and co-operate. 
These results indicate that under the specific circumstances of the Danish economy for the period 
1992-95, a general increase in transformation pressure promoted innovation while at the same time 
reinforcing tendencies toward polarisation in labour markets. It is not certain that these results can be 
generalised to other economies and  apply  to other periods  however.  Even so,  they indicate that 
policies affecting the intensity of competition may actually have a much greater impact on dynamic 
economic performance than is implied by the Schumpeterian trade-off debate. 
Competition and co-operation 
Until recently,  co-operation between firms,  and especially horizontal and lateral co-operation, was 
either neglected or regarded exclusively as a potential threat to competition and economic efficiency 
(Teece, 1992)
40
.  One major factor which has changed this view, and made inter-firm collaboration in 
technology development more legitimate has been the actual growth in the frequency of inter-firm 
40 In 1984 the European Commission adopted Regulation No 418/85 (Reg. 418) expanding the 
favourable antitrust treatment ofR&D. 
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international  comparisons  of structure  and  performance  indicating  that  the  co-operative  mode 
characterising  inter-firm  relationships  in  Japan  has  been  at  least  as  successful  as  the  more  arm 
length's mode in the Anglo-Saxon countries in promoting innovation and industrial efficiency (Sako, 
1990). 
A change in attitude to inter-firm co-operation is demonstrated by the fact that the competition laws 
of the US,  Japan and Europe in different ways now explicitly allow for inter-firm co-operation in 
developing new technology. There are differences between the ways exemptions from anti-trust law 
are designed but the main direction of change has been to give more leeway for alliances aiming at 
technological development. 
One major issue has been whether alliances  should be allowed  only  in  connection with the R&D 
activity as such or whether permission should be extended to include the marketing and sales of the 
new product resulting from  it.  In Europe this has been allowed if the original market share of the 
partners  is  small  (less  than  20%)  while  any  kind  of extension  of the  collaboration  to  common 
marketing has to be specifically applied for in the US. There are different assessments as to which of 
these legal systems to prefer. Those in favour of  the European model refer to the fact that innovation 
increasingly has to involve interaction with users and that therefore it would be inefficient to limit co-
operation  to  the  R&D  phase  (Jacquemin,  1988b,  p.128).  Those  more  sceptical  emphasise  the 
negative impact from increased market power (Geroski, 1993, p. 68). 
Spill-overs, sticky knowledge and inter-firm co-operation 
Why allow for alliances when they may weaken competition? The main argument is that they may 
compensate for knowledge spill-overs weakening the incentives for the individual firms to invest in 
R&D. This basic argument is reinforced when the scale of  the effort is big, the time horizon long and 
the risks involved substantial. But the main argument is that technological alliances may be a way of 
avoiding under-investment in efforts to innovate. Often a distinction is made between social benefits 
and the benefits for the firms joining the alliance. For instance, three major kinds of private benefit 
are recognised by Jacquemin and Soete (1994, p.66): 
inter-firm  alliances  represent  an  efficient  mode  of transaction  and  an  attractive  compromise 
between strong and permanent commitment (vertical integration) and flexibility (pure market); 
faster innovation and risk-sharing; 
synergies in terms of  research information and finance. 
It is  not obvious why  some of these private benefits  should  not  also  be seen  as  socio-economic 
benefits.  In particular the combination of specific  competencies is  a core element in  this  kind  of 
alliances and in the absence of an alliance innovation may not take place at all.  Let us assume that a 
specific field of  innovation can be entered only if two competing firms both with activities located in 
Europe combine their specific technological capabilities in developing a new product. There are three 
different possible results if  the alliance is blocked by the authorities: 
- 139-one of  the firms may try to create the missing capability in-house~ 
the two firms might merge into one single organisation~ 
the field of  innovation will not be entered. 
It is reasonable to assume that all these three alternatives would leave the economy as a whole worse 
off than if the alliance was permitted.  Before the new  capability  has  been created non-European 
competitors may have invaded the new field  (since speed in innovation has become the major factor 
of  competitiveness in the learning economy). A merger would not only result in a permanent increase 
in  market  concentration,  but  more  importantly  might  narrow  down  the  room  for  learning  and 
thereby, in the long term, weaken the innovative capabilities of  the firms and the economy as a whole 
(Lundvall, 1985). 
This  implies  that  the  emphasis  on  spill-overs  as  the  major  argument  for  allowing  alliances  is 
misleading.  In this context it is  also  important to take into account what many  innovation studies 
have demonstrated: knowledge is neither completely excludable nor the opposite. In order to be able 
to get access to specific knowledge developed by another firm a lot of in house knowledge building 
has  to take  place  (Cohen  and  Leventhal, 1990).  Neither  will  spill-overs  always  result  in  under-
. ·investment. Especially in the context of network technologies spill-overs may  actually be a factor 
stimulating investment in R&D  (Langlois and  Robertson,  1996).  Our conclusion is  that there are 
good reasons for designing a competition policy which allows technological alliances. However, the 
major reason for doing so is not spill-overs, but rather the opposite - sticky knowledge. 
Typically the situation will differ from sector to sector. In sectors such as pharmaceuticals and fine 
chemicals where knowledge is highly codified and easily transmitted through templates the spill-over 
argument may play a more important role, while stickyness may be the main argument in the majority 
of  sectors where core competencies remain in the form of  non-codified know-how. It may also differ 
between countries. In Japanese firms strategic elements of knowledge remain tacit to a much higher 
degree than in Anglo-Saxon firms (Lam, 1997). 
This  brings  us  to some  general  considerations  on  competition  analysis  and  policy  in  relation  to 
innovation.  Competition  policy  will  always  aim  to establish  some  general  principles  that  can  be 
applied indiscriminately to all  sectors. This approach is recommendable because it leaves less room 
for sectoral vested interests to come up with ad hoc arguments in favour of  their own case. But it is a 
problem when it comes to handling issues relating to industrial dynamics and innovation. The basic 
mechanisms  behind  innovation  and  competition  are  radically  different  between  sectors  like  the 
mechanical  engineering,  pharmaceuticals  and  steel  industries  (Pavitt,  1984).  As  the  role  of the 
independent authorities regulating competition policy is growing at the national and European leve 
the need  for  them to have  access  to the  necessary  expertise  and  to understand  such  difference 
becomes more important. 
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It  can  be  shown  that  the  frequency  of international  technological  alliances  has  been  growing 
especially in  high technology fields  the last decades.  This is true for both intra-regional and  inter-
regional  alliances between the  'regions' of the European Union,  Japan and  the US.  Data for the 
1980s, indicate that intra-regional alliances tend to grow more rapidly than inter-regional ones (thus 
indicating that globalisation is taking the peculiar form of growing regional integration).  The data 
show that European firms tend mainly to join alliances either with each other (  40%) or with US firms 
(50o/o) -the number of alliances  with Japanese firms  remains  rather  small  (10% of all  registered 
alliances involving European firms- Buiges and Jacquemin- 1996). 
The growing frequency of alliances relates to global competition in two ways. First, it points to the 
risk for global  oligopolies and  second to the need for moving towards a world-wide competition 
policy (Jacquemin and Soete, 1994 and Jacquemin, 1988a) 
It has been argued that more and more sectors are characterised by the formation of new market 
forms substituting for national oligopolies. The scope of  the market is global rather than national and 
can be characterised as  'knowledge-based networked oligopolies'  (Mytelka and Delapierre,  1997). 
Second, it may be regarded as a response to more intense technological competition and the alliances 
as a factor that further increases the speed of  the innovation race (Davis,  1997). As a matter of fact, 
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to reduce competition while in others, such as computers, alliances may have as their primary impact 
a further acceleration of innovation (Mytelka and Delapierre,  1997).  Even within the same  sector, 
changes in technological opportunities and in the dynamics of demand will  from time to time give 
rise  to new  patterns of competition and,  as  time  passes,  there will  be a need  for  changes in the 
regulatory system. 
Competition and co-operation in the learning economy 
It is an important step forward that competition analysis and competition policy have begun to take 
into account the positive aspects of inter-firm co-operation in the context of innovation.  Still, there 
might be some way to go before the radicality of  the actual changes in the mix of competition and 
co-operation have been fully taken into account. As referred to in an earlier chapter, Bob Anderson 
(director of  Rank Xerox Research Centre in Cambridge) has recently given an extremely interesting 
account of  competition in a high-tech sector, and describes what is going on as a "Bazaar economy" 
(Anderson, 1997). 
He argues that the most important change in the new context is not so much the increasing role of 
knowledge in competitiveness as the extreme acceleration of  the innovation process. This means that 
the definition of competitors and  collaborators becomes fluid  and  a major part of the game is  to 
transform competitors into 'co-opetitors'. Actors are constantly shifting roles in these respects, and 
alliances remain unstable and change over time.  Both the rules of the games played and the players 
involved  are  in  a  constant  state  of flux.  Similar  ideas  are  developed  by  Richardson  (1997)  and 
D'  Aveni (1994). 
The  Danish  survey  referred  to  above  also  shows  that  there  is  a  strong  connection  between 
competition and  co-operation in  a different  dimension.  Firms that report a strong increase in  the 
intensity  of competition  differ  from  the  rest  in  having,  more  extensively,  strengthened  their 
relationships  with  customers  and  suppliers  (Lundvall,  1997a).  This  confirms  that  the  growing 
intensity of  network relationships is an integral element of  the new regime of  accelerating change and 
intensified competition. 
The Internet, which may be the single most important infrastructural innovation since the railways 
(hailed  by  Schumpeter  as  the  most  important  innovation  of its  day),  carries  the  new  mode  oj 
innovation  one  step  further.  It helps  to speed  up  the innovation  process,  it  makes  it  even  mon 
dependent  on  an  interactive  and  collective  effort  involving  even  distant  actors  in  innovatio1 
networking.  It breaks  down  the  traditional  division  of labour  between  users  and  producers  o 
innovation,  once again with potentially far-reaching implications for competition policy (Fransmar. 
1997). 
In certain  high-tech  areas  the  establishment  of international  production  networks  has  become 
fundamental means of obtaining competitive strength, and the revival of  the competitiveness of U 
firms has been ascribed to their ability to position themselves in networks involving firms in the Asi~ 
dynamic  economies.  Again a key  element in  the complex networks established is  'speed' both 
terms of innovation and  in  terms of expropriating the benefits from  innovation.  Focusing on  co 
competencies and on the ability to coordinate complex activities in time and space has become a n« 
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not only that the globalisation of the sector producing hard-disk drives  actually increases market 
concentration in terms of  global market shares, but also that concentration does not reduce rivalry in 
the sector, since in fact it becomes even more intense than before. 
Positioning European firms in global networking 
Another policy implication of the high  frequency  of inter-regional  alliances  and  of direct  foreign 
investment is that it becomes increasingly difficult to ensure that European technology policy favours 
European firms to the exclusion of, for instance, US firms (Jacquemin and Soete,  1994). In the US 
there has been a lively debate on the possibility of preventing foreign firms  from gaining access to 
strategic elements of its knowledge base, including academic research, while access to the Japanese 
knowledge base has  been restricted  mainly  through institutional  mechanisms  and  cultural  barriers 
(Ostry, 1996). 
It is doubtful whether a strategy of  exclusion and 'Europeanisation' of  networking is a good idea. As 
pointed  out  in  the  last  section,  the  construction  of international  production  networks  spanning 
several  continents  has  been  a  key  element  in  the  revival  of the  US  high-technology  industries. 
European  firms  may  actually  have  been  too  set  on  building  intra-European  alliances  and  not 
. sufficiently concerned with establishing knowledge-intensive networks with Asian firms, for instance. 
ESPRIT and European framework programmes may actually have reinforced this tendency. 
There  are  also  issues  about  regional  development  involved  here.  Fierce  competition  between 
knowledge-intensive networks leads to a situation where some countries and regions end up being 
well connected to the most dynamic networks while others remain excluded.  This is  a problem not 
only for developing countries but also for countries and  regions within the European Union where 
there  are  signs  of growing  divergence  between  regions  because  of differentiated  access  to  the 
knowledge  base  (Fagerberg  and  Verspagen,  1996).  Here  the  building  of regional  knowledge-
intensive networks, and connecting them to international networks should be a major part of  regional 
development strategy. 
Competition  policy  must  be  adapted  to  the  new  conditions  where  inter-fiqn  co-operation  and 
alliances  have become key  elements in  promoting innovation  and  where global  market  structures 
increasingly determine dynamic performance. European competition policy has to take into account 
the  need  to position European firms  in  global  networks,  while  at  the  same  time  promoting  the 
creation of  a stronger and more workable competition policy regime at global level. 
Can competition become too intense? 
Parallel developments in  regulatory systems,  technology and trade have,  in  combination,  created a 
new kind of 'hyper-competition' (D'  Aveni,  1994). There is  a circular causality between innovation 
and  competition.  On the one hand,  hyper-competition reflects  accelerated innovation,  and  on the 
other, it is driving change and especially technical innovation in terms of  both its rate and direction. 
Therefore there is a need to fine-tune policies driving change and to coordinate them with policies 
aimed at promoting change and coping with the negative consequences of  change. 
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Together,  the  previous  observations  point  to  a  situation  where  the  problem  is  not  so  much  t 
intensify,  further,  competition  in  sectors  already  exposed  to  international  competition  and  t 
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rapidity of change may lead to a misallocation of resources in the sense that too little resources are 
used to pursue long-term objectives and the production of generic knowledge,  while too much is 
used to speed up movement along known trajectories. This tendency to focus on short term rather 
than long-term dynamics is reinforced by the increasingly dominant position of  finance capital in the 
governance of  firms and by the financial crises of  public sectors (Chesnais and Serfati, 1997). 
This does not rule out the need for further deregulation and reregulation at the European level.  Seen 
from  an analytical view-point it is  not at all  clear why the Community Agricultural Policy should 
remain as protectionist as it is.  The impact of  protectionism on product quality, environment and the 
quality of  life in society shows that the present approach cannot be justified from the point of  view of 
general efficiency.  There are many other areas where privileged service providers (such as doctors 
and  lawyers)  operate  in  a  sheltered  and  over-regulated  context.  But,  in  the  context  of hyper-
competition, such initiatives may have to be designed in such a way that they take into account the 
ability to absorb change in the economy as a whole. 
Secondly,  and  this is  a major problem given the present mode of development,  the very speed of 
change is  a key factor in  explaining the polarisation in labour markets and  social exclusion.  In the 
TSER projects on globalisation and employment coordinated by Bart Verspagen and the Systems of 
Innovation project coordinated by Edquist,  trade with low-income countries and technology have 
been identified as two factors  contributing to the polarisation evident  on labour markets (see for 
instance Verspagen, 1997 and Edquist, Hommen and McKelvey, 1997). The point here is that these 
two factors combine with each other and with changes in regulatory systems to intensify competition 
and speed up change. The outcome is that slow learners will  not be able to command a reasonable 
wage. 
Another consequence to be considered is that this speeding-up process may in certain specific areas 
become  a threat to the  environment.  It is  symbolic  that traffic jams in  the  most technologically 
dynamic area of  the world, Silicon Valley, and other environmental factors caused major relocations 
of information technology producers to other regions in the US which were more attractive in these 
respects.  The  recent  serious  warnings  about  environmental  stress  in  the  newly  industrialised 
economies in Asia also indicate the environmental costs of  accelerated change. 
Should competition policy aim to slow down the rate of  change? 
It is  not obvious how the rate of change could be  slowed  down by  any  kind  of local  or national 
policy.  If citizens in  Europe decided  that they were willing  to pay the price in  terms of a lower 
standard of  living a regional slow-down might be possible but even then a slow-down strategy may 
prove untenable in the longer run. To run slower than the rest seems to be self-defeating in the sense 
that running a little slower may ultimately mean moving backwards. 
The most obvious solution would therefore be to go for world-wide agreements, but it is difficult to 
see how such agreements could be reached in a context where competitiveness is the basic goal of  all 
the players. There have been some interesting proposals that might be relevant in this context, even if 
they focus only indirectly on the acceleration of change and on hyper-competition. One is the Tobin 
tax designed to slow down somewhat speculation and flux in financial markets. The other one is the 
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general rather than specific, which means in principle that they can be implemented and controlled. A 
global  sales  tax on all  exports and  imports  of commodities  and  services  where revenue went to 
creating development potential in weak countries and regions would be another general instrument 
with similar impact. 
Another approach is to devise policies to make producers and  consumers pay for the full  costs of 
change.  We already have the example of the "polluter pays"  principle and here the main problem 
might  be  to make  sure  that the  principle  is  actually  implemented  at  a  global  scale  with  a  fair 
distribution of the burden between poor and  rich  countries.  Both the environmental issue and  the 
abuse of people for production purposes - child labour,  and  degrading working conditions - have 
been on the agenda in connection with trade negotiations.  The difficulty  here is  both to agree on 
standards  between  economies  at  very  different  levels  of development  and  to  find  ways  of 
implementing them.  The strength of regulations that focus on financial matters - e.g.  in connection 
with the EMU - is that it is less difficult to cheat since monetary value is a one-dimensional variable. 
To measure what is  happening in  nature and with people is  much more complex,  and  there is  far 
more scope for manipulating data. 
Increasing the capability to absorb change 
The obvious alternative to slowing down change is to improve the potential for bringing about rapid 
change (innovation policy) and  absorbing change (regional policy and human resource policy).  The 
rest of  this report, and most of  the TSER projects covered by this report, are about this alternative. 
The point made here is that 'hyper-competition' may impose too high a cost if left to its own devices 
and fueled by aggressive competition policy at European and global level. 
A more specific version of this alternative is to focus on the very problems created by accelerating 
change and to redirect the forces of change towards the solution of these problems. If learning and 
innovation capability were massively  oriented towards solving the problems of underdevelopment 
and inequality,  and environmental problems, the effort to move rapidly ahead might increase rather 
than decrease the sustainability of  the globalising learning economy. 
Such a strategy might also be a response to the problem of short-termism and the need to stimulate: 
exploration rather than exploitation.  Massive collective efforts in these areas  should be tempora.t) 
and play a role mainly in the initial formation of new paradigms.  They might,  if properly designed 
play a role corresponding to the one played by US military demand for information technology anc 
software in the decades immediately after the war.  The emphasis could be on creating competen 
demand  and  on building new knowledge infrastructures,  but leaving  strategic decisions  about th 
choice of  standards and technologies to the private sector. 
Here, it is important that competition policy at European and global level (WTO) should not becorr 
a  barrier  to  such  a  problem-oriented  policy,  for  instance  by  too  strictly  interpreting  wh 
governments can do without impeding fair competition. On the contrary, competition policy shou 
play a positive role by changing the regulatory framework so that it promotes this kind of  strategy. 
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level 
The establishment of  the European Union has played a major role in developing a new competition 
context for firms  operating in  Europe.  This  involves  a whole  set of policy instruments,  of which 
some represent transfers of classical elements of domestic competition policy to the European level 
while others relate more to trade policy,  such as the Cassis de Dijon judgment of 1979 when the 
European Court of Justice decided that Member States have to admit goods lawfully sold in other 
countries. The establishment of  the EMU will confirm a transfer of  responsibility to a supra-national 
level for a whole package of policies that affect the pressure of competition on firms  in all parts of 
Europe. In a historical perspective the movement may be seen as the continuation of a trend already 
evident in  the major member countries towards more market- and  competition-friendly regulation, 
where  competition  policy  is  increasingly  pursued  by  authorities  outside  the  direct  control  of 
parliaments and governments (Dumez and J  eunemaitre, 1996). 
It is important to note that policies designed to cope with rapid change are to a high degree national 
and regional, while all the policies - including competition policy - affecting the pressure for change 
have increasingly become the responsibility of  the European authorities. To this should be added that 
these  policies  tend  to be  pursued  by  authorities  that  are  semi-independent  from  the  Council  of 
.  Ministers and the European Parliament. In competition policy the European Court of Justice takes 
strategic  decisions.  The EMU is  built  around  the  construction  of a  semi-autonomous  European 
Bank.  This constellation increases the risk of a lack of coordination between policies affecting the 
pressure for  change  and  policies  designed  to  contribute  to  change  and  to  cover the  social  and 
environmental costs of  change. 
Summary 
There has been a growing acceptance of innovation as  a performance variable in  conjunction with 
competition and,  in this context, inter-firm alliances aimed at developing new technology have been 
recognised as  potentially beneficial for innovation.  But the perspective remains narrow in  different 
respects.  Too much of the analysis  is  focused  on major innovations and too little  on incremental 
technical and  organisational change.  In most sectors the spill-over argument for allowing alliances 
should be replaced by its opposite; the stickiness of knowledge. In this and in other respects there is 
a need to be more specific in relation to the characteristics of  the sectors involved. 
But the most important issue is  that competition has become extremely fierce - and that borders 
between markets and between competitors and collaborators are disappearing - in most areas which 
are exposed to new developments in  international trade and  deregulation and that these trends are 
likely  to  continue.  Therefore  a  broader  definition  of competition  policy  is  needed  which  also 
encompasses  the  positioning  of European firms  in  global  knowledge-intensive  networks  and  the 
access of  less advanced players to such networks. 
And,  most important of all,  a major problem in the world economy is that the intense competition 
and  the  acceleration  of innovation  in  different  ways  may  now  threaten the  sustainability  of the 
learning economy. Social exclusion, environmental problems and shallow knowledge-production may 
be the results if  current developments are left unhampered or even uncritically supported by policy. A 
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of life-long learning.  Special emphasis should be given to the weaker regions and  workers and to 
helping them to enhance their learning capabilities. These initiatives need to be complemented with a 
global European strategy aimed at positioning European finns in world-wide production networks 
and supporting the developmental potential of poorer countries. A major threat to the sustainability 
of  the world economy is the massive population flows that might result from a combination of  wider 
income gaps and shorter distance world-wide. 
This chapter has tried to identify new trends in the economy where research is still in its early stages. 
Some of the reasoning in this chapter is  hypothetical and based on preliminary studies that call for 
more analysis.  The issues are,  however,  closely related to the content of the TSER programme of 
research. They go across the TSER research agenda that combines technology and innovation with 
issues related to social polarisation and human resource development. 
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Introduction 
The general purpose of  this exercise is to communicate results from on-going research in the TSER 
programme to policy-makers in  charge of innovation policy.  It is  important to  note that what is 
presented in the report is not just a passive summing up of results from the seven projects covered -
which should not be done until the projects are finalised.  The process of producing the report has 
been an interactive one, with the authors playing an active role in presenting a 'vision' to the project 
leaders and  to other experts on several  occasions.  The results from  the seven projects have been 
crucial building blocks for the overall vision and  they have helped flesh it out.  Still,  some of the 
policy areas covered in the report (such as "organisation of  the firm"  and "competition policy") were 
only marginally covered by the TSER projects and they have been included because they are essential 
elements in a coherent vision. They also signal important priorities for future TSER research. 
The procedure followed  reflects  our conviction that innovation  policy  should  be  given  a  clearer 
direction and that the role of  innovation policy in the broader strategies of  economic policy should be 
better understood. As can be seen from part two of  this report, innovation is an extremely complex 
process affected  by  specific  sectoral  and  social  characteristics,  so  it  is  difficult  to present  simple 
models of  general validity and to end up with rule-of-thumb policy recommendations. In this respect, 
innovation policy may be contrasted, for instance,  with monetary policy,  which is  based on much 
simpler models and also on a simple (too simplistic we would say) vision of  the world. To a certain 
degree this difference reflects real  differences between the world of technology  and  the world of 
finance. But it is also true that innovation policy is hampered by the lack of  simple rules to follow. In 
the present situation, where everything points to the need for a much more active innovation policy, 
and for closer coordination of innovation policy with  other policy areas,  this lack of clarity is,  of 
course, especially problematic. 
Our response to this challenge has been to present a simplified vision of  the world which, we believe, 
most experts in the field,  including people directly involved in  organising innovation activities, will 
recognise.  The vision  is  analytically  based  since  it  is  compatible with  results  from  the  on-going 
research in the TSER projects covered in this pilot action but it is still a 'model' of  the world since it 
includes generalisations not all well established by systematic research. These 'missing links' may be 
used to give direction to the development of  future research programmes in the TSER programme or 
other socio-economic research activities. 
In this last chapter, we shall take the process of simplification and generalisation one step further. 
The results of the whole report will be presented in schematic form and an attempt will be made to 
bring out the essence of  the report as succinctly as possible. First, we shall present the basic model of 
causality lying  behind  the  analysis.  Secondly,  we shall  present the most  pertinent  changes in  the 
parameters  of the  model  linked  to  'the globalising  learning  economy'.  A  broad  set  of policy 
instruments will then be linked to the model and the policy instruments specifically intended to affect 
innovation will be discussed in relation to the model and to different levels of government.  Finally, 
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the model: a narrower one aimed at speeding up innovation and a broader one explicitly taking into 
account the costs of change and the sustainability of the learning economy.  At the very end of the 
chapter we shall present some reflections on the need for further socio-economic research. 
The model 
The basic model underlying the structure of  the report is shown in Diagram I 0  .1. 
Diagram 10.1. The basic model 
I  Transfonnation pressure 
I  Ability to innovate and adapt to change 
Costs and benefits of  change and their social and spatial distribution 
This basic model may be further specified by identifying some of  the strategic variables at each level. 
Transformation pressure 
One of  the most fundamental factors affecting the transformation pressure is technical change. New 
technological opportunities in the form of new products and new processes directly affect us all.  A 
second major factor is the competition regime. New entrants into markets and extensions of  markets 
bringing in new competitors located elsewhere are factors that increase the transformation pressure. 
Governance regimes - the role of  ownership and finance in managing the firms - affect the intensity 
but  also  the  direction  of the transformation  pressure.  Finally  the  macroeconomic  stance  affects 
transformation pressure. For instance a situation characterised by deflationary policies and an over-
evaluated currency rate implies strong transformation pressure, as  do  aggressive trade union wage 
policies. 
Ability to innovate and adapt to change 
A key to successful innovation is to have a strong knowledge base including an R&D capacity and : 
well-trained labour force. But as indicated by the concept 'innovation system' many different  agent~ 
organisations, institutions and policies combine to determine the ability to innovate.  Adaptation t, 
change can take many forms and this is the subject of  on-going debates on economic policy. FlexibJ 
labour markets may be at the core of  adaptation in some innovation systems while others adapt mot 
through functional flexibility  within  organisations.  The  creation  of new firms  may  be  a  key  1 
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adaptability and innovation in  some systems while others rely more on innovating and reorienting 
the activities of  existing  firms. 
Costs and benefits of change and their social and spatial distribution 
The different forms of adaptability characterising an innovation system will distribute the costs and 
benefits differently. In a system based on flexible  labour markets the primary costs will be born by 
marginal workers while the costs will be shared between employers and employees in systems where 
firms  assume long-term responsibility for their employees.  Governments may compensate marginal 
workers through social policies and through labour market policies so that the actual costs born by 
marginal workers are reduced and shared by the community. 
The spatial distribution of costs and benefits will  reflect regional and  national abilities to innovate 
and  to  adapt  to  change.  The  nature  of the  transformation  pressure  may  favour  the  particular 
institutional set-ups prevalent in some innovation systems and inhibit others. What might be an ideal 
set-up in  one period may not be so  in  the next,  and  it  usually takes decades rather than years to 
fundamentally reorient regional and national systems of  innovation. 
The g/oba/ising learning economy 
In this report we have pointed to changes at all the three levels of  the basic model presented above. 
Diagram 10.2. Major trends in the globalising learning economy 
Intensification of  transformation pressure 
New demands on the ability to innovate and adapt to change 
Uneven distribution of  the costs and benefits of  change 
We have shown how fiercer competition and accelerating change give rise to stronger transformation 
pressure. We have pointed out the need for greater ability to innovate especially when it comes to 
building new relationships within and between organisations.  Finally we have pointed to trends in 
labour markets and in regional development indicating a more uneven distribution of the costs and 
benefits of change. Now we will briefly look at the major factors involved at each of these three 
levels. 
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The  development  and  widespread  use  of new  technologies  and  especially  of information  and 
cemmunication technologies has transformed fundamental aspects of  the economy such as time and 
space. It has brought new players into the world trade game, especially from Asia,  speeded up long-
distance  information  exchange  as  well  as  innovation  processes  and  opened  the  way  for .radical 
transformations of  all economic (and social) activities. 
The wider set of competitors in  world trade  also  reflects  deregulation of trade and  international 
financial  flows  as  well  as  transport  technologies  that  make  it less  and  less  expensive  to  move 
commodities and people over long distances. 
The collapse of  the Soviet system and the inflationary crisis of  the seventies have changed the vision 
of general  economic policy,  giving  greater emphasis to the role of market regulation  and  less  to 
government interventions that reduce market competition. Privatisation and deregulation increase the 
transformation pressure on parts of  the economy that have so far been sheltered. 
i 
These  are  the  main  factors  which  increase  transformation  pressure.  An  important  point  in  our I 
argument is  that certain mechanisms in the system reinforce this tendency by introducing circular 
·causality. Selection mechanisms in product and labour markets favour change-oriented organisations 
and individuals and thus increase the transformation pressure. 
It is  difficult  to see  what  endogenous  mechanisms  might  halt  this  tendency.  The  full  impact  of 
information  technology  has  yet  to  be  felt:  new  entrants  into  world  trade  are  on  their way  and 
deregulation  still  awaits  most  countries  and  international  organisations.  The  main  limits  to the 
process might be 'exogenous' and have to do with increasing costs in terms of potential social and 
environmental crises that might trigger popular resistance. The attention increasingly being given to 
ethical,  environmental  and  social  strategies  in  big  firms  reflects  a  growing  anxiety  about  such 
developments and  an insight that, in  the absence of both external regulation and  self-restraint, the 
pressure for change might become too strong. 
New demands on the ability to innovate and adapt to change 
In this area, the TSER projects point to a new mode of knowledge-production and to the need to 
rethink most of the institutions and  organisations that constitute the knowledge infrastructure. The 
new context puts a premium on interactivity within and between firms,  and between firms  and the 
knowledge infrastructure. These changes are reflected in new and more stringent demands regardinB 
the qualifications of employees  and  management.  The  ability  to  combine  abstract reasoning witt 
social  skills  in  communication and  co-operation,  including  inter-disciplinary  co-operation,  is  no~ 
more important than before. The delegation of  responsibility to employees reflects the fact that rapi< 
learning  can  take  place  only  in  a  democratic  working  environment.  Services,  and  especiall: 
knowledge intensive services, tend to become much more important, both in their own right and fo 
overall industrial dynamics. 
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innovative firm  are similar to those of the functionally flexible  firm.  The kind of external network 
relationships most conducive to innovation are also similar to those which favour flexible response. 
More uneven social and spatial distribution of the costs and benefits of change 
The most immediate benefit to consumers is growing productivity, lower prices and a higher level of 
consumption. Another primary benefit is that members of innovative and flexible organisations may 
earn a premium or at least avoid bankruptcy.  In newly industrialised areas there may be dramatic 
increases in per capita consumption. 
Figures seem to indicate that, on balance, distribution of  benefits has become more uneven during the 
last decade,  at least within the OECD area.  Profit shares seem to have grown at the cost of wage 
shares  in  all  parts of OECD  since  the  middle  of the  seventies  (OECD,  1994b,  p.  22).  Earning 
differentials between skilled  and unskilled  workers have grown in  the Anglo-Saxon countries and 
differences  in  employment  opportunities  between  more  or  less  skilled  labour  categories  have 
increased  in  those as well  as  in  the  other European countries  (op.cit.  p.  22-23).  TSER research 
demonstrates that the differences  in  income  between rich  and  poor regions  in  Europe remained 
substantial through the eighties (Fagerberg, Verspagen and Caniels, 1997). 
The nature of  the costs of  change are quite different for those leading the field and for those lagging 
behind. This is true for people as well as regions. People who are frontrunners may experience stress, 
a shortage of  time and work overload while laggards may experience exclusion from the core of the 
economy and be relegated to passive consumption of mass-produced entertainment.  From a social 
point of  view the extreme demands on the learning capability of  the workforce made by rapid change 
and intensive competition is costly in that fewer people participate actively in the labour market. 
The  flourishing  regions,  taking  Silicon  Valley  as  the  prototype,  will  experience  congestion, 
environmental  problems,  rocketing real  estate prices  and  labour market bottlenecks.  The laggard 
regions  will  be  characterised  by  poverty,  unemployment  and  other  typical  underdevelopment 
characteristics. What is new in this context is that the accelerating pace of change makes access to 
communication  infrastructures  even  more  important,  and  investment  in  local  knowledge 
infrastructures has an even more vital role in breaking the vicious circles of  underdevelopment. 
Another set of  costs arising from rapid change and which now need to be tackled are those relating 
to global and local environmental problems: new industrialisation and the intensification of  transport 
increasingly threaten the basic conditions for human life. 
Policy alternatives 
Three kinds of  policy considerations follow from this basic model. The first has to do with striking a 
balance  between  the  three  levels  in  the  model  and  coordinating  innovation  policy  in  broader 
strategies.  The  second  has  to do  with  increasing  our ability  to  exploit  the  potential  for  change 
through innovation policy.  The third points to a different mode of innovation policy that takes into 
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account the full  consequences of  the analysis presented above, including the costs of  change and the 
risk oftechnologicallock-in. 
Creating  a  balance  between  transformation  pressure,  innovative  capability  and 
distributional objectives 
There are packages of policies that affect each of the three levels and this can be illustrated as  in 
Diagram  10.3.  (below).  A  major  problem  is  the  tendency  to  disregard  the  interaction  between 
policies  operating at the  different  levels.  Deregulation policy  may,  for  instance,  aim  at reducing 
protectionism  for  a  particular  sector  and  have  as  its  main  result  an  increase  in  the  pool  of 
unemployed unskilled labour: yet, at the same time, government, through its labour market policies, 
may try to create low-productivity protected jobs through wage subsidies.  Without  co-ordination 
different policies might undermine each other's effectiveness. 
It is obvious that the costs and benefits arising from increasing pressure for change will  reflect our 
ability to innovate and adapt. We have argued that transformation pressure may become too strong, 
resulting  in  social  polarisation  and  social  exclusion.  Policy  initiatives  on  human  resource 
development and  innovation may  reduce the problem if properly designed.  Redistribution  policies 
may compensate losers. But in all cases the policy package aimed at affecting the pressure for change 
should be designed in such a way as to take into account our ability to innovate as well as the scope 
for redistribution. 
This problem is especially serious since such packages are distributed unevenly between the regional, 
national and European levels. One of  the major impacts of  EMU is that it ensures that the first policy 
package moves from the national to the European level.  Despite the need for better coordination, 
implementation of  this policy package is increasingly left to semi-autonomous institutions not subject 
to  direct  democratic  control  (the  courts  for  competition  policy  and  central  banks  for  monetary 
policy).  The  other  two  packages  remain  largely  the  responsibility  of national  and  regional 
governments.  There are European initiatives in  the field  of innovation policy and  human  resource 
development, while the regional funds aim at tackling social and regional distributional issues. but in 
both cases the resources involved are small  when compared to national resources.  (The exception, 
the  Common  Agricultural  Policy,  goes  to the  other  extreme,  in  protecting  the  socio-economic 
interests of  a specific social group with little reference to any socio-economic rationale.) 
A major issue is  whether this  division  of labour is  sustainable,  even in  the medium  term  A.'·  the 
pressure  for  change  builds,  and  currently  European-wide  policies  tend  to  increase  rat:-to..·f  than 
decrease it, the social costs may grow and popular resistance to the whole project might become:  M1 
strong that the EU would either have to reduce the pressure or become much  more active in  the 
other two policy areas. The first alternative would probably involve negotiations to reach worldwide 
agreement on social  (and  environmental)  standards.  The  other side of the coin is  that  intensified 
global competition and the increasing difficulty of levying taxes in the new Internet trading regim€ 
might  tempt  national  governments  and  regional  authorities  to  compete  by  reducing  social  anc 
environmental protection or enter into global tournaments where subsidies are used to attract foreigr 
capital. 
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consequences of change 
Transformation pressure 
Macro-economic policies 
Competition policies 
Trade policies 
Ability to innovate and adapt to change 
Human resource development policies 
Labour market policies 
Innovation policies 
Redistribution of  costs and benefits of  change 
Tax and other income transfer policies 
Social policy 
Regional policy 
Increasing the ability to innovate- moving along the technological trajectory 
In Chapters 5-9 we outlined new principles for a policy aimed at keeping abreast in the innovation 
race.  The most basic principle is to create a learning economy that can cope with rapid change and 
be  successful  in  developing  new  products  and  services.  This  involves  policies  aimed  at  human 
resource development, creating new forms of  organisation, building innovative networks, redirecting 
innovation policy towards service sectors and involving universities in the innovation process. 
Human resource development 
There is  a growing consensus among scholars and policy-makers on the need for radical change in 
policies aimed at human resource development.  The problem is  the huge gap between the official 
rhetoric and what is actually taking place. While everyone agrees that what we really need is a school 
system  which  increases  the  ability  to  acquire  both  theoretical  knowledge  and  social  skills,  the 
education system does not change very much. Financial pressures on governments trying to qualify 
for EMU result in resource scarcity that makes experimentation and radical reform difficult. Business 
leaders, scholars and policy-makers also agree on the need for life-long learning, and on the need for 
new teaching methods better suited to slow learners,  but there are few  incentives to actually  do 
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issues.  The  most  fundamental  need  is  not  to  standardise  curricula  internationally  but  rather  to 
establish  flexible  norms  and  standards  making  sure  that  sufficient  resources  are  allocated  to 
education and that the activities are designed so that they respond to the new context. It is almost 
tautological to point  out that the economic future  of Europe will  reflect,  above  all,  the learning 
ability  of its  citizens.  Paradoxically,  it  is  much  easier  to  reach  agreement  at European level  on 
subsidising agriculture than it is to agree on the necessary means to realise a community-wide human 
resource development plan. 
New forms of organisation 
An organisational revolution is  now taking place and  European firms  have enormous unexploited 
potential  in  this  respect.  The  full  benefits  of information  technology  can  be  reaped  only  if new 
organisational  forms  develop.  New  forms  of organisation  that  increase  interconnection  and 
interaction between departments are the key to accelerating innovation. Forms of organisation will 
always  reflect  national  characteristics  and  the  broader  social  and  institutional  context,  including 
industrial relations,  education systems and  industrial  structures. Nevertheless,  new broadly-defined 
better-practice  organisational  trajectories  can  now  be  discerned  and  policy-makers  should  help 
management  and  workers to move  ahead  along  these  paths.  It will  mean  moving  towards more 
horizontal communication, more intense communication inside and  outside the firm,  and delegating 
responsibility to the workers. The EU should stimulate research in this area and establish a forum for 
the exchange of  experiences. The "Made in Europe" project established in connection with the TSER 
programme should be given high priority. 
Building innovative networks 
One of  the most dramatic changes in the learning economy is the growing importance of  networking 
and inter-firm co-operation in connection with innovation. It reflects the growing pace of  change, but 
also  the growing complexity of the innovation process,  where each single innovation has  to build 
upon several  disparate technologies and  where each technology has  to combine  several  scientific 
disciplines. Public policy has different roles to play here. Competition policy may need to be changed 
if it is to respond to the full implications of  the new regime.  The formation of  networks of  firms and 
expert or learning institutions may be encouraged at different levels.  At regional level, the formation 
of knowledge-intensive networks is  a key to regional development. The different forms of regional 
networking in Europe have been analysed in the Cook TSER project (see for instance Cook,  1997, 
and Todtling and Sedlacek, 1997). At European level, the formation of  networks and consortia may 
help to create a more interdependent and  coherent innovation system and make European industry 
more competitive. There are two caveats to be borne in mind here. 
Firstly, it is difficult to design effective public policies in this area.  The right parties must be brought 
together in  small  co-operative activities so that they can  start to build trust (Lazaric and Lorenz, 
1997). Public policy may try to support the formation of organisational routines which reduce the 
risks involved and to support grass roots initiatives to form new networks. Further research in this 
field is needed, including analyses of  the basic roles of  and reasons for network formation. 
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stimulate innovation.  At both regional  and  national  levels,  external networking may  be crucial  in 
order to stay ahead in the innovation race.  Experiences gained in ESPRIT and the generally weak 
state  of the  European  electronics  industry  point  to  the  need  for  extra-European  networking. 
Industrial districts may need greater interaction with external parties to avoid becoming locked into 
stagnating product areas. This implies a role for public policy in promoting the internationalisation of 
firms and the positioning of  big European firms in global networks. 
A new role for the service sector 
TSER research indicates that change is currently most dramatic in the service sector and that this will 
remain so for the time being. The Hauknes-project (see for instance Hauknes, 1996, Hauknes, 1997 
and  Miles,  1996) has  produced  a  a  broad  map  of innovation  in  services while  the the thematic 
network coordinated by Peter Wood has focused on the role of  knowledge-intensive services. 
These  contributions  show  that  better  analytical  understanding  of the  service  sector  is  of key 
importance for policy-making. The preliminary results from research indicate that parts of  the service 
sector - business services, communication services and other knowledge-intensive services - tend to 
become key sectors in relation to overall  industrial  dynamics.  They become central nodes  in  the 
innovation  system,  gathering  and  codifying  knowledge,  connecting  users  and  producers  of 
knowledge and distributing knowledge world-wide (Wood, 1997, Antonelli, 1997, Tomlinson, 1997, 
and  Tsounis,  1997).  The  traditional  focus  of  industrial  policy  on  the  competitiveness  of 
manufacturing firms is thus becoming less relevant. Services are increasingly important in their own 
right  as providers of wealth and jobs and  as  strategic elements in  innovation systems.  Rethinking 
regulatory  systems,  including  quality  control  systems,  so  that  they  promote  rather  than  block 
innovation in  these  sectors  is  one policy  task.  Another is  to promote more equal  access  to the 
services available to Sl\1Es and marginal regions. 
Integrating research institutions into the innovation system 
In this report we have accepted elements of the hypothesis proposed by Gibbons et al.  ( 1994) that 
we have  entered a new mode of knowledge-creation where there is  a  much  stronger connection 
between science and technology and where innovation will typically result from interaction among a 
multitude of actors in  many  different  institutions and  locations.  These developments  point  to the 
need to integrate knowledge production at universities more closely with the innovation process  But 
we have also warned against completely removing academic autonomy. The TSER thematic network 
coordinated by Keeble on "High-technology Sl\1Es" illustrates different regional and national models 
in this respect (Keeble and Wilkinson,  1997). In the case of Chalmer' s University in  Sweden.  the 
building of  new technology-oriented transdisciplinary centres seem to have been a major element in a 
successful  strategy.  The  TSER project  coordinated  by  Jones-Evans  has  shown  the  diversity  of 
attempts in Europe to get universities more effectively involved in innovation, and also some of the 
difficulties encountered. It is obvious that local conditions are important but certain principles may 
be followed.  Matrix-forms of organisation (combining discipline-based departments with temporary 
inter-disciplinary centres), buffer organisations connecting universities with SMEs and the rotation of 
scholars between basic, applied and development research tasks are obvious policy initiatives in the 
new context. 
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So far, the focus has been on a set of  policies that will increase our ability to innovate and adapt in a 
rapidly-changing environment. As indicated earlier in this chapter, the costs of  rapid change and the 
negative  effects  of the  learning  economy  may  be  substantial.  A  number  of factors  make  it 
increasingly  difficult  to  leave  these  changes  to  'repair'  policies.  Large-scale  income  transfer  is 
becoming  more  and  more  difficult  in  the  context  of globalised  monetary  regimes  and  Internet 
transactions. This is one reason for proposing a wider perspective on innovation policy.  The other 
argument  has  to  do  with  exploitation/exploration  and  integration/flexibility  trade-offs.  Moving 
rapidly  ahead  on a well-established  technological  trajectoty might  discriminate  against  long-term 
efforts to create new ones. The kind of  innovation policy referred to in this section tackles the first 
problem and it may also help to solve the second one. 
Responding to the inherent contradictions in the global  ising learning economy 
The  package  of innovation  policies  presented  above  emphasises  the  need  to  develop  human 
resources  and  to integrate the  different  parts  of the  innovation  system  through  networking  and 
interaction. They affect the pace of  innovation and change rather than its direction. The alternative to 
be discussed here is a need-oriented innovation policy explicitly aimed at tackling issues raised by the 
gathering pace of innovation and  change.  There are too many  such needs to mention,  so  we will 
focus on two issues and use only the second of  these to illustrate the basic principles involved. 
They are: 
social and regional polarisation 
environmental threats from rapid change 
While  polarisation  is  a  question  of people  and  regions  becoming  economically  and  socially 
marginalised, the basic mechanism behind it increasingly has to do with competence, access to and 
participation  in  interactive  learning.  New ways  of exploiting  advanced  user-friendly  information 
technologies such as multi-media may be a key element in tackling these issues. Providing equal and 
effective  access  to  information  technology  and  communication  systems  in  marginal  regions  is 
another one. 
The  environmental  threats  call  for  immense  trans-disciplinaty  and  multi-technological  efforts.  A 
strategy for sustainable growth will include measuring what is going on at global level,  developing 
clean technologies in manufacturing and  transport, changing the incentive structures in  agriculture 
and forestry to use more environment-friendly techniques and changing our everyday way of  life. 
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In this  context  it  is  interesting  to  consider  the  historical  role  of government  in  moulding  the 
tachnological system around information and software technologies.
41  The major player in this field 
was, of course, the US military.  According to Mowery and Langlois (1996), the impact of military 
demands was dramatic especially in the early history of  the formation of  a new technological system. 
While the impact of direct procurement was important in this phase, the most significant influence 
came through the construction of expert and learning institutions, academic training and subsidised 
access to computers. The fact that universities were used as the base for developing new knowledge 
in the field  was critically important for the wide and  rapid  dissemination of the new technologies 
throughout the economy. The direct procurement of  software became less and less effective in spill-
over terms as it became increasingly oriented toward very specialised  military needs.  The authors 
also argue that attempts to design separate organisations outside universities and to pursue applied 
research aimed at specific private needs actually hinder the dissemination of  knowledge. 
These Cold War experiences, positive as  well  as  negative,  are worth considering.  In preparing this 
report we found  that new procurement  policies,  where public  agencies  organise  private users  in 
procurement aimed at saving energy, have been highly effective in affecting the direction of  technical 
change (Edquist, 1997, and Westling,  1997). The software example from the US illustrates that this 
kind of 'incremental' policy, if supplemented by broader and more massive intervention, might have 
long-term effects on the overall dynamics  of economic growth,  fostering  a new techno-economic 
paradigm. The idea is not to designate the technological winners of the future:  nobody involved in 
the early stages of building the software knowledge infrastructure had  any  idea that this  specific 
technology would revolutionise the economy and neither did those initiating the embryonic Internet. 
But the massive concentration of expertise on solving a set of common problems had the indirect 
effect of  opening up radically new technological avenues. 
42 
The environmental field is different from the military field in being closer to private markets. As new 
regulations  are  introduced,  e.g.  making  the  polluter  pay,  new  markets  for  'green products'  are 
created.  Also,  the preferences of private and  collective consumers are affected by  'environmental 
learning' as the non-sustainability and risks of  following present strategies are realised. In the case of 
defence  expenditure,  the  problems  of 'spin-off'  were  much  more  intricate,  often  involving  very 
specific use and a lot of  secrecy. The 'weakness' of  the environmental case is that the interest groups 
41  This section is inspired by a Master Thesis on the relationships between the development of 
civilian and military technologies in the US (Rogaczewska, 1997). 
42 The analysis of  CIS-data for Italy indicate according to Pianta and Sirilli (1997) that the impact of 
environmental policy on innovation has actually been stronger than policies directly oriented toward 
promoting innovation. This points to the enormous potential in co-ordinating innovation and 
environment policies. 
- 161-behind the military industrial complex in the US were so much stronger than the popular alliances 
currently acting in the field of  environmental issues. 
43 
Building new technological systems 
It is  useful to think in terms of 'technological systems' as  a special version of innovation systems 
(See Carlson, 1995 and several of  the working papers from the Edquist project, such as for instance 
Smith,  1997,  Johnson  and  Gregersen,  1997,  and  Malerba,  1997).  A  technological  system  is  a 
combination of  interrelated sectors and firms,  a set of  institutions and regulations characterising the 
rules of  behaviour and the knowledge infrastructure connected to it, all focused on the same braodly 
defined technology. It may be argued that most of  the innovation policies referred to above are well-
suited to supporting existing technological  systems but much less  suited to helping to create new 
ones. 
In the case of  environmental innovation the following elements may be crucial for success in building 
a new technological system focused on environmental challenges: 
establishing flexible  but demanding standards in  an  interaction between users and  producers -
this implies creating markets for green products and  procurement policies involving  private as 
well as public users~ 
establishing  institutes  responsible  for  systematically  measuring  and  evaluating  the  crucial 
environment parameters; 
stimulating experimental new initiatives in building training and research centres in crucial fields: 
such initiatives may be trans-disciplinary, combining elements from a small number of  disciplines~ 
strengthening the links between environmental policy,  innovation policy and general  economic 
policy. 
Such  a  model,  in  which  the  core  elements  are  market  creation,  building  new  lnov.IC'dtrt 
infrastructure and policy coordination, might be used in  other areas where the globalising  lcMNng 
economy tends to undermine its own logic. 
It might also be regarded as a way of  shaping the institutions and structure of  production so that tht 
innovation system becomes better suited to future market developments. One of  the major results of 
the Verspagen project (see for instance Laursen,  1997, Verspagen,  1997, and Dalum,  Laursen and 
Villumsen,  1997) is  that the structure of production affects economic growth,  and  that  Europe· s 
lack of  specialisation in electronics has slowed down growth and job creation. It has proved almost 
43 For a TSER-project analysis of  social movements and environmental policy see Jamison and 
0stbye (1997). 
-162-impossible to correct this weakness through science and technology policies (the experience gained 
in the ESPRIT programme illustrates this). The alternative sketched here takes into account the fact 
that the European market is one of  the biggest in the world: setting new standards and creating new 
markets while at the same time building new technological systems may be seen as a way of shaping 
the future rather than trying to adjust to it when it has already become a fact. 
A European agenda for innovation policy 
There are different kinds of arguments for pursuing policies at European level.  The implications of 
the principle of subsidiarity are not always clear and simple.  To define what can be done as well,  or 
better,  at national  or regional level  is  not just a technical  issue.  For instance,  the mechanism that 
makes  the  EMU  a  natural  step  has  to  do  with  earlier  steps  to  deregulate  financial  flows 
internationally. 
Reviewing  the different  aspects  of innovation  policy  discussed  in  this  summary,  we believe  that 
action at European level should: 
use Europe's strength in  world trade negotiations to avoid trade and  competition regulations 
that hamper innovation,  including  radical  innovations,  or that block  need-oriented  innovation 
policies; 
stimulate  international  openness  in  knowledge  production  and  distribution,  and  position 
European firms in global production networks and in global competition; 
ensure  that  the  pressure  for  change  is  bearable  for  people  and  regions,  and  take  greater 
responsibility for shaping their ability to absorb and cope with rapid change; 
encourage local experiments,  assess the results and  stimulate European policy  development in 
the fields of  human resource development, organisational change, network formation and linking 
industry to knowledge-intensive services and universities; 
establish flexible European standards in  the field  of knowledge production and  in  other areas 
where there are clear economies of  scale. 
build European information infrastructures; 
initiate  need-oriented  innovation  policies,  create  new  markets  and  build  new  technological 
systems. 
Many of these elements are  already on the European agenda as  specified  in  the  Green Paper on 
innovation and in the outline of  the next Framework Programme, although the TSER projects point 
to lacunae and bias in the agenda.  In the follow-up to the Green Paper there is  still a tendency to 
design policy on the basis of the linear model  of thinking  about innovation and  to underestimate 
- 163-certain aspects of  innovation such as the role of  human resources, competent users, demand factors 
and organisational change. 
The new more need- and problem oriented approach of  the fifth Framework Programme is much in 
line with the argument in this report.  So is the emphasis given to environmental problems.  At the 
same  time,  it  bears  a  strong  mark  of having  been  designed  by  experts  in  natural  science  and 
technology.  There  are  few· references  to  social  problems  such  as  polarisation  and  the  science-
technology  response  is  almost  exclusively  defined  in  terms  of natural  science  and  technology. 
Apparently, it has not been recognised that economic performance as well as the success in tackling 
environmental  problems will  reflect  organisational  capabilities  and  human  resource  development. 
Bringing in results from TSER-projects in the European policy discourse may help to correct this 
bias and give a better understanding of the potential contributions from the social sciences and the 
humanities. 
Elements of  an agenda for socio-economic research 
The limited scope of  this exercise - seven projects mainly focused on technology policy issues - does 
not allow us to propose an encompassing research agenda.  Here we will just mention some topics 
that seem to need further research, given the general vision of  the world presented in the report. 
There is  a need for at least three types of social  science projects in  the future.  One type aims  at 
integrating the results of projects with different  orientations in terms of disciplines and  objectives. 
Projects of the second type focus on specific sectors where too little is known.  The third type are 
more directly concerned with supporting the policy agenda indicated in this report.  In all  cases the 
promotion of specific  research projects may  be  combined  with creating new infrastructure at the 
European level or with a European perspective. 
The learning economy is a complex phenomenon where the social dimension is  important because 
interactive learning is basically a social process, and because the learning economy has an impact on 
social patterns such as inclusion and exclusion. We need research that gives better understanding of 
the role of learning and knowledge in  an  economic perspective, but also inter-disciplinary research 
bringing together economists and sociologists, and experts in cognitive science and communication. 
We need to analyse the role of social cohesion and trust as a prerequisite for learning.  Finally,  we 
need  to  understand  how  learning  takes  place  in  time  and  space.  What  are  the  implications  of 
information technology for the codification of  knowledge and for the accessibility of different kinds 
of knowledge and learning across regional and national borders in the future? This is an agenda for 
both basic and applied research. Perhaps TSER projects should aim to establish one or two centres 
for studying the learning economy/society at European level. 
In the field  of economics, there is a particular need to continue examining the interaction between 
competition, co-operation and innovation as well as the role of  intra- and inter-organisational change 
in  radical  innovation.  The  new  modes  of evolutionary,  structuralist  and  institutionalist  economic 
analysis  referred  to in  Chapter 3  have  been  extremely  useful  in  helping  us  understand  the  new 
features  of the globalising learning  economy.  These analytical  developments  are  not  yet  properly 
anchored in solid academic institutions.  Consideration should therefore be given to establishing one 
or two European centres for studying evolutionary/structuralist economics. Another reason for doing 
-164-so is that this is an area where Europe has a lead over US economists, who are even more hampered 
by the neo-classical tradition. 
Turning to specific problems,  we would emphasise the need to understand the role of the service 
sectors  in  the  overall  dynamics  of innovation  and  economic  growth.  It  is  also  important  to 
understand  the  changing  extent  of intemationalisation  and  competition  intensity.  Labour  market 
research and analysis of  education and training also need to focus more explicitly on service sectors. 
There is a need for data sets,  research institutions and taxonomies to sort out the heterogeneous 
nature of  the service sectors. Again the formation of new centres with a European outlook may be 
useful. 
Finally,  our  policy  conclusions  point  to the  need  for  a  systematic  and  historical  overview  and 
assessment  of policy  development  and  especially  for  better  understanding  of the  impact  of 
government efforts to stimulate innovation in the context of  need-oriented policies, not least relating 
to human  resource  development  and  environmental  problems.  Such  projects  might  continue  the 
analysis of past experiences with technological forecasting and with the use of  interactive media to 
involve policy-makers. In this area it is important that new institutions combine autonomy from the 
executive European authorities with a close connection to the political  process.  Connecting these 
activities to the European Parliament could be a natural response to this dilemma.  The aim  of the 
research would be to give regional, national and European policy-makers inspiration for bold action 
in areas crucial for the sustainability of  the learning economy and for Europe's long-term innovative 
capability. 
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